

The Rise of Post-Intervention: Shifting Discourses of Global Political Community and the Construction of the Human

**Paper for the European Commission funded
project ‘Politics in the Global Age: Critical
Reflections on Sovereignty, Citizenship, Territory
and Nationalism’**

**Indian Institute of Technology, Madras, Chennai
12-14 December 2011**

Draft (not to be cited at present)

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Abstract

In the 1990s and 2000s debates over human security focused largely upon whether human security discourses were a challenge to the hierarchies of power, giving agency to the marginalised, or were instead liable to become co-opted into Western security agendas seeking to legitimise external intervention on the basis of the international responsibility to protect and secure those in need. An alternative reading is sketched out here, that of post-interventionism, which suggests that discourses of human security can neither be grasped as empowering or giving agency to individuals or marginalised communities nor as an extension of the liberal interventionist problematic of the 1990s which denied agency to its victims, casting Western interveners as the agents of or providers of security. In today's dominant discourses, security regimes constitute a regulative and interventionist framework of international power, but one which emphasises the agency and responsibilities of non-Western actors. These regimes operate beyond the liberal intervention/non-intervention binaries through the constitution of a pro-active framework of resilience – of work with and upon the vulnerable.

Introduction

International intervention into (post-)conflict zones has been radically transformed since the high-profile debates and discussions of humanitarian intervention and human rights in the 1990s. In that decade, the dominant discursive framings were those of abusers and victims – and the insertion of international interveners in the role of external saviours and external judges, with the moral duty of bringing security and the sovereign rule of law to the benighted borderlands. In this framework, non-Western victims were to be protected or saved by humanitarian interveners who assumed the role of sovereign protection once the post-colonial or post-conflict state was judged to lack the capacities or the will to fulfil its sovereign duties of protecting the human rights or human security of its citizens. Security was to be constructed in the universal human rights-centred language of global or cosmopolitan law, rather than in the state-based, territorialised language of international relations, where it was held that governing elites could hide behind claims to sovereign impunity. Sovereignty had to give way to intervention in order for a new world of global rights and global security to be enforced (see for example, Archibugi 2000; Booth 1991; Linklater 1998).

Allied to the discussions of humanitarian intervention and the protection of human rights a third 'human-centred' framework entered international policy discourse in the mid-1990s: that of human security. Human security frameworks were posed in less clear terms - with its broad emphasis on prevention and international development under the rubric of 'freedom from want' as well as upon the need for more reactive and coercive humanitarian intervention under the rubric of 'freedom from fear' – human security appeared to try and saddle two horses at once, creating confusion or ambiguity as to whether the concept was broadly or narrowly construed (Martin and Owen 2010: 213-4).

Nevertheless both ‘narrow’ (more conservative) and ‘broad’ (more radical) approaches were understood as presaging a transformation in international security approaches, challenging the traditional agendas of power and placing the needs of the individual at the centre of security discourses (Kaldor 2007; Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007).

Human security was perhaps seen as the least conceptually interesting of the three ‘human-centred’ framings, lacking the political content of the intervention/sovereignty debate or that of the ethical/political framing of human rights. In fact, it could be argued that it is the most conceptually interesting. The discourse of human security allowed the conflation of two very different understandings of security and intervention. The ‘freedom from want’ perspective clearly put the agency of those most in need of assistance at the centre, stressing a programme of empowerment and capacity-building. In the ‘freedom from fear’ framing, the emphasis was upon the agency of external interveners, acting to save or to secure the victims of state-led or state-condoned abuses. Thus the framework of human security was often described as unproblematically combining ‘protection and empowerment’: as both a ‘top-down’ and a ‘bottom-up’ approach. This paper will argue that the discourse of human security has largely been misconceived through its discussion in terms of the binary division between a military/security focus held to reinforce dominant power relations and a development/basic needs focus held to be a radical and empowering approach (Chandler and Hynek 2010).

More to the point, the discussions which argue that human security itself is becoming marginalised with the growing dominance of security concerns under the rubric of the Responsibility to Protect, with its emphasis on protection of populations, rather than empowerment, is particularly misplaced (see, for example, Orford 2011). This perspective is clearly articulated in Mary Martin and Taylor Owen’s influential article in *International Affairs*, which argues that the term human security ‘has all but vanished’ from high level UN reports (2010: 211) and that security discourses are now dominated by the Responsibility to Protect, with its emphasis on intervention and the conditional nature of sovereignty. They argue that this shift has denuded the radical content of human security approaches, where it is no longer clear whether international interventions are in the interests of empowering and capacity-building others or about serving Western security interests through projecting power abroad to secure other regions (ibid.: 222).

This division is emphasised in the 2010 UN Secretary-General’s *Human Security* report to the General Assembly, which firmly distances human security from the concerns of the use of force seen to be the prerogative of the Responsibility to Protect:

The use of force is not envisaged in the application of the human security concept. The focus of human security is on fostering Government and local capacities and strengthening the resilience of both to emerging challenges in ways that are mutually reinforcing, preventive and comprehensive.

Meanwhile the responsibility to protect, as agreed upon by Member States in paragraphs 138 to 140 of the World Summit Outcome, focuses on protecting populations from specific cases of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and

crimes against humanity. (UNSG 2010: §23-24).

In this framing, human security is demarcated from the use of force and defined as a preventive security project of empowering resilient subjects able to secure themselves and not necessitating reactive protective coercive or militarised external intervention. This paper seeks to demonstrate that this conceptualisation of human security as distinct from the approach taken by the Responsibility to Protect is misplaced and that rather than human security being potentially high-jacked by the narrow, militarised, ‘protection’ approach to human security or needing to be conceptually distinguished from the Responsibility to Protect; that, in fact, the recent changes and shifts in the understanding of both the Responsibility to Protect and humanitarian intervention can only be fully grasped by understanding that the discursive framings of human security are in clear ascendancy. Where the dominant understanding of the problematic of human security is that it has been hijacked by the security agenda of the ‘freedom from fear’ providing legitimacy for military intervention on the basis of the international protection of ‘victims’, it will be suggested here that, in fact, the empowering and capacity-building agency-focused framings of ‘freedom from want’ have become much more influential in orientating international security discourses around the empowerment of the ‘vulnerable’ through discourses of resilience. This framework is conceptualised here in terms of post-interventionism (see further, Chandler 2010; Foucault 2008; Joerges 2010).

This paper seeks to argue that the decline of human security as an empowering and capability-building discourse has been based upon a fetishisation of the use of the term rather than an understanding of the underlying approach, which has always been at the heart of human security frameworks. This has resulted in an aporetic understanding of human-centred approaches to security, which has prevented the theorizing of the emergence of post-interventionist framings of security. As an example of the post-interventionist approach pioneered by human security, this paper focuses on the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P), often seen as a prime example of the shift from the broad to the narrow framing of security discourses. This paper will challenge the narrative of the R2P as illustrating the shift away from a human security focus on empowerment and capability-building, and suggest that even in its initial establishment it already reflected a retreat or problematisation of the shift from intervention on behalf of victims to the agency-based approach of work to make the vulnerable resilient. It will be suggested that the conceptual gap between human security discourses and that of the R2P is being bridged by the shift from a focus upon intervention to the post-interventionist framings of human security.

The first section of this paper heuristically stakes out a genealogy of the subject of security within international relations, tracing the emergence of the post-interventionist paradigm of resilience. The second section will then focus on the transformation of the R2P and the third will expand upon the discourse of the post-intervention and the practices of inculcating resilience. Here the subject of resilience is understood as one which is judged as incapable of acting with autonomous agency to secure but instead is under the external compulsion of external actors whose legitimacy and authority is discursively produced not through their own capacity to secure but through their capacity

to enhance the securing capabilities of states and populations judged to be fragile or vulnerable. The subject of resilience is one which is always open to external intervention - always in the process of becoming; of being capacity-built – never denied autonomy but at the same time never conceived of as capable of securing itself.

Shifting Paradigms of Security

This paper is concerned with the shifting understanding of the subject of security and the practices of intervention within the discipline of international relations. This section focuses on the R2P and, in the heuristic terms of paradigm shifts, draws out two stages: firstly, the shift towards a global discursive framework of intervention posed in terms of the weighing of competing concerns of human rights and sovereignty - reflected in debates on the ‘right of intervention’ and the alleged emergence of a ‘global community’ capable of authorizing such intervention - which was dominant in the 1990s; followed by a retreat from the consequences of this liberal internationalist imaginary to what I describe as the post-interventionist paradigm, cohered in the 2000s, which moved beyond the liberal problematic, reformulating the political subject in relation to security in terms of resilience (the need to intervene to construct securing capacity) rather than autonomy (the capacity to secure oneself). In this framework, the inculcation of resilience is the work of external engagement conceived in post-interventionist terms, as prevention rather than as post-hoc or after the fact, intervention. In this way, intervention and sovereignty are no longer binary opposites; there is no longer an inside and an outside or a clash of rights. Human security or human-centered approaches no longer challenge states or sovereignty, in this framework, but instead are conceived as constructing subjects: as empowering.

Interventionism of the 1990s

In the 1990s, with the collapse of the cold war divide, many theorists and political leaders suggested that the end of the problematic of IR had been reached with the domestication of the global. States began to articulate ‘ethical’ foreign policies, eschewing the idea of national interests and articulating the values of ‘global citizenship’. In this ‘new international order’, leading Western states suggested that – in the absence of a formally constituted global sovereign or world government – they could act as putative sovereigns of the international sphere. Through discussions of human rights protection and humanitarian intervention, leading policy discourses of the international framed the world in liberal terms whereby Western states and international institutions, such as the United Nations, NATO, the OSCE and the European Union, increasingly came to envisage international policy making as if they were acting not merely as representatives of their own interests but as imagined global authorities, capable of securing and balancing the interests of others.

In this context, the boundaries of sovereignty appeared not to matter and Western governments began to conceive of domestic and foreign policies in similar terms, regardless of representation or accountability (see, for example, Cooper 2003). In the terminology of Michel Foucault, the international sphere was imagined as a ‘liberal

economy of power' in which freedom and security could be framed similarly in both the domestic and international arenas. The question of 'intervention' was calculated on the basis of this balance:

The principle of calculation is what is called security. That is to say, liberalism, the liberal art of government, is forced to determine the precise extent to which and up to what point individual interest, that is to say individual interests insofar as they are different and possibly opposed to each other, constitute a danger for the interest of all. (Foucault 2008, p. 65)

The particular freedoms of state sovereignty were weighed against the collective security of 'international society', held to be manifest in the duty of protecting the rights and security of all. Security discursively shifted from a concern of states, with the protection and promotion of their national interests, to the interventionist discourse of human rights protection, construed as a reflection of the immanent or emerging 'global community'.

The liberal framing of the international sphere, imagined the domestication of conflict under the regulatory gaze of the putative global sovereigns, acting within or outwith the consent of the UN Security Council, as representatives of an immanent, global or cosmopolitan legal framework (for example, Held 1995; Archibugi 2003; Kaldor 2003; Habermas 1999). The power to act - to intervene - of major Western powers, began to be equated with a moral legitimacy to act in accordance with higher laws, articulated over the NATO war over Kosovo, in terms of 'natural law', 'cosmopolitan law' or 'global ethics' (see *AJIL* 1999; Krish 2002). The 'Spiderman' movie encapsulated the satisfaction with moral hierarchy, strongly articulated at the time, asserting that 'with great power comes great responsibility'.

However, the assertive and optimistic mood of the 1990s began to dissipate as the putative claims to global sovereignty resulted in a counter discourse of Western responsibility. If the West was now responsible, why was it that troops were not dispatched to prevent genocide in Rwanda? Why did Western states prevaricate and delay when intervention was needed to prevent genocide in Bosnia? Why was it that the war over Kosovo, the asserted high water mark of global liberal interventionism, was fought from 15,000 feet, preventing the loss of a single NATO life but at the cost of the 'collateral' damage of the deaths of many of those who NATO was sent to save? Why was it that global responsibility seemed to stop when it came to addressing the structural inequalities of poverty and insecurity that blighted whole swathes of the post-colonial world, especially sub-Saharan Africa? The political leaders of Western states and international institutions realised that the discourse of global ethics and Western responsibility had its limits: that the consequences of dismissing the importance of international law and sovereign statehood undermined, rather than enforced, their moral claims to global leadership. It was in the context of the rolling back of claims of liberal interventionist claims of Western responsibility, and of the overt claims of Western powers to the mantle of global sovereignty, that the R2P was born. Emerging in response to the need to limit the claims upon the West: as a retreat from Western responsibility.

The Retreat from Intervention

The R2P was formally conceived in 2000, in the wake of the Kosovo campaign, where Western states, under the banner of the NATO alliance launched a humanitarian intervention without the consent of the UN Security Council - although its roots lie in Francis Deng's assertion of 'Sovereignty as Responsibility' in response to super power withdrawal from Africa and the need to constitute local and regional forms of conflict-management (see Deng *et al* 1996). The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), which produced the *Responsibility to Protect* report in 2001, sought to deflect attention from Western responsibility and Western rights of intervention, arguing that responsibility for the protection of basic rights and security was shared but was primarily the responsibility of the domestic state concerned. Starting from the functional responsibility to protect the individual, the report steered away from the liberal discourse of intervention, which pitted the universal 'human' rights of individuals against the particularist, conditional, sovereign rights of states.

Defining the protection of rights as part of the responsibility of sovereignty, the report argued that there was no clash of rights and that Western states had responsibilities to enable and facilitate the sovereign capacities of non-Western states and that only if this failed would coercive intervention be necessary. The report sought to assuage the advocates of Western intervention that bringing the state back in was not a retreat from Western responsibility but, at the same time, was keen to mediate the relationship between Western responsibility and the problems of conflict in the non-Western world, further seeking to bring in the ambiguous normative framework of 'just war' to moderate the more interventionist arguments of those who argued that the liberal framing of interventionism was essentially without sovereign limits, and amounted to no more than 'cosmopolitan law enforcement', more akin to policing than war (see Kaldor 2003).

The R2P reflected a world where the liberal discourse of the globalising or domestication of the international sphere shifted onto the defensive and clearly articulated the signs of retreat from the triumphalist claims of the early- and mid-1990s (see Chandler 2006). However, for the advocates of the R2P, it was understood, at the time, as representing and institutionalising the gains of that era. It was seen to be a symbol of the global cosmopolitan order of liberal rights and justice, which the 1990s appeared to promise. For these advocates, the evolution of the R2P has been a disappointment and hard to explain (see, for example, Evans 2008; Bellamy 2009). Why has the interventionist promise of the R2P been shelved? Why did the UN World Summit agreement of 2005 entirely separate R2P from the need to reform the decision-making process of intervention in the UN Security Council?

The Rise of a Post-Interventionist Order

The R2P was, in fact, substantially transformed when the concept was revived by Kofi Annan in 2003, in preparation for the World Summit (Evans 2008; Bellamy 2009; Chandler 2009). In its revived form, the R2P was refitted into a much more radical human security framework, concerned with prevention and resilience. Interestingly, this

top-down, more narrow approach to human security was constructed on the basis of a rational-choice, conservative, neoliberal or neo-institutionalist understanding of conflict and underdevelopment in the non-Western world (see, for example, North 1990; World Bank 1997; 2000; Ghani and Lockhart 2008). The UN Secretary General's follow-up report to the World Summit, illustrated this approach well in asking the question 'why one society plunges into mass violence while its neighbours remain relatively stable'? (UNSG 2009, para. 15) The answer it provided was the neo-institutionalist framing; understanding mass atrocities outside of a concern with economic and social relations, focusing merely on the institutional structures which are held to shape the behavioural choices of individuals, either providing opportunities and incentives for mass atrocities or limiting the possibility of these occurring:

Genocide and other crimes relating to the responsibility to protect do not just happen. They are, more often than not, the result of a deliberate and calculated political choice, and of the decisions and actions of political leaders who are all too ready to take advantage of existing social divisions and institutional failures. (Ibid.: para. 21)

The understanding of mass atrocities as a product of institutional shortcomings then set up the agenda for international preventive engagement to assist in institutional capacity-building that would make states 'less likely to travel the path to crimes relating to the responsibility to protect':

Experience and common sense suggest that many of the elements of what is commonly accepted as good governance – the rule of law, a competent and independent judiciary, human rights, security sector reform, a robust civil society, an independent press and a political culture that favours tolerance, dialogue and mobility over the rigidities of identity politics – tend to serve objectives relating to the responsibility to protect as well. (Ibid.: para. 44)

There is no liberal internationalist discourse of protecting the victims. There is no 'quick fix' of intervention and exit-strategies, but much lower expectations, stressing the lack of universality and the difference between institutions and cultures, which constitute a barrier to Western capacity and responsibility. Here, the best that the international community can do is to indirectly work to facilitate good governance mechanisms and capacity-build state institutions which are the ultimate solution, rather than the direct provision of expensive social, economic and military resources.

Dealing with the problem of weak or failing states in the post-interventionist paradigm of human security does not rely on a liberal discourse of intervention, as there is no rationalist assumption of a securing subject. Failing states are held to lack the capacity to secure themselves or to prevent themselves from becoming security threats to others. At the same time, there is no assumption that external agency, acting as constituted global sovereigns, can secure failing states. The post-interventionist discourse asserts the solution of preventive self-management – this is not the return of internationalist self-help but a globalised framing of external intervention that is orientated around assisting others

to help themselves. Intervention does not take the liberal form of post-hoc securing, developing or democratizing but the post-interventionist form of the preventive inculcation of capacity- or capability-building in order to strengthen adaptive efficiency.

This shift is aptly demonstrated by consideration of the ongoing bombing of Libya (as of June 2011), heralded by many international relations commentators as marking a return to the 1990s era of humanitarian intervention. If this is humanitarian intervention it certainly lacks the ethical/political/legal framework of meaning of the 1990s. The claim of the interveners does not derive from any global ethical assumption of duty or right (in fact, the bombing campaign has the state-based international legal sanction of the UN Security Council). More importantly, the Libya campaign does not present the 'humanitarian' bombing as an undermining or rolling back of state sovereignty. Instead it is posed in the post-interventionist language of capacity-building and good governance, allegedly strengthening the Libyan state through enabling the forces for democracy (anyway, those supporting the disparate opposition forces) to strengthen their influence.

The Post-Interventionist Discourse

The post-interventionist order is conceptually very different from that of the 1990s debates on human-centered and state-centered approaches. The post-interventionist world order no longer counter positions external intervention to sovereignty as if this was a zero-sum game, or articulates intervention in the language of a clash of rights or as a problem which needs a legal solution, but rather sees the internationalisation of state governance as a process of empowerment, of capacity- and capability-building. This shift is reflected well in discussions of intervention as bridging the 'sovereignty gap' (Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan 2005) and in Stephen Krasner's view of 'domestic sovereignty' being built up (or co-produced) by external actors on the basis of giving up 'Westphalian/Vattelian sovereignty' (Krasner 2004, pp. 87-88; see further, Chandler 2010). Despite the increased regulatory engagement, the discourse is one of prevention and the building of sovereignty, not of intervention and the denial of sovereignty. In its attempt to come to terms with this different – post-interventionist - framing of the international sphere the doctrine of the R2P has adapted to human security models of intervention. The form of adaptation illustrates clearly how our understanding of the international sphere, and intervention within this, has shifted from the 1990s, when the subjects of human rights and of humanitarian intervention were construed as 'victims' and understood to lack agency and require protection and securing by external actors. In the 2010s it appears that the R2P has been most successful when discursively articulating the modes of reasoning of the human security discourse.

This shift brings discourses of 'freedom from fear' very much into line with the discourses of 'freedom from want' clearly articulated in the 'broader' discourses of human security which are seen to be much more empowering and emancipatory. What this misses is that the discursive framing of the 'broader' discourse with its emphasis upon prevention, resilience and empowerment is exactly that which facilitates dominant discourses of international regulation and intervention today, rather than that of the struggle to displace 'state-based' approaches to security with 'human-centred' ones.

From its inception, in the 1994 UNDP Human Development report, *New Dimensions of Human Security*, the conceptual framework of human security has always sat uneasily with the focus on sovereignty and intervention at the centre of discussions of the legal and moral standing of human rights or humanitarian reasons for intervention. This can be seen quite clearly by consideration of the four ‘essential characteristics’ of human security flagged up as part of the radical rethinking of traditional state-based security frameworks: the first two are the fact that human security approaches are conceived as ‘universal’ and ‘interdependent’, the second two are that human security approaches focus on ‘prevention’ rather than intervention and that they are ‘people-centred’ (UNDP 1994: 22-33). There is no discussion about the problematic of sovereignty, in fact, already upon its inception human security discourses focused on people as agents rather than as victims and upon intervention as a way of giving people more control over their own lives and decisions and of enhancing their autonomy:

Ensuring human security does not mean taking away from people the responsibility and opportunity for mastering their lives. To the contrary, when people are insecure, they become a burden on society.

The concept of human security stresses that people should be able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living. This will set them free and help ensure that they can make a full contribution to development - their own development and that of their communities, their countries and the world, Human security is a critical ingredient of participatory development. (UNDP 1994: 24).

Prevention

The dominant understanding of human security today is one that seeks to evade the need for post-hoc intervention:

In recent years, responses to conflict prevention have increasingly focused on tackling the *root causes* of conflicts. This awareness has resulted in the integration of conflict *prevention* strategies into national development and poverty reduction plans. The international community has also learned that protection and *empowerment* measures are not only strategies to be adopted during and after conflicts but are also important conflict *prevention* mechanisms. As a result, protection efforts have targeted the most *vulnerable* groups, including women, children and the displaced, and have placed increasing emphasis on supporting the *capacities* of national authorities to, inter alia, provide public safety, deliver essential basic services and strengthen the rule of law. Since conflicts erode trust among communities, protection strategies are most effective when they are complemented with *empowerment* measures that promote partnerships with local and national stakeholders. Local partners can play a significant role in reinforcing *national ownership* in the country’s future, nurturing reconciliation and coexistence and restoring trust in the institutions that return stability to post-conflict situations. (UNSG 2010, §51, emphases added)

As can be seen in the above paragraph, taken from the UN Secretary General's *Human Security* report to the General Assembly in April 2010, the emphasis has shifted from post-hoc, after the fact, intervention to that of prevention. Rather than dealing with victims (who are seen to require external agency to secure them) the problematic of post-interventionism is that of the vulnerable (who are seen to lack adequate agency and to require empowerment in order to secure themselves). Through working on the root causes of conflict, through preventive intervention, the relationship between intervention and sovereignty is transformed. In rearticulating intervention in the language of prevention, the Secretary-General's report is very different from 1990s articulations, which tended to contra position sovereignty against international activity to promote human security and human rights. Sovereignty is no longer conceived here as a barrier to international intervention but is in fact its precondition. As can be seen from the report section heading, 'Human Security and National Sovereignty' the problematic of sovereignty is addressed quite differently in the UN Secretary General's 2010 report:

The advancement of human security requires strong and stable institutions. Among these, Governments retain the primary role in providing a rules-based system where societal relations are mutually supportive, harmonious and accountable. In cases where Government institutions are weak or under threat, the human security concept advocates addressing the root causes of these weaknesses and helps develop timely, targeted and effective responses that *improve the resilience* of Governments and people alike... the human security concept seeks to *enhance the sovereignty of States* by focusing on the multidimensional aspects of human and therefore national insecurities. Improved *capacities* of Governments and their institutions to provide early warning, identify root causes and address policy gaps in order to tackle persistent and emerging challenges are key components in advancing human security and maintaining a viable framework for promoting peace and stability. (UNSG 2010, §20-22 emphases added)

In this framing, conceptualized here as that of post-intervention, sovereignty and intervention no longer stand as conceptual opposites. Early or preventive intervention, as opposed to post-hoc or reactive intervention, is here understood as building or strengthening sovereignty rather than as undermining it. There is no longer a discourse which distinguishes the state as a problem requiring the limiting or constricting of sovereignty in order for external agency to secure its citizens. Here, both the post-colonial/post-conflict state and the society are seen to require enhanced capabilities in order to be able to secure themselves – to require the inculcation of resilience.

Resilience

Resilience is key to the post-interventionist framing of human security. The subject of resilience practices is held to have autonomy but also to lack the capacity to secure itself or to act in its own best interests. Rather than sovereignty being conceptually understood as the autonomous capacity to act as a rational interest-securing agent, the fundamental link between autonomy and security is broken. The capacity to act as a self-securing actor

– to be able to secure one’s interests rationally and autonomously – is thereby removed from the liberal discourse of sovereignty and rights. The subject of resilience requires external intervention. However, this intervention is not conceived of as undermining that subject’s rights or autonomy. The subject of resilience requires intervention in order to become a self-securing rational subject, in order to be better able to pursue its interests and to govern itself in ways which enable security to be maintained at both domestic and international levels.

Resilience practices work on the subject understood to lack the securing capabilities traditionally associated with sovereignty in discourses of liberal modernity. Here external intervention is held to be necessary in order to enable the subject to become self-securing. Resilience is a measure of the internal capabilities of states held to be failing, fragile or vulnerable, however this form of measurement is not open to traditional forms of liberal understanding. This is for two reasons. Firstly, resilience discursively operates on an open scale or continuum; the attaining of resilience is not possible as the potential risks and problems are diverse and unknowable – the capacity to preventively manage security problems is always going to be contingent. Secondly, resilience is an inner or an internal attribute for making the right choices and judgments and can only be measured indirectly, it is a capacity for good governance not a set of rules or laws or institutions that can be established once and for all; practices which seem to demonstrate resilience one day may be inadequate to cope with problems on another day. In this way the human security practices of inculcating resilience can only be understood as a process of developing capabilities. This process has no end point as preventive intervention is a process which always presupposes the existence of problems which cannot be managed in the future. It is only after the future crisis has been successfully managed that resilience capabilities can be judged. This is an open-ended future-orientated process and in this way works entirely differently from the post-hoc after-the-fact interventions of liberal discourses.

The Responsibility to Protect today is illustrative of the dominance of human security frameworks and emphasises future-orientated or preventive practices, aimed at addressing the causes rather than consequences of security threats. Preventive practices are therefore concerned with inculcating the capacities for resilience; the spreading of empowering practices enabling subjects to preventively secure themselves.

Empowerment

This framework of human security is often presented as a radical democratization of security, where the threats to human security are seen as those which threaten the security of the most vulnerable who therefore need the most external intervention in order to enhance their capacities for security. This framework is that of intervention to protect through empowerment rather than through external sovereign intervention. As Sadako Ogata, co-chair of the UN Commission on Human Security stated in a conference speech title ‘Empowering People for Human Security’:

To attain the goals of human security, the Commission proposes a framework based upon the protection and empowerment of people. Neither of these can be dealt with

in isolation as they are mutually reinforcing. Protection refers to the norms, processes and institutions required to shield people from critical and pervasive threats. It implies a 'top-down' approach, such as establishing the rule of law, accountable and transparent institutions, and democratic governance structures. States have the primary responsibility to implement such a protective infrastructure. Empowerment emphasizes people as actors and participants in defining and implementing their vital freedoms. This implies a 'bottom-up' approach. People protected can exercise choices. And people empowered can make better choices, and actively prevent and mitigate the impact of insecurities. (Ogata n.d., 2)

In the discourse of post-intervention, work to inculcate resilient subjects, which are capable of securing themselves, presupposes the absence of securing agency or the absence of sovereigns in a Hobbesian sense (Hobbes 1978). It is held that the post-colonial or post-conflict state lacks securing capability but this is not addressed through the interposition of a new sovereign actor acting to secure in its own (extended) sovereign capacity (as in the debates over humanitarian intervention - and protection/protectorate powers - in the 1990s).

The discourse of human security inverts a liberal understanding of sovereign securing power. The emphasis is no longer upon the sovereign acting as a securing agent; the discourse of human security, empowerment and resilience insists that the emphasis must be upon a 'bottom up' understanding of security. Securing agency is 'de-liberalised' in this discourse. This is the social contract framing of liberal modernity with the collective constitution of securing agency at the level of the state, tasking the sovereign with the post-hoc duty of intervention to correct any problematic outcomes of the free interplay of market forces or of democratic contestation. Human security works in reverse. Here there is a shift from state-based conceptions of security as a task of the state – of high politics.

The task of the state is no longer to secure but to facilitate or to empower citizen-subjects so that they can become rational interest-bearing subjects capable of securing themselves. Rather than securing power being transferred to the sovereign, this securing power is decentralized or dispersed back into society:

An actor-oriented, agency-based resilience framework...reframes resilience from a systems-oriented to a people-centred perspective. It starts by considering social actors and their agency, arenas and respective agendas in the transformation of livelihoods in a resilient way. The framework proposes a normative context of entitlements, capabilities, freedoms and choices or, even more broadly, of justice, fairness and equity. An agency-based framework measures resilience in terms of how peoples' livelihood vulnerability can be reduced or, to put it more broadly, in terms of their human security. Mechanisms for resilience-building, from this perspective, are first and foremost about empowering the most vulnerable to pursue livelihood options that strengthen what they themselves consider to be their social sources of resilience. (Bohle, Etzold and Keck 2009: 12)

In this dispersal of securing power, the task of the state is to focus on empowering those

held to be least able to secure themselves – least able to govern themselves through reason and respond preventively to security threats. In this way, no conceptual distinction is made between the empowering practices of the domestic state and of international interveners as both are constructed as pursuing the same tasks of dispersing the power to secure, rather than as acting as securing actors per se.

In this framework there is no clash of sovereign powers because sovereign power in the liberal sense of self-securing agency is taken out of the realm of international relations. Under discourses of human security states are not being constructed as capable of acting externally to secure themselves vis-à-vis other states, as in traditional security discourses. Human security instead focuses on the state as the inculcator of resilience, as capable of capacity- or capability-building the vulnerable. In fact, the sign of high military spending (the traditional indicator of security capability) is seen as an indicator that a state may be neglecting its duties of human security:

One of the most useful indicators of political insecurity in a country is the priority the government accords military strength - since governments sometimes use armies to repress their own people. If a government is more concerned about its military establishment than its people, this imbalance shows up in the ratio of military to social spending (table 2.3). The two nations with the highest ratios of military spending to education and health spending in 1980 were Iraq (8 to 1) and Somalia (5 to 1). (UNDP 1994: 33)

Once autonomy is problematized, the concept of sovereignty or of self-government or self-determination is no longer equated with the subject capacity to secure. Sovereignty or self-government applies to a range of capacities for good governance rather than to self-direction or the establishment of autonomous political goals or aspirations. The capacity of states to act as political communities - as sovereign, i.e. self-governing, actors - is no longer equated with their capabilities to secure their own subjects. In this framing, the problem of failed and failing states is precisely that they are difficult subjects of resilience practices, that their alleged lack of capacity prevents the easy inculcation of resilience. The good governance practices that are held to assist in securing society in the liberal West are held to be problematic in the post-colonial world. The problematic of the inculcation of resilience has been at the centre of academic discourses. From Nobel prize-winning development theorists, such as Amartya Sen and Douglass North, to leading security theorists, such as Paul Collier, the problem of security has been seen to be that of the difficulty of the transfer of liberal frameworks of conflict resolution and social and economic development (Sen 1990; North 1990, 2005; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner 2006).

In the post-interventionist framework, the West no longer has the responsibility to secure, to democratise, or to develop the non-Western world. This is always the lesson learned from experiences of 1990s-style interventions and their corollary of the formalised external processes of international statebuilding, where responsibility is directly assumed by international actors. It is for these reasons that human security can easily mesh with the concerns of 'post-liberal' approaches to peacebuilding, where the emphasis is

squarely placed upon ‘the capacity of people to decide their own future’ (Martin and Owen 2010: 223; see also Richmond 2011). The regulatory mechanisms of empowerment, prevention and capacity-building are premised upon the understanding that there can be no clash of rights between sovereignty and intervention, no inside and no outside. This framing assumes that the autonomy of the non-Western state is the problem, necessitating regulatory management. State autonomy facilitates or necessitates preventive engagements rather than acting as a barrier to them. External capacity-building to build sovereignty cannot be subjected or bound by liberal framings of clashes of rights or of law. Responsibility once again stops at the boundaries of the sovereign state but this is a state understood as incapable of managing its autonomy without the help of external facilitators.

Conclusion

Human security framings which seek to place the agency of the non-Western subject at the centre of security practices have become central to security discourses, even those which originally were focused upon military intervention and the assertion of Western intervention as a protecting and securing power. This does not mean that there is necessarily any less emphasis on military intervention, it does mean, however, that even when military intervention takes place it is discursively-framed as an act of facilitating or empowering or capacity-building the vulnerable subjects on the ground. The bombing of Libya stands a prime example of this shift from the 1990s discourses of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect - which originally posed intervention as the assumption of Western securing agency through the undermining of sovereignty - to a human security framing of enabling the Libyan state and people to secure themselves.

Since the 1990s, the trend has been that of a shift from Western responsibility for securing the Other to enabling the Other to secure itself, this shift cannot be readily understood through the academic and policy analysis which understands the R2P as undermining the radical potential of human security. Rather, it seems clear that the radical and empowering framings of human security have facilitated interventionist practices, up to and including coercive military engagement. It seems that radical discourses calling for the empowerment of the vulnerable through discourses of inculcating resilience are no more capable of challenging the hierarchies of power or the dominant agendas and framings of security problems and crises than more traditional or conservative discourses which similarly rely on human-centred calls for intervention. The difference is that intervention is less clearly articulated as an act of hegemonic power when posed in the post-interventionist terms of prevention, resilience and empowerment. It is therefore the more radical framings of human security that deserve much more critical attention from those concerned with challenging dominant security agendas and practices.

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