REVIEW ARTICLE

Expanding the Research Agenda of Human Rights: A Reply to Bellamy

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I welcome Alex Bellamy’s desire to engage in a dialogue about the legitimacy of international human rights and attempts by states and international organisations to uphold them (IJHR 6/4). In response to my book From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention he raises three issues: the changing nature of humanitarianism; the problematic relationship between human rights and democratic processes; and the dynamic behind ethical foreign policy. These questions are dealt with in specific chapters in the book and I will reprise the core arguments below to engage with his central remarks. Prior to that I wish to briefly restate the rationale behind the book and put this dialogue in a broader context of current research approaches to the international human rights agenda.

THE HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA

While the focus of Bellamy’s article is the defence of the liberal human rights agenda my book is less concerned with criticising this agenda than understanding its development and implications for international relations theory and practice. Criticism of this agenda or of its practice comes from across the field of political perspectives, not just from conservative Realists and radical anti-imperialists. Many of the most trenchant critics of ethical foreign policy practice come from a liberal international perspective, focusing on double-standards or hypocrisy and highlighting a wide-range of limitations from unethical arms-trading and selective indignation over human rights abuses to military strategy which risks civilian casualties rather than military ones.

From Kosovo to Kabul was not written because I did not think there was enough criticism of international human rights regimes but because the criticism did not appear to explain very much about how or why

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these regimes had been transformed in the context of the reshaping of the international framework since the end of the Cold War. Realist critics appear at a loss to explain why politicians talk about moral values and ethics rather than national interests and realpolitik and, until recently, saw little to be gained from open-ended commitments to ‘nation-build’ other people’s countries. Bellamy is right to argue that Realists share much in common with the socialist Left, as both sides of the old political framework have little to offer by way of analysis of the transformation of the human rights agenda and collapse of the Cold War UN Charter framework. This has resulted in conspiracy theories taking the place of analysis, and the questionable focus on oil pipelines, raw materials or the struggle to impose capitalism, to explain high profile interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and other peripheral areas of the world economy.

The most influential critics of the new human rights agenda have, in fact, been the liberal internationalists, who have tended to point out the limits and contradictions behind ethical foreign policy. For these critics, international change is a very important factor and has been welcomed as a movement in the right direction but criticised for being too slow and inconsistent. For example, the big powers in the UN Security Council still have the right to veto interventions, states are still treated as legitimate representatives of their people despite the fact they pursue narrow national interests rather than global cosmopolitan needs, international law still formally treats sovereign states as equals despite their differing human rights records, and major powers are still reluctant to intervene to safeguard human rights. From Kosovo to Kabul engages with the critical research agenda of liberal internationalism and suggests that this should be extended to reconsider the core assumptions and ideas at the heart of the liberal human rights thesis. It suggests that we take a step back and look at the bigger picture before advocating the dismantling of the old framework of international relations in favour of privileging the individual human rights subject at the centre of international affairs.

The central argument of the book, one not touched upon by Bellamy, is the suggestion that an international regime which privileges individual rights will tend to empower major powers rather than the poor and excluded. While at the domestic level individual rights can be safeguarded through the universal framework of law and civil and political equality, no such legal or political framework exists at the international level. Without a world state, world law, a world police force, a world court and a world army, standing independently of powerful states, there is no framework which can guarantee universal individual rights. The definition and enforcement of international
human rights may be a nice idea, but as the world is currently constituted, in practice it can only be the prerogative of the powerful. The distinction between the domestic sphere of ‘order’ in which it is possible to pursue collective goals and ‘the good life’ and the international sphere, where political division and power inequalities make this much more problematic, has traditionally been the central issue at the heart of international relations theory.¹ This distinction is noticeably absent in Bellamy’s analysis.

In order to avoid reinforcing and legitimising power inequalities, by giving powerful states the right to coerce smaller powers, the enforcement of individual rights was carefully regulated under the UN Charter system. The definition of rights and their enforcement was the sole prerogative of sovereign states. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 was a non-binding UN General Assembly resolution, which promoted human rights in abstract terms and was not intended to be read as a statement of law or legal obligation.² Similarly, the drafters of the 1948 Genocide Convention chose to explicitly reject universal jurisdiction for the crime, Article 6 giving national governments the final responsibility for prosecution of the crime on their territory.³

Prior to the Second World War, ideas of Great Power responsibility rested on the international recognition of political and legal inequality, manifested in empire and the restriction of sovereignty and self-government to a select group of powers. With the discrediting of fascism and the ideology of empire and the emergence of popular movements against colonialism and the Soviet Union as a Cold War super power, major Western powers were on the defensive. With the dismantling of empire, international society was forced to take a more egalitarian form. International law and collective security depended on legal equality, consent, equal rights of sovereignty and the concomitant principle of non-intervention. This system worked to the advantage of smaller states as the core right of ‘Westphalian’ sovereignty, the right to wage war, was heavily restricted. In the wake of two world wars, under the UN Charter, aggression, even the threat of aggression was seen as a crime. It was universally accepted that attempts to privilege universal rights, rather than the rights of political and legal equality through state sovereignty, would have destroyed the fragile basis of international society and threatened a return to the more ‘permissive’ era of aggressive war and ‘might makes right’.

The world of 2003 is not the world of 1945 and international relations are being (and have been) recast in ways that reflect current social forces and economic and military alignments. The period of egalitarian international society can now be seen as a ‘blip’, a historical
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accident, which, with hindsight, could never have been expected to withstand the vast structural economic, social and military inequalities between sovereign states. The forces and pressures which held back a more direct exercise of hierarchical power, such as the threat of superpower conflict, concerns of post-colonial instability and the discrediting of elitist ideas of ‘Great Power’ responsibility, no longer have the same bearing.

The renegotiation of the UN Charter framework in these circumstances is not surprising. The gradual lifting of restrictions on Great Power use of force and the degradation of formal legal and political equality between sovereign states flow from this new reconfiguration of forces. The collapse of the cornerstones of the Cold War international order – international law, sovereign equality, the norm of non-intervention – are the product of an inevitable realignment of rights claims and capabilities. What is surprising is that this shift to a more hierarchical world order – where there is one set of international laws for small states and another for major powers, where Great Powers are free to wage war in the name of peace and re-establish protectorates in the name of democracy and progress – should be greeted by the mainstream consensus as a progressive ‘new dawn’. This is the research theme that From Kosovo to Kabul seeks to engage with.

Rather than a critique of the liberal human rights agenda, the book traces how this agenda evolved and reflected the reshaping of the Cold War international order. It traces the intimation of new hierarchies of power in the expansion of Western influence over the less developed South through the transformation of the non-governmental organisation (NGO) agenda during the Cold War, which expanded from humanitarian aid to conflict prevention and sustainable development. It considers the domestic dynamic to use the new opportunities provided by the international sphere for domestic political capital and credibility. It analyses the attempts to give content to individual rights in the international sphere and establishes the contradictory nature of these new ‘rights’ whose subjects remain forever the objects of external powers. It also seeks to map out the implications of a new international order based on a human rights framework rather than one of state sovereignty, considering the changing nature of international law, the transformation of peace-keeping into war-making and the attempts to colonise (in some cases literally) the political through law and ethics.
CHANGING NATURE OF HUMANITARIANISM

Bellamy has little disagreement with the book’s description of the transformation of humanitarianism from universal needs-based relief to a highly conditioned and selective human rights-based provision of relief. Interestingly, he does not disagree with the implications of this shift – the end of a right to provide universal and unconditional humanitarian relief in times of severe need. The right to provide humanitarian assistance, promoted by the international Red Cross through the Geneva Conventions, was based on the Enlightenment principle of a shared humanity – that ‘our enemies are men’. For Bellamy the restriction of this form of aid provision, which laid down no political conditions and therefore was seen as neutral between competing parties, is a positive step. As is usually the case with advocates of ‘universal’ human rights, any genuine universals are seen to be threatening to their particular political preferences, dressed-up in the moral language of ‘empowerment’, ‘capacity-building’ and ‘good governance’. Bellamy states that: ‘The work of the ICRC (International Committee of the Red Cross) notwithstanding, it is very difficult to demonstrate the empirical or philosophical foundations for such a right.’

The key attribute that clearly demarcates today’s rights-based humanitarianism from non-political humanitarian action is the end of the strict separation between strategic ends-based state assistance, which was often highly selective and conditional on certain economic and political policy choices, and needs-based NGO humanitarian activism, which was based on unconditional need. The conflation of these two approaches has become possible because, on one hand, the NGOs have either called for the politicisation of aid or been complicit in its politicisation, while, on the other hand, governments have sought to justify strategic policy-making through the ethical discourse of humanitarianism. The politicisation of aid reflects the more interventionist nature of external assistance to non-Western states.

As Bellamy notes, the perspective which seeks to impose Western conditionality on all aid provision is often termed the ‘do no harm’ approach. Today, the non-provision of aid to those in need is ethically defensible through the human rights discourse. Saving lives in the short-term is criticised for the potential long-term harm, either in potentially fuelling conflict or possibly legitimising and strengthening political factions. This perspective of subjecting humanitarian aid to human rights conditions has, since the Rwandan crisis, become the official UK government position. Tess Kingham MP, a member of the International Development Committee, argues: ‘Surely taking a view of the wider
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good – for the long term interests of people – to actually achieve real stability and development, it may be better to withdraw aid now – to ensure that in the long term, it is in the best interests of the people.\(^4\) British Secretary for International Development, Claire Short, openly castigated British aid agencies for raising money for humanitarian relief during the 1998 famine in Sudan, arguing that what was really needed was a political solution and an end to the war. Similarly, in the case of Sierra Leone, the UK government called on humanitarian agencies to suspend relief because it would legitimise the military coup and postpone the return of democracy. Today, instead of feeding famine victims, aid may well be cut back.

I am not suggesting that in the past humanitarian aid was a perfect process or that it could do any more than provide temporary assistance. The simple point is that post-Cold War restrictions on humanitarian aid and universal charity mean that those dependent on aid have even less opportunity for autonomy than previously. The politicisation of humanitarian aid has led to even greater leverage over non-Western societies as NGOs and international institutions increasingly assume the right to make judgements about what is right and just, about whose capacities are built and which local groups are favoured. Where humanitarian aid started out as an expression of empathy with common humanity it has been transformed, through the discourse of human rights, into a lever for strategic aims drawn up and acted upon by external agencies.

The points made in the book key into a major debate within the not-for-profit movement. For example, Oxfam’s Nick Stockton has spoken out passionately against the new vogue for ‘deserving and undeserving victims’ and has highlighted the dangers of human rights-orientated humanitarianism which abandons the universal right to relief:

The concept of the undeserving victim is therefore morally and ethically untenable, and practically counter-productive. It represents an outright rejection of the principles of humanity, impartiality and universalism, fundamental tenets of human rights and humanitarian principles... Withholding humanitarian assistance on the grounds that those in need may be criminals... is the arbitrary application of punishment before trial and it constitutes cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment on a massive scale. Such treatment is arguably a crime against humanity.\(^5\)

Once humanitarian intervention is conflated with rights-based strategic ends, defined by external agencies, the political ends are redefined as ethical and used to justify the denial of humanitarian principles.
Inevitably the universal humanist core of humanitarian action becomes
degraded, and humanitarianism becomes an ambiguous concept capable
of justifying any form of external intervention. Today, leading
commentators suggest that ‘There is no general definition of
humanitarianism’ or ask ‘What on earth does the word “humanitarian”
mean?’ As Peter Fuchs, the Director General of the ICRC has stated:
‘The respective roles of politicians, generals and humanitarian actors are
not clear anymore.”

The points made in Kosovo to Kabul in relation to the negation of
universal relief are intended to highlight the distinction between
humanitarianism and human rights approaches and to emphasise the
particularist and hierarchical political framework behind universal claims
of human rights. Bellamy wishes to avoid the question and states that
that he is ‘not saying that the principle of neutral humanitarianism
should be discarded’. My point is that you cannot have both, and to
conflate humanitarianism and human rights merely downplays the
importance of the discussion and adds to the conceptual confusion.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY

In a similar fashion, Bellamy seeks to downplay the distinctive attributes
of the human rights approach in relation to democracy and political autonomy. His central argument in responding to From Kosovo to Kabul
is, in fact, the assertion that there can be no contradiction between
democracy and human rights because human rights are the precondition
for democracy. According to Bellamy: ‘Rather than “degrading” the
subject, liberal human rights attempt to guarantee that subjects can
exercise their capacity for self-government.’ Apparently, if we lived in a
world where states ‘allowed individuals and communities to freely
construct their own conceptions of the good and live according to them
there would be no need for a global human rights regime or military
humanism’. Where I assert that human rights are a restriction upon
democracy and political autonomy and the sphere of the political itself,
Bellamy asserts that I a priori privilege the formal political sphere, and
that of state sovereignty, rather than first assessing whether this formal
framework meets his required standards of inclusion and ‘communicative ethics’. For Bellamy, where the formal political sphere
falls short, most obviously under dictatorial or oppressive regimes such
as those of Slobodan Milošević or Saddam Hussein, but also where ‘the
moral community and the state do not necessarily overlap’ (a somewhat
more inclusive remit), it is the duty of enlightened citizens and
international institutions to ‘empower individuals and communities’
through enforcing their human rights.
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As is clear from Bellamy’s critique, human rights are, in fact, very different from liberal democratic and civil rights. We apparently only need ‘human rights regimes’ and a bit of ‘military humanism’ where subjects cannot act on their own behalf. It is important again to stress the qualitative difference between the liberal-democratic approach, which derives rights from self-governing human subjects, and the human rights approach of claiming rights on the behalf of others. No matter how admirable the cause, there is no escaping the fact that human rights are the rights of external interests to act on the behalf of others – the so-called ‘rights of empowerment’. For most human rights theorists, the distinction between the two ways of deriving ‘rights’, and the different political practices that derive from this, are not particularly controversial. As John Wadham, the Director of Liberty argues, human rights are about ‘putting a limitation on the power of democracy; putting a limitation on the power of the state’. For Tony Evans, it is clear that: ‘Any attempt to legitimate a set of universal human rights may be seen as a threat to a democratic community’s claim to decide its own particular political, economic and social system’.

There are a couple of basic problems with the democratic assertions of the universal human rights approach, which are discussed in the book and ignored by Bellamy. For example, who decides what these rights are, who they should be given to, and how they should be enforced? For the advocates of human rights, the legitimacy of their claims stand independently of, and sometimes in inverse relation to, the capacity of their subjects. Some external source has, of necessity, to be looked to. In privileging human rights, as an a priori and pre-political moral claim, as opposed to a legal and political one, a contradiction appears between the enforcement and guarantee of international human rights and the formal equality of the liberal democratic legal and political framework. The ambitious nature of the concept of human rights, which establishes the content of those rights independently from the capacity of its subjects, means that this gap between claim and capacity lies at the heart of the thorny question of implementation.

In order to help bridge this gap, human rights advocates tend to privilege the role of international institutions and coalitions in which the world’s most powerful states play a prominent role. As Neil Stammers notes, the imperative of action to defend human rights ironically entails a realpolitik which is highly state-centric and, in fact, not only reflects but also reinforces the highly uneven balance of existing power relations. It is not exactly rocket science to point out that the new ‘rights’ at the centre of the liberal human rights thesis have tended to give new rights and powers to Western advocates and actors, most
controversially in the case of the ‘right of intervention’ for international institutions, NATO and self-selecting ‘coalitions of the willing’. While I agree with Bellamy that many states can be criticised for their democratic deficiencies, it also quite obvious that citizens of non-Western states, both those that are politically ‘included’ and those who are ‘excluded’, will always have less of a relationship of accountability to the world’s most powerful states and international institutions than their own governments, no matter how undemocratic.

DYNAMIC BEHIND ETHICAL FOREIGN POLICY

Bellamy asserts that my ‘idea that ethical foreign policy is inspired by domestic interests rather than domestically inspired or international values casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of the whole ethical foreign policy project’. First, this is not quite true as many commentators would argue that motivation is not key to the legitimacy of foreign policy interventions, but rather the outcome. Few advocates of the human rights cause would be quite as keen as Bellamy in his voluntaristic assertion that the explanation of the ‘ethical shift’ lies in a new generation of altruistic political leaders, such as Blair, Clinton, Axworthy, Evans and others who ‘thought that it was simply the right thing to do whenever it was feasible to do it’. Bellamy’s defensiveness here does little to open up dialogue and research into understanding the determinations behind the drive for ethical policy.19 My intention is not to somehow discredit ‘ethical foreign policy’ by revealing ‘interests’ but rather to understand it and in so doing look at likely possibilities and limitations in its practice. I suggest that one factor driving ethical policy-making is a problem of domestic legitimacy.

There is increasing cynicism and doubt over government and politics at a domestic level, demonstrated by falling turn-outs at the polls, declining party memberships and lower viewing figures for the nightly news. It is in this context, where domestic policy-making initiatives easily lead to party divisions and often public discrediting, that an interventionist ethical foreign policy can be a powerful mechanism for generating a sense of political purpose and mission. Ethical concerns, such as the human rights of others, seem to provide a moral framework which can project a sphere of agreement and consensus and point beyond the relativism and pessimism of our times. As Francesca Klug notes: ‘The post-Cold War search for new ideals and common bonds in an era of failed ideologies appears to have contributed to a growing appreciation of human rights as a set of values.’21
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However, as against Bellamy’s view that I make the false assumption that Western electorates are concerned about human rights in foreign countries and vote accordingly, thereby giving legitimacy to governments and political leaders, I in fact emphasise the opposite relationship. The demand for new ethical ideals and the ‘growing appreciation’ of the need to support the rights of others has been generated by governing elites rather than in response to popular movements from below. Opinion studies have consistently demonstrated that the idea that there is public pressure for a policy shift towards more ‘ethical’ concerns has been exaggerated. For example, in the mid-1990s, polls showed that only a minority of the American public backed human rights promotion as an important foreign policy goal, well behind stopping the flow of illegal drugs, protecting the jobs of American workers and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. This finding was illustrated by the fact that President Clinton had to explain where Kosovo was on the map before attempting to promote military action in 1999, because there was so little public interest in the issue.

Perhaps the most important example of the British and US governments attempting to create an ‘ethical’ interventionist agenda is the case of Iraq. For the last ten years US and British political leaders have used Iraq as an international cause which they can pursue to raise their status at home and emphasise their commitment to a moral mission abroad. The British and UK publics have never been as enthusiastic as their governments in pursuing conflict with Saddam Hussein, and the emphasis on Iraq in foreign policy initiatives has little to do with shifts in public opinion. For example, in July 2002 when George W. Bush and Tony Blair prepared the public for a possible military conquest of Iraq, polls showed that only a small, and declining, majority of American people were in favour. Opinion polls consistently demonstrate that the Western public tends to share a more traditional view of foreign policy priorities, based on national interests, rather than the liberal ‘crusading’ perspective often pushed by their government leaders. This gap is explained by the fact that the drive to pursue ethical adventures abroad is not directly related to winning votes, but to an even more basic political instinct of the political establishment – the need for governing administrations to have a sense of self-identity, purpose and self-belief. Governments without a sense of ‘mission’ and collective purpose would lose their internal cohesion and soon dissolve into faction-fighting and petty squabbles.

The attention to the articulation of a political mission, beyond the petty partisanship of Left and Right, through foreign policy activism abroad has been an important resource of authority and credibility for
Western political leaders. The ability to project or symbolise unifying ‘values’ has become a core leadership attribute. George W. Bush’s shaky start to the US presidency was transformed by his speech to Congress in the wake of the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks, in which he staked out his claim to represent and protect America’s ethical values against the terrorist ‘heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century’.

Tony Blair, similarly, was at his most presidential in the wake of the attacks, arguing that values were what distinguished the two sides of the coming conflict: ‘We are democratic. They are not. We have respect for human life. They do not. We hold essentially liberal values. They do not.’

By association with the cause of the victims of international conflicts, Western governments can gain a moral authority which can no longer be easily secured through the domestic political process. Even General Election victories, the defining point of the domestic political process, no longer bring authority or legitimacy. This was clear in the contested victory of George W. Bush in the 2000 elections, which turned on the problem of the ‘hanging’ chad in Florida. However, the problem of deriving legitimacy from elections is a much broader one, with declining voter turn-outs. In the British elections in 2001 Tony Blair achieved a landslide second term mandate, but there was little sense of euphoria – this was a hollow victory on a 50 per cent turn-out which meant only 1 in 4 of the electorate voted for New Labour.

The demise of the framework of traditional party politics, the source of Western governments’ domestic malaise, is directly associated with the search for an external source of legitimacy. Governments, like many gap-year students, seek to define and find themselves through their engagement with the problems experienced by those in far-off countries. This search for a moral grounding through solidarity with the ‘victims of bad causes’ has led to an increasingly moralised ‘black and white’ or ‘good versus evil’ view of crisis situations in the non-Western world. The jet-setting Tony Blair has been much criticised for appearing to de-prioritise the domestic agenda in the wake of September 11, yet even his critics admit that his ‘moral mission’ in the international sphere has been crucial to enhancing his domestic standing.

The search for ethical or moral approaches emphasising the government’s moral authority has inexorably led to a domestic shift in priorities making international policy-making increasingly high profile in relation to other policy-areas. The emphasis on ethical foreign policy commitments enables Western governments to declare an unequivocal moral stance, which helps to mitigate awkward questions of government mission and political coherence in the domestic sphere. The contrast
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between the moral certainty possible in selected areas of foreign policy and the uncertainties of domestic policy-making was unintentionally highlighted when President George Bush congratulated Tony Blair on his willingness to take a stand over Afghanistan and Iraq: ‘The thing I admire about this Prime Minister is that he doesn’t need a poll or a focus group to convince him of the difference between right and wrong.’17 Tony Blair, like Bush himself, of course relies heavily on polls and focus groups for every domestic initiative. It is only in the sphere of foreign policy that it appears that there are opportunities for Western leaders to project a self-image of purpose, mission and political clarity. This is because the lack of accountability involved in human rights promotion abroad facilitates the promotion of clear and strident ethical values, rather than the vagaries of compromise and political pragmatism inevitable in domestic policy.

CONCLUSION

I welcome Bellamy’s responses to Kosovo to Kabul and appreciate that questions of human rights and international intervention (rightly) raise deep-felt moral and political passions. However, I wish to reassert the need for a more open and dispassionate engagement with changes in the international sphere justified in relation to the protection of universal human rights. It is possible that prematurely choosing to take sides, for or against human rights, before adequately exploring the issues, may restrict our analysis and artificially limit our research agenda, at a time when flexibility is needed to address a period of rapid change. Defending the need for alternative (more egalitarian) futures is a very important task, but we should beware of letting our hopes restrict our critical analysis of a post-Cold War emergence of a new, even less egalitarian, hierarchy of power.

NOTES

1. For a recent survey and well balanced treatment of the issues involved see, for example, Chris Brown’s Sovereignty, Rights and Justice: International Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).
10. For a particularly apologetic perspective on the NATO war over Kosovo in 1999 see his Kosovo and International Society (London: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002).
16. Tony Blair’s speech to the House of Commons, 14 September 2001, accessed at www.guardian.co.uk/Archive/Article/0,4273,4257319,00.html.