Abstract

The nature of democratic governance has without doubt been the most important problem of the first three decades of the twenty-first century. The question which this paper seeks to address is how to assess the changing perceptions and nature of democratic governance and the shift towards a more internationalised framework in which international and regional bodies have acquired greater powers to protect and enforce citizens’ democratic rights. Today, external judgements are regularly made as to the democratic nature of governing regimes and a broad range of regulatory powers are in place to deter retrogressive shifts towards either authoritarianism or anarchy and state failure. This paper will consider the problems over the last few decades and likely prospects for the present world in 2030 in selected geographical areas where there have been significant changes in the practices and institutions of democratic governance: the United States, European Union, Russian Federation of States, Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, India and China. It concludes that although the extension of democracy across many regions of the world and at the regional and global levels has undoubtedly been a positive development, it has been difficult to turn the global consensus on the need for democracy and good governance into a reality for all. Furthermore, it would appear that despite the progress in developing and safeguarding democracy there is still more work to be done in the coming decades to ensure that the prevention of intra- and inter-state conflict, complete adaptation to global codes of sustainable development and climate change, and full security against fundamentalist political extremism can be achieved.

Introduction: The Internationalisation of Democracy

It appears that the further we have progressed into the twenty-first century the more obvious it has become that democracy is both more necessary and more problematic
than we had generally understood to be the case in 2000. On the one hand, it is now clear in 2030 that we have seen tremendous changes in an understanding of the importance for democracy, for a wide range of social, economic and political problems – as a vital part of the solution for addressing poverty, the spread of disease, the adaptation to climate change, the amelioration of conflict and of social and political alienation which is understood to lead to growing support for political fundamentalism and to increasingly arbitrary acts of individual violence. On the other hand, the difficulties of realising the goal of developing democracy, in many regions of the world, have become increasingly clear. Francis Fukuyama’s prediction at the birth of the post-Cold War era that the global consensus that liberal democracy was the only possible form of government would lead to the ‘End of History’ was proved to be over optimistic. In fact, the difficulties of promoting democratic transition and stability led to a lengthy period during which there was a reconsideration of the definitions and institutional frameworks associated with liberal democratic regimes, the real shift in democratic thinking and international policy-making only came with the United Nations formalisation of the need to link democratic governance with international institutional oversight and regulation.

The end of the Cold War gradually brought with it both a universal consensus on the need for democracy and the realisation that transitions to democracy could be painstaking and problematic without the development of international regulatory regimes. Until around 2015, the frameworks of democratisation and democratic consolidation were still dominant in policy circles, while in academia they had been increasingly criticised in the foregoing five to ten years. In policy institutions, the assumption was that democratic values and institutions would gradually develop within post-conflict societies. International regulation was seen as generally only necessary to provide a kick-start to the process and maybe to provide funding support to the civil society sector or to provide educational or training support to ensure the professionalism of the media and the election process. While it was clear that democracy could not take root ‘overnight’ in societies where it had long been absent or had never existed, there was little focus on the long-term role of the international community and mistaken assumptions about the ‘naturalness’ or ‘inevitability’ of democratic growth.
It took a long time for international institutions to learn the lessons of the expansion of democracy over the last forty years. While initially mistakes were made in the Balkans, Caucuses, Russia and Central Asia with assumptions that the fall of Soviet rule would enable a rapid transition to Western forms of democracy and later with regard to African political reform processes, the issue of reform of the Middle East took centre stage in the wake of the collapse and informal de facto division of the Iraqi state. The crisis of the Middle East was also formative in reform of the United Nations and the creation of a new two-tier system of membership, making democracy and external accountability essential for membership of the international law-making body.

One of the reasons, for what (by 2030’s standards) seems a peculiar reluctance to see the need for democratic mechanisms of accountability to stretch outside and above states to international bodies as well as downwards towards citizens, was leading Western actors’ concerns about being accused of ‘imperialism’ - of exercising regulation for their own interests - another problem was the reluctance of the United States to push for international institutions to have formally constituted regulatory powers. In fact, it was only in 2015 that the United States Supreme Court formally agreed that international law took precedence over the US Constitution, although in reality this had already been increasingly the case for a number of years. One other reason, increasingly commented upon, was the deep ideological roots of liberal enlightenment thought with its teleological assumptions towards progress and assumptions that Western experiences and institutions would inevitably be replicated in the rest of the world, the rejection of this type of teleological thinking, and the recognition of the permanence of imperfection and vulnerability, has been a major factor in global democratic theorising in this century.

Over the last twenty years it has become universally accepted that democracy and internationalisation go hand-in-hand with each other. The experiences of international intervention in the resolution of conflicts, removal of human rights abusing regimes and the war against terrorism, established a large body of international experience in which many lessons were learned from the mistakes of poor international co-ordination, short-termist thinking and premature withdrawal of international armed forces and peace-builders. From numerous studies undertaken and the experience of
long-term analysis of numerous different forms of international assistance to problematic or failing states it became clear that rather than democracy being a ‘silver bullet’ or magic solution to social problems, the transitional path to democracy was, in fact, highly problematic. Against the intuitions of many, social conflict and instability was more likely to take place in regimes making a transition towards extended democracy than they were in regimes which maintained authoritarian controls. This was not an argument for authoritarianism but a cautionary lesson in the need to manage reform gradually within tight networks of external international institutional oversight. The reforms of the United Nations and the merging and reform of the international financial institutional bodies, bringing together the World Bank, IMF and other bodies under the World Development and Sustainability Bank (WDSB) has enabled much tighter controls on financial and economic policies and the investigation and reigning in of corruption and other forms of misrule in countries supported by new long-term international policy mechanisms.

The United States

The twenty-first century has seen the transformation of democracy in the wake of the war on terror and widespread voter disillusionment with the formal political process in the United States. Many analysts agree that the shift in approach of the US government to international law and international institutions was as much a response to domestic questions of democratic legitimacy as it was to the need to enforce international institutions for international security reasons. With increasing cynicism and estrangement from the political process, it became increasingly difficult for the US to marshal its resources and manpower in the service of international peace and democracy. The consequences of the US public’s unwillingness to support the US as the world’s ‘policeman’ capable of pursuing a unilateralist strategy, if necessary outside of the formal requirements of international law and international bodies, such as the United Nations, led to the US belatedly taking a leading role in supporting the reform of the institutions of global governance.

The relationship between the domestic political process in the US and the developments this century in the internationalisation of democracy has been often remarked upon. For many commentators, particularly those in European institutes, the
American ‘political malaise’ has been a fortunate and opportune one for the future of democracy on a global scale. Public disillusionment with America’s ‘special’ mission towards the end of first decade of the century, in many ways repeating the Vietnam experience and social division of the ‘culture wars’, did not lead to a renewed period of isolationism, but to the gradual integration of US engagement in international bodies which in the process came under pressure to reform.

As the democratic mandate for US administrations became problematic, with the fall in voting numbers and increasing factionalism within the main parties, the US administrations have increasingly sought to claim their legitimacy and their democratic mandate through the role which the US plays within international institutions. The importance of the export of democracy, through international institutions such as the United Nations, has helped in preserving a view of US mission which was in danger of fading domestically. At the same time, international bodies have - especially since the 2015 Supreme Court decision - played a larger role in US domestic legal issues. Under the new global human rights jurisdiction, crucial issues, such as the homeland security powers of detention and exile were successfully given the stamp of international approval overcoming the domestic stand-off in the Supreme Court.

The United States has for many years argued that the problematic nature of democracy which necessitates international oversight and new regimes of regulation, is no more evident than in America itself. The decline in the vote, widespread citizen unrest in major cities and the increasing security restrictions over the last few decades have made the US a much less libertarian and more regulated society, where the need to protect democracy has become increasingly important. However, the security restrictions, such as the ban on gun ownership in many of the states and restrictions on carrying and storing arms in others, have done little to slow the widespread use of firearms by illegal street gangs and localised militia. The fact that many inner-city zones appear to be ungovernable and have had to be fenced-off demonstrates the fact that democracy alone does not necessarily guarantee social peace or local sustainability.
The transformation in the relationship between the US and global institutions, such as the United Nations, has been subject to varying interpretations. For many analysts, especially European voices, the reform of UN bodies and the bringing in of full and associate member status, has been crucial in establishing global democracy, firstly, by making full membership dependent on international agreement that democratic standards are met, and secondly ensuring that UN decision-making processes meet the highest democratic standards and are not watered-down by governments with a weaker democratic tradition. For other commentators, especially those from the states which currently have associate and limited voting rights, the reform of the UN is seen to reflect the power and influence of the US in the decision-making process, especially as China has increasingly sided openly with the US and the European Union and seems reluctant to use its influence to challenge the process of consensus decision-making.

**European Union**

The story of the extension of democracy this century could not be told without the story of the extension of the European Union. The increase in the formal membership of the European Union halted in 2025 with the membership of Israel, the Palestinian Territories and Turkey. The Brussels Council will reopen the question of progress towards membership in five years time with the Regional Association of North Africa States (RANAS) - whose members, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt are keen to institutionalise the ties established under the Democratisation and Sustainability process over the last fifteen years - and with the Eastern European Union Association (EEUA) states, Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and Georgia.

While some commentators argue that the enlargement of the full membership of the European Union has made decision-making increasingly unwieldy and less open to public debate and involvement, others argue that the economies of scale provided by the Brussels Council means that regulations can be implemented in nearly forty states with the possibility of increased security cooperation and the better coordination of measures to tackle arising health threats and measures to address climate change. In fact, the appreciation that security is a core democratic and human right has enabled the EU to put more emphasis on the ‘democracy of results’ rather than merely seeing...
democracy as a ‘process’, which was the case in the last century. As the perceived need for protection of the citizen has increased it has become increasingly clear that centralised directives and increasing uniformity of policing, surveillance and health-care systems has been a major benefit of European integration.

Within the European Union core states, those with permanent rotating Ministerial positions in the Brussels Council, the Union has become the key policy-actor as sovereignty at the level of the nation-state has become less and less important. The major shift in European politics came with the creation of European-wide parties as positions in the European parliament became more important than seats in the national governments. The merging of major traditional European parties and the creation of new political associations has been the product of a healthy European-wide debate on shared views of administrative goals and integrative values. This shift to the Union level has also been reflected in the way that national politics operates around European-wide time-tables, with fixed dates for elections at local, national and Union levels. For the states of the EU, even though the elected representatives at Union level have more of a consultation and oversight role than that of earlier legislative systems, the elections are still held to be of vital importance in terms of listening and engaging with the public voices of local communities. It is then the role of EU parliamentarians to express and feedback these local concerns and to ensure that their constituents have a feeling of having a stake in decision-making in Brussels.

It should also be noted that the EU has led the way in putting the rule of law at the centre of the democratic process. In fact, one of the reasons why elected representatives have a smaller role in the policy process in the Brussels Council is because both elected representatives and the civil secretariat have agreed over the years that the European Court of Justice should play a larger role in the law-making process, adjudicating on issues from social insurance to immigration and quarantine and exile policies. With the highly trained secretariat and some of the most experienced judicial appointees in the world, democracy and human rights in Europe have stronger legal protections than anywhere else in the world.

The rise of the European Union has symbolised the importance of the internationalisation of democracy. The approach of enlargement through member-
state building has been tremendously successful in tying-in prospective members to the regulatory requirements of the European _acquis communautaire_ which has been facilitated by the support of the World Development and Sustainability Bank and the seconding of EU civil servants and advisors to support government ministries (the 35 Chapters of the _acquis_ are listed in Appendix 1). The high legal standards of the Union have been exported through the building-in of judicial training practices and most importantly, through the extension of the European courts system. Although this sometimes poses problems if the judges and the prosecutorial team have limited local knowledge and the homeland security departments do not have systems adequately linked-in with the security computer systems of EU member states.

The success of the European Union as a democracy-builder has been clearly illustrated through its experiences in integrating the Balkan states. Where, once, the Balkans were repeatedly destabilised by external powers and local ethnic and regional rivalries, today the Balkan area has seen stability and sustainable growth. The seven member states which joined in the last Balkan enlargement process in 2015 - Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania – have all taken on formal membership of European institutions with few problems. This has been put down to the extensive oversight provided by the Union in the fifteen years prior to membership, when in the aftermath of the 1999 Kosovo war it was decided to shift the emphasis of the enlargement process to one of pro-active engagement in capacity-building potential member states.

These states moved rapidly from recognition to guided sovereignty under EU oversight, through the Stabilisation and Association process which was a forerunner of the Democratisation and Sustainability process which was applied to the states which are members of the Regional Association of North African States and to those of the Eastern European Union Association. In these processes, membership of the EU is held out as the final goal but it is made clear that progress in this direction is very much a choice of the applicant governments and the regional associations themselves. Because the enlargement process is based on the legal agreements and independent expert assessments in the fields of the 35 chapters of the _acquis_, there has been little formal discussion of this process in the Brussels Council. This has been an advantage for the extension of EU legal and democratic norms, as there were concerns
that ‘enlargement fatigue’ - popular disengagement and cynicism towards the remoteness of EU governance within member states - might make the process of tying states into European frameworks of law problematic. The fact that this process can continue in a stable and sustaining way, based solely on democratic concerns of good governance and citizen security has been a major step forward in internationalising European norms and practices.

**Russian Federation**

The Russian federation has been a vital influence in internationalising democratic and legal norms. The region itself had been suffering in the wake of the collapse of Soviet era production and the lack of external investment outside the extractive industries. In many ways, Russia has had to play a vital role in co-ordinating regional governments (in the same way as Nigeria and South Africa have played a central role in the Organisation of Democratic African States, see below). Democracy in the Russian Federation has been less successful than was initially hoped, with only Russia having full membership status of the United Nations (see the list of associate UN members in Appendix 2). Western republics formerly linked to Russia in the twentieth century, such as the Baltic states, Belarus, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova have become firmly anchored in the governance regime of the European Union. Under the Democratisation and Sustainability programmes, these republics have increasingly dropped their former trade dependency with Russia and the new Schengen rules have meant that it is increasingly difficult for visa travel between the EEU A states and the Federation, with heavily fortified borders and large privately run transit camps and prisons in eastern parts of Ukraine and of Belarus, for holding failed asylum applicants and the excess prison populations from overburdened states, such as the UK and France. In exchange for their support in enforcing European security, there has been a gradual loosening of visa controls on citizens from EEU A states, but the costs of applying are still largely prohibitive.

Russia has not been overly happy with the rolling back of the Kremlin’s influence to the West and the international mission taking over the administration of the Chechen Republic. While democracy has progressed to Russia’s west through growing EU influence, Russia has been supported by the EU and by United Nations and the
WDSB in playing a greater influence in stabilising the regimes of its southern neighbours. Russia itself has a stable democracy, with one party coalition rule, although there is only one party, there is plenty of discussion and debate within it over the best administrative approaches to take to issues and ways of effectively implementing international norms. With compulsory voting and one party rule, elections are always a day of celebration and community involvement with a two-day national holiday. The national consensus government was brought in with popular support after the Putin years and there was little opposition to the government’s decision to provide permanent advisory roles to the international institutions of the UN and the WDSB. With international satisfaction over the oversight mechanisms of Russia’s financial institutions, there has been a flow of social assistance programmes focusing on regional needs as well as the restoration and security of major cities.

Russia has set a regional example in the tying of democratic reforms to international institutional oversight and through the Federation has enabled neighbouring states to go forward in the promotion of democracy, human rights and security. Russia’s greater formal influence over the states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgystan through the Federation has been important in terms of regional security and has enabled these states to have a framework through which they can work together collectively to oversee UN and WDSB funding support for governance reforms and for initiatives aimed at facilitating the growth of civil society actors. All these states aspire to full membership of the UN and reluctantly accepted associate status on the basis that there would be greater international support for economic and environmental initiatives and improved institutional ties under good governance programmes. For Russia, the formalisation of its leadership role has assisted in the revival of a sense of Russian pride through its role in promoting democracy to its neighbours.

Africa

Africa has been the continental success story in terms of the transformation of democracy and the prospects for further advances over the twenty-first century. Already well over half the states in Africa are full members of the United Nations and currently only four states are non-members of the United Nations (down from twelve,
when the UN was fully reformed in 2015 – for the full list of states who are not members of the UN see Appendix 3). While north African states have gradually moved towards the European Union, sub-Saharan Africa has been increasingly improving mechanisms of government oversight and human rights and security promotion under the growing wealth and military dominance of the powerful democracies, South Africa and Nigeria through the framework of the Organisation of Democratic African States (ODAS).

As stated above, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Egypt formed the Regional Association of North Africa States (RANAS) in 2015 as part of the negotiation and assessment process for the Democratisation and Sustainability process (DSP) with the European Union. The DSP agreements with the individual states were signed over the following five years and the long process of alignment with the EU *acquis* is well under way. At present there is no consensus on when the EU might expand to formally include African member states, but the inclusion of Turkey, the Palestinian Territories and Israel as full members is a promising sign that the Union might one day encompass all the Mediterranean states, who clearly share many interests. Many commentators think that the shared needs and the strong economic and security performances of the north African states may well encourage the Brussels Council to revisit their 2025 decision to call a halt to enlargement. Whether this is the case or not, there is little doubt that the DSP has brought higher standards of governance and administration to the region, and given the governments a cohering political programme of moving towards Europe, with the promise of increased development aid, trade subsidies and time-limited work visas for selected categories of labour.

In many ways, the beneficial effect of European influence in north Africa has been at the cost of sub-Saharan Africa. The securitisation campaigns in Tunisia and Algeria in the mid-2010s had the unfortunate by-product of forcing many Islamic militants to seek refuge with Islamic groups in states such as Sudan and Somalia. Similarly, increased trade barriers and security controls have made travel and trade more problematic for many African states. It is unfortunate that the direct influence of the EU and incentive of potential EU membership has not been able to be extended to sub-Saharan Africa, where problems of ethnic division, climate change, lack of economic diversification, poor health systems and seemingly endemic corruption have
undermined attempts to promote democracy and good governance in many states on the continent. Africa has also been increasingly the battleground of the war on terror, with fundamentalist Islamic groups having strongholds in many border regions and in the failed states of Somalia, DR Congo and Sudan.

Nevertheless, the prospects for progress in the sub-Saharan states which are members and associate members of the United Nations and members of the Organisation of Democratic African States look particularly promising. The shared constitutional framework and especially the Codes of Good Governance accepted at the formation of ODAS have been increasingly turned from aspirations to realities with the coordination and support of the UN Office for Sustainable Societies, with heavy funding from the WDSB. Across Africa it is recognised that Africa’s problems are the world’s problems and that therefore it is necessary for coordinated UN support if democracy is to prosper and Islamic extremism is to be rooted out of the continent. The international support given to the ODAS states, especially in the financial and technical support provided by the United States to the South African air force and the Nigerian army, have made a substantial difference to their capacities for promoting and maintaining democracy and security in the region.

The Middle East

The Middle East is another region of the world that has made major strides towards democracy and stability over the last quarter century. Probably the most important changes have been the sweeping reforms in the gulf emirates; Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, have all seen major reforms and the shift towards democracy, with regular elections. The above mentioned states have all been classed as meeting the UN standards for full membership because of a number of factors, including their strong security protections for citizens, health and welfare policies and the speed with which there has been the institutionalisation of multi-party systems and parliamentary rule. The UN Democratic Standards Committee has cogently argued that it is necessary for flexibility in the judgements on individual states and also that it is necessary to reward and tie-in rapid progress on reform. The fact that citizenship, social and electoral rights were tightly restricted was not seen to pose a problem as the tight regulations were not unique to the region.
The Middle East’s other remarkable success story for democracy has been the long-term resolution of the Israel-Palestine dispute through the framework of European Union member state building. The Israel-Palestine peace process had been the central foreign policy concern of the European Union through the 2010s and the EU’s gradual assumption of influence over the actors, with the cutting back of US aid to Israel and the EU’s coordination of both UN peacekeeping and international financial assistance, resulted in both Israel and the Palestinian Territories signing the formal Democratisation and Sustainability agreements with Brussels in 2015. Exactly on schedule, ten years to the day after these agreements were signed, both states joined the Union on the same day. In the decade-long formal process of joining the EU, the Brussels Council was able to substantially reform the governance, judicial and security processes in both states, gradually bringing to an end the security division and allowing the free exchange of people and goods. With the incentives of Union membership and EU funding support for both states, the EU was able to promote democracy in the region through its ‘soft power’ in ways which the US has so far been unable to match.

However, not all has moved in the direction of democracy and sustainability in the region. The fall out from the failure of the Iraqi state and the international moves to punish Iran for seeking to further destabilise the region, has meant that the regimes in these two states and those in Lebanon, Jordan and Syria, while technically classed as democracies, are more like military protectorates. While the United Nations has assumed formal control over the administrations of these five states, there is still martial law in force and no elections have been attempted since the violence which marked the Jordanian elections in 2026. Because these five states are ruled by UN appointees and the constitutions enshrine the highest level of democratic and human rights, these states have associate UN membership and are classed by the UN as democracies. The fact that protectorates and martial law have been imposed in the interests of the populations concerned was a major factor in the controversial UN committee rulings on this matter.

**Latin America**
Latin America has probably seen least change in terms of democracy over this century. While the states of Colombia and Ecuador have associate UN status at the moment, the rest of Latin America is considered to be democratic. States in this region seem to have bucked broader global trends in which participation in the formal political process has fallen dramatically. This continent has continued to witness Left/Right political divisions which shaped the political process in the 20th Century, but which have tended to have much less relevance in this one. However, the existence of Right and Left populist parties, with often closely contested and disputed elections, has not necessarily meant that democracy has progressed in the region. Many states are highly volatile, with politics often taking the form of violent clashes in Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia and other states. It would appear that public participation and democracy is not necessarily the best way of bringing social consensus and cohesion to Latin American society, nor for managing long-term relations with the US and other powers.

**India**

India may have formally lost its title of being the world’s most populous democracy in the 2015 reforms but few people would question the genuine progress in citizenship security which has been made, particularly over the last twenty years. The Federal State has funded some of the largest social and welfare programmes ever undertaken, quadrupling the size of the Indian state-sector of the last fifteen years, as the long Indian growth boom has been gradually translated into a factor which has strengthened rather than undermined the Indian state. The social instability and ethnic and regional divisions which marked the early 2010s led many commentators to think that the Indian state was on the verge of fragmentation and to question the viability of democracy in an Asian setting. The progress made by the modernising and centralising Indian state since the low point of mass communal violence which claimed over 30,000 lives in those years has been astounding with major investments in transport, health and education. There are still large disparities between and within states in India but the days of inter-communal violence appear to be past and India has also become a major contributor to the work of international institutions, particularly in the fields of international law and climate change and is seen as the major champion of states vulnerable to the consequences of global warming.
China

In 2015 China was formally classified as a full democracy by the United Nations Reform Commission. There was concern that this was a political decision rather than a purely legal consideration as at that time there was still no multi-party elections and concern over a number of human rights infringements. Nevertheless, China has made large steps forward in its support for democracy both domestically and in the international arena, playing a major role, in terms of finances and troop contributions to the running costs of the United Nations. For many commentators, it has been China’s integration into the UN and other international bodies, particularly the UN Commission for Climate Change, that has marked the birth of a true order of ‘global governance’ where all the major powers agree on the importance of democracy as the foundation stone of both the domestic and the international order, with international law fully recognised as taking precedence over domestic law.

Conclusion

So, looking around the world in 2030 you could either see the glass as half full or half empty. The global consensus on the need for democracy and international law has led to increased power and authority for international organisations and international institutions. Overall, democracy has developed, making the twenty-first century the century of democracy, and with it sovereignty has become much less relevant to governance at local, national and global levels. We have also witnessed the important integration of populous and growing economic powers such as China and India into playing major roles within international institutions. The role of the United States and the expanded European Union have both proved crucial in support for regional regimes, such as the Organisation of Democratic African States and the Organisation of American States and the conditioning of international assistance for development on the need for democratic reform.

The spread of democracy has meant that global governance has been able to expand and with this the increased security protection against fundamentalist violence and agreement over regulation for environmental protection and the flow of goods and
migrants and refugees. However, with the victory of democracy it has become increasingly clear that democracy, as stated above, is not a ‘silver bullet’ or magical solution capable of ensuring that struggle to define and achieve common goals is over, that there will be an ‘End of History’. The goals of previous generations - of, for example, the end of climate insecurity, the elimination of conflict, poverty and disease – are still on the agenda and while the extension of democracy may not be sufficient to achieve these goals, it has certainly demonstrated itself to be necessary.

Time has demonstrated that having a universal consensus on the need for democracy and its international universalisation is not the same as having a universal democratic world community, where a citizen’s rights are similar wherever they are in the world. In fact, in many ways, it could be argued that too little has changed beyond superficial aspects. Many commentators argue that the democracy we have in countries like Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, or even the United States, is one which is fairly brittle, where dominant parties shape the political process but have little popular support and governments and political elites seem very remote from ordinary citizens. For some analysts, the internationalisation of governance issues and the consensus on administrative matters means that it is inevitable that the formal politics of the ballot box becomes less important to people and to their psychological sense of ‘connection’ to governing institutions.

While ideological political divisions tend not to exist in domestic politics, it could be argued that the emphasis on the importance of democracy has institutionalised international divides, particularly those of an economic and social nature. The more divided nature of international society became an issue especially with the reforms of the United Nation during the 2010s, with some countries effectively excluded from membership while others lost their full voting rights as one of the conditions for making the institution more efficient. There was also some disagreement regarding the lack of transparency with which the UN Democratic Standards Committee judged oil-rich states friendly to the United States, such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, as full democracies and entitled to full membership while other states were consigned to associate status. The world appears to be still a divided and hierarchical one with some states, such as Sudan, DR Congo and North Korea, remaining outside the United Nations and some of the associate member governments still having some way
to go in meeting the international requirements before they can enjoy full membership status.

It should also be noted that the framework of the international order is now much more dependent on the smooth working of international institutions than was the case at the turn of the century. With the institutionalisation of regional zones for security and for the purposes of good governance, national sovereignty is much less important, and for some associate members of the United Nations purely a legacy of past forms of international order. With sovereignty increasingly reduced to issues of cultural rights and increasing authority located at regional level, especially in Europe, Africa and Latin America, there are some concerns that people are increasingly out of touch with decision-makers despite the universal use of the internet and electronic voting and messaging. There are concerns that the reliance on international institutions, such as UN courts and committees, to propose key legislation and to make the final judgements on policy may lead to a culture of ‘democratic complacency’, where citizens loose their interest in, and ability to engage in and defend, democratic systems.

The judgement of this paper is that although there will be some negative factors associated with the internationalisation of democracy, the tying of democracy to international oversight has been a fundamental step forward for human freedom. The strengthening of international regulatory regimes through the key United Nations bodies, such as the Democratic Standards Committee and the UN Office for Sustainable Societies, and the integration and strengthening of the regulatory activities formerly undertaken by institutions such as the World Bank and IMF, through the establishment of the World Development and Sustainability Bank, have resulted in today’s world where for the first time every full and associate member state of the United Nations (with full or limited voting rights) is a democracy.

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Appendix 1
Chapters of the European Union *acquis communautaire*

1. Free movement of goods
2. Freedom of movement for workers
3. Right of establishment and freedom to provide services
4. Free movement of capital
5. Public procurement
6. Company law
7. Intellectual property law
8. Competition policy
9. Financial services
10. Information society and media
11. Agriculture and rural development
12. Food safety, veterinary and phytosanitary policy
13. Fisheries
14. Transport policy
15. Energy
16. Taxation
17. Economic and monetary policy
18. Statistics
19. Social policy and employment (including anti-discrimination and equal opportunities for women and men)
20. Enterprise and industrial policy
21. Trans-European networks
22. Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments
23. Judiciary and fundamental rights
24. Justice, freedom and security
25. Science and research
26. Education and culture
27. Environment
28. Consumer and health protection
29. Customs union
30. External relations
31. Foreign, security and defence policy
32. Financial control
33. Financial and budgetary provisions
34. Institutions
35. Other issues

Appendix 2
List of States with Associate membership of the United Nations

Afghanistan
Armenia
Azerbaijan
Chechen Republic
Colombia
Cuba
Dominican Republic
East Timor
Ecuador
Haiti
Iraq
Iran
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Lebanon
Liberia
Mynamar
Kuril Island State
Republic of Congo
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Somaliland
Syria
Swaziland
Turkemenistan
Uzbekistan
Western Sahara
Yemen
Zimbabwe

Appendix 3
List of States who are not members of the United Nations

Democratic Republic of Congo
Eritrea
North Korea
Somalia
Sudan
Taiwan
Tamil Eelam