

# International State- Building: Beyond Conditionality, Beyond Sovereignty

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# **International State-Building: Beyond Conditionality, Beyond Sovereignty**

State-building - the development of international mechanisms aimed at addressing cases of state 'collapse' or at shoring up 'failing states' - is increasingly becoming the dominant framework for the international regulation of non-Western states. This paper seeks to examine the development, content and consequences of the state-building discourse. Locating state-building as a response to the consequences of the 1990s decade of humanitarian intervention, it engages with changing theoretical approaches to state sovereignty, which redefine sovereignty as state capacity rather than as political independence; recasting intervention as strengthening sovereignty rather than undermining it. Today this intervention often no longer appears as external coercion but as an internal matter of administrative assistance for 'good governance' or 'institutional capacity-building'. The consequences of this move are also considered and it is suggested that 'state-building' non-Western states without self-government will result in the institutionalisation of weak states which have little relationship with their societies and lack legitimate authority.

## **Introduction**

State-building, the development of international regulatory mechanisms aimed at addressing cases of state 'collapse' or at shoring up 'failing states' is commonly held to be the most pressing problem facing global security. According to Francis Fukuyama, 'state-building is one of the most important issues for the world community' and today has 'risen to the top of the global agenda'.<sup>1</sup> Robert I. Rotberg argues that state-building has 'become one of the critical all-consuming strategic and moral imperatives of our terrorized time'.<sup>2</sup> As the 2002 US National Security Strategy states: 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than we are by failing ones.'<sup>3</sup>

It seems that no international policy or strategy document can be complete without the focus on state-building as a key objective: in August 2004 the US government established a state-building department, the Office of the Coordinator for

Reconstruction and Stabilization;<sup>4</sup> in February 2005 the UK Government's Strategy Unit report *Investing in Prevention - An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response* viewed state-building as a key part of its 'partnerships for stability' agenda;<sup>5</sup> in March 2005, at the High Level Meeting of the OECD Donor Assistance Committee in Paris, the Ministers of Development of OECD countries agreed to a set of 'Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States' with a 'focus on state-building as the central objective';<sup>6</sup> the same month the Commission for Africa report, welcomed the fact that more than a quarter of bilateral aid to Africa is already channelled directly into state capacity-building;<sup>7</sup> in September 2005 the UN world summit agreed on the establishment of a proposed Peace-Building Commission to coordinate international activity in this area.<sup>8</sup>

The focus on state capacities and institutions seems to herald a shift away from the 1990s when new, more interventionist, norms were heralded which challenged the fundamental rights of state sovereignty - those of self-government and non-intervention. These rights took their clearest institutional form in the UN Charter framework of international law which emphasised the rights of peoples to self-government (Article 1.2), the sovereign equality of member states (Article 2.1), and the principle of non-intervention - outlawing the threat or use of force (Article 2.4).<sup>9</sup> Throughout the Cold War, successive judgements of the International Court of Justice upheld these rights to self-government and denied the existence of any legitimate grounds for external intervention, even on the basis of 'humanitarian' or 'human rights' justifications.<sup>10</sup>

After the end of the Cold War, the focus appeared to shift to an emphasis on the rights of individuals, often posed counter to the rights of states. States were no longer seen to be the primary security referent and state sovereignty was not considered to be an absolute barrier to external intervention. Following extended intervention in Iraq, to protect the Kurds and Marsh Arabs after the 1991 Gulf War, and external military intervention for humanitarian purposes in Somalia (in 1992-3) and Bosnia (1993-5) the high point of this new focus on individuals rather than states was the NATO-led international intervention over Kosovo in 1999.

Today, the state is once more at the centre of security concerns. It now appears that states, particularly those that have been marginalized by the world economy or weakened by conflict, can no longer be ignored or isolated. In the aftermath of 9/11 - where the failure of the Afghan state to control its borders and the activities of its citizens was held to have opened the way for Al Qaeda's operations - the state is no longer viewed from a mainly negative perspective. Non-Western states now appear less obviously as objects of opprobrium and are more likely to be fêted by international institutions and leading Western states, offering programmes of poverty-reduction, capacity-building, democratisation, and good governance.

This paper questions the vision of the state which is being placed at the centre of international security policy-making. The following section puts the state-building discussion in the context of current problems in conceptualising the role of states and in response to the 1990s decade of humanitarian intervention. Further sections then lay out specific problems which highlight the corrosive nature of current policy practices in this area: firstly, that the redefinition of sovereignty, central to the state-building framework, facilitates the erosion of ties linking power and accountability, enabling international interveners to distance themselves from the policies they promote; secondly, that it does not work, states without the capacity for self-government will always be weak and lacking in legitimate authority, the policy agenda focuses on bureaucratic, administrative mechanisms, which can only institutionalise current divisions between the West and the non-West and are unable to overcome the social and political divisions of post-conflict states.

### **From the 'Right to Intervene' to State-Building**

The discussion of state-building - of international mechanisms to capacity-build weak states - seems, at face value, to herald a return to traditional frameworks of international relations. This paper suggests, that this focus on a familiar political form should not obscure, what is, in effect, a radical transformation of the mechanisms of international regulation. Everyone seems to be agreed that states are not what they used to be. As Fukuyama notes, 'for well over a generation, the trend in world politics has been to weaken stateness', this trend has been particularly marked since the end of the Cold War.<sup>11</sup> It is only in the context of current uncertainties over the role and

purpose of the state that we can understand the novel processes at the heart of state-building policy and practice.

It would seem that states are losing their capacities rather than gaining them. For many commentators, this is clearly a positive shift.<sup>12</sup> Across the board of social theory, from historical sociology to postmodern international relations, states have been increasingly cast as problems rather than solutions. Charles Tilly's work is regularly drawn on to argue that states are merely government-run 'protection rackets' based on the repression and exploitation of their citizens in the interest of criminal or self-interested elites.<sup>13</sup> Postmodernists draw on the work of Foucault to argue that Clausewitz's famous dictum should be inverted to reveal the illegitimacy of the liberal democratic state and understand 'politics as the continuation of war by other means'.<sup>14</sup> David Campbell, Mary Kaldor and others argue that it was the state-orientated perspective of the international community that encouraged many post-Cold War conflicts, such as the Bosnian war.<sup>15</sup>

In this context, the focus on the state, rather than on alternative forms of international governance might seem to be an unexpected development. Some commentators have explained this by suggesting that the new focus on state capacity is a reaction against the 'humanitarian intervention' policies of the 1990s which were held to have underestimated the importance of states for maintaining international stability.<sup>16</sup> One example of interventionist policies, often held to have been counterproductive in this context, is that of international aid provision which bypassed state institutions establishing parallel bureaucracies and encouraging a brain drain from the underpaid state sector.<sup>17</sup> The Commission for Africa report argues that state-building policies should:

...stand in marked contrast to the approach in the 1980s and much of the 1990s, when aid was often used to try to compensate for poor governance, simply ignored governance issues, tried to force policies on reluctant countries, or aimed primarily at advancing the economic or political interests of the donor'.<sup>18</sup>

Several commentators, have highlighted that the result of 1990s humanitarian and human rights interventions has been the ‘sucking out’ of state capacity as core state functions have been taken over by UN agencies, international institutions and international NGOs, undermining the legitimacy and authority of non-Western states.<sup>19</sup>

With the end of the Cold War, there rapidly developed increasingly interventionist regimes of international regulation, clearly exposing claims of international sovereign equality and in the process forcing Western powers and international institutions to account for the outcomes of these regulatory practices. Once relations of sovereign equality were openly brought into question through aid conditionality and human rights intervention, the question was sharply posed of Western responsibility. This was most strikingly raised in the Balkans, where individual Western states, and the EU, UN and other international institutions played a major role in overseeing the fragmentation of the Yugoslav state, making key decisions on recognition and republic boundaries. The result of this process of being drawn directly into conflict prevention was the unwieldy international protectorates of Bosnia, since 1995, and Kosovo, since 1999, which have left intervening institutions exposed (so much so that the UN was opposed to assuming responsibilities in Afghanistan). Since 9/11, with the likelihood that new Western responsibilities would be acquired through ‘regime change’, there was even greater pressure to develop new approaches which could help distance the West from the consequences of interventionist policies.

There is little doubt that international policy intervention in the 1980s and 1990s tended to bypass or reduce the non-Western state’s administrative and political institutional capacity: through giving coercive powers of conditionality to international financial institutions which imposed fiscal regimes cutting the state’s role in the economy and service provision; implementing discrete projects run independently by international agencies and NGOs; or by dictating policy-outcomes through tying aid to donor goods and services. However, the key element of these interventions was their overtly external and coercive nature. The relations of authority were transparent; nowhere more so than in aid conditionality where international financial institutions specified detailed policies which the recipient countries had to

accept. It was clear that, in these cases, non-Western governments, particularly those in Africa, were more accountable to international donors than to their own people.<sup>20</sup>

Bearing this context in mind, this paper suggests that the new focus on the non-Western state has less to do with the desire for strong non-Western states, or a new found confidence in non-Western governing elites, than a desire on the behalf of Western states to avoid direct accountability for policy interventions, which have thrown up as many problems as they have answered. The fact that state-building is not driven by the need to strengthen non-western states is highlighted by the strong consensus, among those engaged in the field, that ‘strong’ states are deeply problematic; that state capacities should not include the traditional ‘right to do what they will within their own borders’.

I. William Zartman, for example, argues that ‘weak/soft’ states are no worse than ‘hard/brittle’ states – while weak states cannot exercise adequate authority over the domestic arena, ‘strong/hard/brittle’ states exercise too much authority and tend to marginalise other voices from civil society.<sup>21</sup> Robert I. Rotberg agrees that there is a ‘special category of weak state: the seemingly strong one’ and that the number of states in this category has grown rapidly in recent times.<sup>22</sup> States that are resistant to external engagement in their affairs, which cling to traditional ideas of ‘Westphalian sovereignty, referring to the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority configurations’ are seen to be problematic.<sup>23</sup> In fact, the more one investigates the capacity-building literature the more difficult it is to isolate exactly what is meant by claims that states are being ‘capacity-built’ by external interveners. The first thing that is clear is that the aim is not to create states as classically understood, as self-governing, independent and autonomous political subjects.

This paper argues that today’s discussion of ‘bringing the state back in’, in the policy discussions of state failure and state-building, can be better understood as a radical extension of the practices of the 1980s and 1990s which internationalised the domestic policy-making sphere of non-Western states.<sup>24</sup> The key difference, with the overtly ‘interventionist’ approach of the 1990s is that the emphasis is now on the non-Western state rather than those states and institutions doing the intervening. The transition away from justifying and holding intervening powers to account was

presaged by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) *Responsibility to Protect* report, published in December 2001, and formulated prior to 9/11.

In this widely cited report, the Commission proposed a shift in language away from the ‘human-centred’ framework of a ‘right to intervention’ and towards a ‘state-centred’ framework of the ‘responsibility to protect’. Whereas the ‘right of intervention’ put the emphasis on the international interveners to justify and legitimise their actions, the ‘responsibility to protect’ sought to avoid this ‘attention on the claims, rights and prerogatives of the potentially intervening states’.<sup>25</sup> The ‘responsibility to protect’ seeks to off-load responsibility onto the non-Western state at the same time as these states increasingly lose their policy-making authority.

The ICISS report successfully set out to ‘shift the terms of the debate’ and has facilitated the evasion of any clarification of the competing rights of state sovereignty and of those of intervening powers, by arguing that state rights of sovereignty can co-exist with external intervention and state-building. The report spells out that, in its view, ‘sovereignty then means accountability to two separate constituencies: internally, to one’s own population; and internationally, to the community of responsible states’.<sup>26</sup> As the Commission co-chairs note, this shift changes ‘the essence of sovereignty, from control to responsibility’.<sup>27</sup> The major implications which this shift would have for accountability (a power which is accountable to another, external, body clearly lacks sovereign authority – the capacity for self-government) have been consistently played down by the report’s authors and academic commentators. Robert Keohane, for example, disingenuously argues that the ICISS report is not at all ‘devaluing’ sovereignty, merely that it is ‘reinterpreting’ it, to bring the concept more into line with the modern world.<sup>28</sup>

Rather than the 1990s debate, where international intervention was posed in terms of a clash of competing rights – the ‘right of intervention’ against the ‘right of state sovereignty’ – today the language is one of ‘shared responsibilities’ and ‘new partnerships’. Where the non-Western state was the subject of overtly coercive external intervention it is now more likely to be the focus of supportive, empowering, and capacity-building practices and new modalities of surveillance. The product of

this change has been the enthronement of the state-building discourse as the framework for discussing Western regulation of and intervention in non-Western states.

This shift in the language of the Western projection of power reflects both the new relations of subordination with the end of the bi-polar world and at the same time the desire of Western institutions to reject direct accountability and distance themselves from the direct management of 'zones of instability'. The state-building framework seeks to obfuscate and confuse relations of power and accountability which stood clearly exposed in the 1990s as a fundamental clash of rights. The *Responsibility to Protect* report, in emphasising the responsibilities of the non-Western state, heralded the shift towards state-building as a policy of both intervention and avoidance. The contradictions involved in this process are highlighted in the irony that states are alleged to being 'built' at the same time as they increasingly lose the traditional attribute of sovereignty: self-government.

### **States without Sovereignty**

Sovereignty in international relations signifies political and legal autonomy; constitutional independence. It is a legal concept which is unconditional and indivisible. As Robert Jackson summarises:

[It is] legal in that a sovereign state is not subordinate to another sovereign but is necessarily equal to it by international law... Absolute [unconditional] in that sovereignty is either present or absent. When a country is sovereign it is independent categorically: there is no intermediate condition. Unitary [indivisible] in that a sovereign state is a supreme authority within its jurisdiction.<sup>29</sup>

Prior to decolonisation in the last century, the sovereign state form was only one of several kinds of international status. Under European colonialism territorial entities took the form of 'colonies', 'protectorates', 'mandates', 'trust territories', or 'dominions'.<sup>30</sup> What these various forms had in common was formal legal subordination to a foreign power; they were a denial of sovereignty. There is nothing

inevitable or natural about the sovereign state form or about its universalisation in the twentieth century, in the wake of World Wars One and Two.<sup>31</sup>

Few people engaged in the field would argue that international state-building in post-conflict situations is a framework for the creation or support of traditional sovereign entities. This can be seen clearly in practice in the cases of international engagement in Bosnia, Afghanistan, the handing over of ‘sovereignty’ in Iraq, and moves to make Kosovo an independent state in 2006, and more broadly in the UN and G8 proposals for state capacity-building in Africa. The sovereign state forms are held up but sovereignty is being redefined (or ‘unbundled’ in Stephen Krasner’s phraseology),<sup>32</sup> emphasising the importance of the legal shell of the state form while abandoning its political content of self-government and autonomy.

This is done in three ways. Firstly, by redefining sovereignty as a variable ‘capacity’ rather than an indivisible right; legitimising a new hierarchy of variable sovereignty and undermining the UN Charter principle of sovereign equality. Secondly, by redefining sovereignty as a duty or responsibility rather than a freedom; legitimising external mechanisms of regulation, held to enhance ‘sovereignty’ despite undermining the traditional right of self-government or autonomy. Thirdly, by exaggerating the formal importance of international legal sovereignty; this formal shell then facilitates the repackaging of external domination as ‘partnership’ or ‘country ownership’ and the voluntary contract of formally equal partners.

#### *Sovereignty as capacity?*

The most important challenge to traditional conceptions of sovereignty has been the conflation of the formal political and legal right to self-government (an absolute quality) with the question of state capacity (a variable quantity), usually formulated in terms of ‘good governance’. The conception of sovereignty as a capacity, rather than as a formal legal right to self-government and international legal equality, creates a structure of a ‘continuum’ of sovereignty or a hierarchy of sovereignty where some states are considered to be more sovereign than others. This approach was famously developed by Robert Jackson, with his conception of ‘quasi-states’.<sup>33</sup> For Jackson, the sovereignty granted to post-colonial states was artificial. Not because they were often

still under the influence of their former colonial rulers, but because many of these states did not have the capacity to regulate and control their societies to the same extent as states in the West. For Jackson, these states possessed *de jure* sovereignty, formal international legal rights, but lacked *de facto* sovereignty, the capacity to govern domestically.

This idea of the ‘unbundling’ of sovereignty into its different attributes was popularised by Stephen Krasner in his 1999 book *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. In his more recent work, he has focused on sovereignty as a ‘bundle’ of three separate attributes: ‘domestic sovereignty’, the capacity of domestic governance structures; ‘Westphalian/ Vattelian sovereignty’, i.e., self-government or political autonomy; and international legal sovereignty, formal juridical independence.<sup>34</sup> Krasner uses the problem of weak capacity to argue that self-government should not be a barrier to international intervention. Whereas in the 1990s intervention would have been posed as a conflict between human rights (or the right of intervention) and the right of state sovereignty (self-government and autonomy), in Krasner’s terminology there is no conflict with sovereignty because human rights would be protected if governments possessed adequate governing capacity (‘domestic sovereignty’):

Honoring Westphalian/ Vattelian sovereignty... makes it impossible to secure decent and effective domestic sovereignty... To secure decent domestic governance in failed, failing, and occupied states, new institutional forms are needed that compromise Westphalian/ Vattelian sovereignty for an indefinite period.<sup>35</sup>

The discovery that the equality of sovereignty hides the inequality of state capacities was not a new one. The same problem, although to a lesser extent, is present in domestic politics, where equality at the ballot box or under the law in liberal democracies does not necessarily ameliorate social and economic inequalities between individuals. In the domestic context, of course, relatively few people would argue that these inequalities should mean that formal political and legal equalities should be abandoned. In the international sphere, the existence of vast inequalities of power was one of the reasons that state sovereignty, held to be unconditional and indivisible, was the founding principle of international society. It was only on this

basis, of formally upholding the equality and autonomy of states and the sovereign rights of non-intervention, that post-colonial societies could be guaranteed the rights to self-government. UN General Assembly declarations during the Cold War regularly asserted that differences in state capacity could never be grounds for undermining the rights of state sovereignty.

The affirmation that differences in capacity were no justification for the unequal treatment of sovereign equals was confirmed most notably in the UN General Assembly Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December 1960 (Resolution 1514 (XV)) which proclaimed that: ‘all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development’ and that ‘inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence’.<sup>36</sup> This was passed in the General Assembly by a vote of 89 to 0, with 9 abstentions. Even the colonial powers were unwilling to reject it.<sup>37</sup> This was followed by the Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty of 21 December 1965 (Resolution 2131 (XX)) and the Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of 24 October 1970 (Resolution 2625 (XXV)). The latter declaration making it clear that: ‘All States enjoy sovereign equality. They have equal rights and duties and are equal members of the international community, notwithstanding differences of an economic, social, political or other nature.’<sup>38</sup>

By associating sovereignty with a sliding scale of ‘capacities’, rather than political and legal rights of equality, not only is a new international hierarchy legitimised but intervention can be framed as supporting ‘sovereignty’ at the same time as it is undermining the rights of self-government. This inversion of the concept of ‘sovereignty’ is formulated in the clearest terms in the UK Overseas Development Institute (ODI) working paper report ‘Closing the Sovereignty Gap’. In this report, by Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart and Michael Carnahan, sovereignty is understood in functional rather than political or legal terms:

The consensus now emerging from global economic, military and political institutions signals that this gap between *de jure* sovereignty and *de facto* sovereignty is the key obstacle to ensuring global security and prosperity. The challenge is to harness the international system behind the goal of enhancing the sovereignty of states – that is, enhancing the capacity of these states to perform the functions that define them as states. Long-term partnerships must be created to prepare and then implement strategies to close this sovereignty gap.<sup>39</sup>

Here sovereignty is no longer conceived of as a right to self-government. Sovereignty is merely a capacity which can be ‘enhanced’ or, presumably, ‘weakened’. The conflation of external intervention for the purposes of ‘capacity-building’ with enhancing state sovereignty and independence is central to the state-building discourse. In Africa, where state capacity is held to be a fundamental concern for external powers engaged in supporting a multitude of empowering projects, headlined by the UN’s Millennium Development goals, these governance interventions have gone furthest.<sup>40</sup>

If sovereignty is defined as the capacity of non-Western states for ‘good governance’ there would seem to be little wrong in external institutions implementing strategies for long-term engagement in these societies in order to enhance their ‘sovereignty’. In fact, governments which resisted this external assistance could, in the Orwellian language of international state-builders, be accused of undermining their own sovereignty. The key to the success of this conceptual conflation is not in its legitimisation of external intervention (already accepted in the 1990s) but in its portrayal of external regulation as somehow empowering or strengthening non-Western states. Here is the virtuous circle for intervening powers, one that was not possible in the post-conflict interventions of the 1990s: the more intervention there is the more the target state is held to be responsible and accountable for the consequences of these practices.

*Sovereignty as responsibility?*

The second shift articulated by the advocates of state-building as empowerment is the assertion that non-Western states have the ‘responsibilities’ of sovereignty rather than the rights of sovereignty. What these ‘responsibilities’ consist of is not held to be a decision made solely by the citizens of a state or their representatives, but in ‘partnership’ with external bodies. Rather than being a barrier to external interference, sovereignty becomes a medium through which non-Western states and societies become integrated into networks of external regulation. International regulatory mechanisms of intervention are legitimised, firstly through the role of international institutions in deciding the content of the ‘responsibilities’ of sovereignty, and, secondly, through holding states to external account for ‘failings’ in the exercise of sovereignty (now discussed in the language of responsibility/capacity).

Sovereignty as ‘responsibility’ enables a new consensual or ‘partnership’ approach to state-building. Non-Western states are in a poor position to resist new international mechanisms of regulation which come replete with carrots of international aid, trade privileges, debt forgiveness, or integration into international organisations, in return for external support for governance reforms and institutional capacity-building. State-building or ‘sovereignty-building’ involves non-western states being firmly embedded in international institutional frameworks, over whose decision-making processes they have little influence. For the UK’s Overseas Development Institute, the focus on strengthening sovereignty entails a much more interventionist role by external institutions:

We define a sovereignty or state-building strategy as...the alignment of the internal and external stakeholders... In order to design and implement state-building strategies, the operation of the current international system must be reorientated towards a model where partnership and co-production of sovereignty becomes the aim of both national leaders and international partners.<sup>41</sup>

This ‘co-production of sovereignty follows the strategies adopted by the European Union towards Balkan states from 2000 onwards where international partnerships enmeshing applicant states in a network of international institutional processes were coordinated through the Stability Pact, the Stabilisation and Association Process, the

Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation programme, and the 'European Partnership' process. The prospect of future EU membership was explicitly offered to Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the Feira European Council in June 2000. At this point the EU shifted away from external conditionality and towards state-building in the Balkan region, initiating a project of 'reforming and reinventing the state in South Eastern Europe'.<sup>42</sup>

This shift from external relations of aid and trade conditionality to 'partnership' in domestic governance is symbolised by the dropping of the term 'Balkans' by international institutions, as too 'negative' and 'hegemonic' and its replacement by 'South Eastern Europe' symbolising that this is a joint project of partnership, addressing 'European problems' with 'European solutions'.<sup>43</sup> The EU argued that it was well placed to assist these states in developing governance capacity which was identified as not just their main barrier to progress but also an area where the EU held a vital 'comparative advantage' and could 'provide real added value'.<sup>44</sup> This engagement in domestic policy-making is held to have 'both pedagogical and political' benefits for the target states.<sup>45</sup> Although talking up the partnership between international institutions, the EU and target states; the state-building process has been directed by close cooperation between the EU and international financial institutions which together have provided 'an effective means of focusing authorities' minds on essential reforms and of engaging with them in a sustained way to secure implementation'.<sup>46</sup>

Since 2000, the concept of state-building through international partnerships to enhance governance capacities has increasingly replaced external pressures. Where the incentive of European membership is not available a wide range of other governance partnerships have been established around acceptance that the core problem of non-Western states is that of state capacity and that the solution lies with the shared 'responsibilities' of both the non-Western state and international institutions. The general rule of thumb appears to be that the greater the inequalities at play in the relationship between non-Western states and international institutions the more grandiose the language of partnership. As would be expected, it is in relation to Africa that the rhetoric and reality are most out of step. Here the language is of

‘African leadership’ and an entirely ‘new kind of partnership’ not based on inequality and hierarchy but ‘mutual respect and solidarity’.<sup>47</sup> The UN Millennium Development Goals (MDG) project, following and extending the ‘country ownership’ approach of the interventionist Poverty Reduction Strategies, requires that states engage in far reaching governance reform and open up every area of domestic policy-making to international scrutiny and involvement. The ‘responsibilities’ or ‘leadership’ or ‘ownership’ lie with the domestic state but their partners (or joint ‘stakeholders’, in the language of the ODI authors) decide the policies:

The host country should lead and own the effort to design the MDG strategy, drawing in civil society organisations; bilateral donors; the UN specialized agencies, programs, and funds; and the international financial institutions, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the appropriate regional development bank. The contributions of the UN specialized agencies, programs and funds should be coordinated through the UN Country Team, and the UN Country Team should work closely with the international financial institutions.<sup>48</sup>

Policy ‘coherence’ is the new buzzword for external capacity-building; this coherence is gained from closely tying international aid to new institutional frameworks of regulation and monitoring. In effect, this transforms external assistance from being a subject of international relations, between states, to one of domestic politics, of management and administration. This radical transformation in the relationship between non-Western states and international institutions is highlighted forcefully by the Commission for Africa report which stresses that it is: ‘not simply recommending throwing money at the problems’ but a ‘fundamental change in the way in which aid works’.<sup>49</sup>

Once international financial institutions have a more direct role in the *internal* governance mechanisms of non-Western states, aid is much less likely to be based on overt external regulation in the form of *external* conditionality. Graham Harrison usefully highlights the ‘post-conditionality’ regimes of international financial institutions in states like Tanzania and Uganda, where the influence of external donors is better conceived not as a ‘strong external force’ but as ‘part of the state itself’, through direct involvement in policy-making committees.<sup>50</sup> The undermining of

sovereign autonomy and the enmeshing of subject states in international institutional frameworks fundamentally blurs the lines of accountability and control and the relationships of power behind these mechanisms. The relationship between Western institutions and non-Western states is a highly coercive one which forces these states to cede their sovereign powers to external institutions; the fiction of ‘partnership’ then relies heavily on an exaggeration of the importance of international legal sovereignty.

*International legal sovereignty?*

Today, despite the new interventionist consensus and the international attention given to ‘failing’ states and the lack of governance capacities in ‘zones of instability’, there is surprisingly little support for the return of international protectorates and direct external administrations. Only a small number of commentators argue that states should, in fact, be ‘allowed to fail’ and more capable neighbours allowed to directly govern these territories,<sup>51</sup> or that the UN Security Council should establish new international trusteeships.<sup>52</sup>

Intervening powers and international institutions seem to have a particularly strong desire to preserve the formal trappings of sovereignty. The contradictory desire to intervene but also to avoid responsibility is most sharply posed in questions of military intervention, such as post 9/11 ‘regime change’ in Afghanistan and Iraq. Few acts are as fundamentally undermining of sovereignty as the external removal of a state’s government. Yet, no sooner have intervening actors destroyed sovereignty than they are talking up its fundamental importance and pledging to restore authority to local actors at the soonest possible moment. State-building is the process of negotiating these contradictory drives towards intervention and away from responsibility for outcomes.

Leading US policy advisors and international think tanks are increasingly singing from the same hymn sheet, suggesting that international regulation should no longer be seen in the old ways. Today’s policy context means that the old restrictions on international intrusion no longer exist. In the absence of Cold War rivalries between competing Great Powers, external intervention no longer needs to be overtly recognised in the undermining of sovereignty and open return to trusteeships and

protectorates. In fact, the maintenance of formal sovereignty is at the heart of new approaches to ‘neotrusteeship’,<sup>53</sup> ‘pooled sovereignty’,<sup>54</sup> or ‘shared sovereignty’.<sup>55</sup> In the words of Krasner:

Shared sovereignty would involve the engagement of external actors in some of the domestic authority structures of the target state for an indefinite period of time. Such arrangements would be legitimated by agreements signed by recognized national authorities. National actors would use their international legal sovereignty to enter into agreements that would compromise their Westphalian/ Vattellican sovereignty [self-government/ autonomy] with the goal of improving domestic sovereignty [governing capacity]. One core element of sovereignty – voluntary agreements – would be preserved, while another core element – the principle of autonomy – would be violated.<sup>56</sup>

The key difference between new forms of external regulation - ‘neo-trusteeship’ or, even more user-friendly, ‘shared sovereignty’ - and traditional notions of a trust or protectorate is that, today, the subordinated territory will formally be a contracting legal equal. International legal sovereignty is maintained while political autonomy – self-government is given up. The Bosnian peace agreement at Dayton in 1995 is the classic example of the voluntary surrender of sovereignty; the ‘neo-trusteeship’ was legitimised not through war and intervention or through international legal agreement (the UN Security Council’s blessing was bestowed retrospectively) but through the signature of the Bosnian parties.<sup>57</sup>

Law and reality no longer coincide when considering the location of sovereign power and authority.<sup>58</sup> Kosovo, for example, is, at the time of writing, formally part of the state of Serbia-Montenegro, but again the lack of fit between the formal location of sovereignty and external mechanisms of regulation makes discussions of final status hard to resolve as decision-making authority lies neither with the elected Kosovo government in Pristina nor the Serbian government in Belgrade. Afghanistan and Iraq have the juridical status of independent states despite their dependence on the political and security role of the US. The artificial nature of these regimes is highlighted by the fact that their governments’ writs seldom extend outside the protected security zones of the capitals. The restrictions on the Iraqi interim government’s authority has meant

that the formal transfer of Iraqi sovereignty from the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority to an Iraqi government in June 2004 did not reflect any change in the real relations of authority.<sup>59</sup>

Here we have states without sovereignty. States exist on paper, in terms of juridical status, for example, as members of the United Nations, with national flags, and maybe their own currencies, but not as independent political subjects capable of self-government. As Robert Keohane argues:

We somehow have to reconceptualize the state as a political unit that can maintain internal order while being able to engage in international cooperation, without claiming the exclusive rights...traditionally associated with sovereignty... The same institutional arrangements may help both to reconstruct troubled countries that are in danger of becoming 'failed states', and to constrain the autonomy of those states.<sup>60</sup>

He suggests that state-building can establish the 'institutional arrangements' which are capable of taking responsibility for maintaining order ('domestic sovereignty') but without giving rise to rights of self-government ('Westphalian sovereignty'). He recommends an exit strategy for Kosovo, for example, where there is a shift from existing trusteeship status, which could be called 'nominal sovereignty', to 'limited sovereignty' with external powers able to override domestic authorities, to a final stage of 'integrated sovereignty' where the state is locked into international institutions able to override domestic authorities.<sup>61</sup> This would resolve the problem of Kosovo's independence as it would never achieve independence beyond the purely formal trappings of statehood: 'Westphalian sovereignty...is simply bypassed in the movement from limited to integrated sovereignty'.<sup>62</sup>

His proposals are strikingly similar to those later advocated by the International Commission on the Balkans. The commission's April 2005 report, *The Balkans in Europe's Future*, talks about Kosovo's 'independence without full sovereignty', to be followed by 'guided sovereignty' with 'reserve powers' for the EU and a final stage of 'full and shared sovereignty'.<sup>63</sup> Here state-building is held to be able to build a new type of state; one which has 'sovereignty' but is still in essentially the same position

as it was when it was formally a protectorate. The difference being that formal accountability has been shifted back to the non-Western state.

James Fearon and David Laitin suggest a similar approach arguing that a return to traditional forms of sovereignty is not the solution, but instead that the transfer of power in cases of post-conflict intervention and regime change should be ‘not to full sovereignty but rather as a state embedded in and monitored by international institutions’.<sup>64</sup> Krasner argues the point even more openly in his support for the concept of ‘shared’ sovereignty, which similarly uses ‘sovereignty’ as a means for enabling external regulation. Here, international legal sovereignty allows post-conflict states to enter into ‘partnerships’ which informally violate their sovereign rights:

For policy purposes, it would be best to refer to shared sovereignty as “partnerships”. This would more easily let policymakers engage in organized hypocrisy, that is, saying one thing and doing another. Shared sovereignty or partnerships would allow political leaders to embrace sovereignty, because these arrangements would be legitimated by the target state’s international legal sovereignty, even though they violate the core principle of Westphalian/Vatellian sovereignty: autonomy... Shared sovereignty or partnerships would make no claim to being an explicit alternative to conventional sovereignty. It would allow actors to obfuscate the fact that their behaviour would be inconsistent with their principles.<sup>65</sup>

It is this ‘obfuscation’ of the maintenance of international legal sovereignty that enables international institutions to present themselves as facilitating partners in a shared project rather than as coercive external powers. Robert Cooper, focusing particularly on the enlargement policies of the European Union, describes this as a new conflict-free ‘postmodern’ or voluntary’ form of imperialism.<sup>66</sup> Mark Leonard argues that unlike the old imperialism based on conflict and overt subordination, the EU is completely transforming states from the inside, rather than ruling them from above, for example: ‘Europe is changing all of Polish society, from its economic policies and property laws to its treatment of minorities and what gets served on the nation’s tables.’<sup>67</sup>

The more ‘sovereignty’ is voluntarily shared between target states and international institutions, coercive external conditionality is exchanged for internal forms of ‘enhanced surveillance’ through the reporting mechanisms generated by the good governance requisites of openness and transparency enforced by international institutions.<sup>68</sup> Policy-advisers can no doubt see the gains to be made in enabling Western governments to talk about sovereignty and accountability in non-Western states, while avoiding accountability for their actions and policy prescriptions. However, while sovereignty can be ‘unbundled’ as a heuristic device there is little evidence that conceiving the non-Western state in purely administrative and bureaucratic terms, as a conduit for external policy, is necessarily a recipe for success. States without sovereignty are not easy to ‘capacity-build’.

### **Phantom States and Fragile Empires**

States that are not designed to be independent political subjects in anything but name are a façade without content. States without sovereignty may have technically sound governance and administrative structures on paper but the atrophied political sphere hinders attempts to cohere post-conflict societies and overcome social and political divisions. The states created, which have international legal sovereignty but have ceded policy-making control to international institutions, are phantom states because their lack of self-government prevents them from being recognised or legitimised as embodying a collective expression of their societies. The states of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bosnia, for example, may have formal sovereignty and elected governments but their relationship of external dependency means that the domestic political sphere cannot serve to legitimise the political authorities or cohere their societies. This form of state-building is, in fact, even more corrosive of the authority of the non-Western state than earlier policies which sought to bypass or marginalise the state.

Bosnia is possibly the clearest case of a new type of state being built through this process of distancing power and formal accountability. To all intents and purposes Bosnia is a member of the European Union; in fact more than this, Bosnia is the first genuine EU state where sovereignty has in effect been transferred to Brussels. The EU provides its government; the international High Representative is an EU employee and the EU’s Special Representative in Bosnia and has the power to directly impose

legislation and to dismiss elected government officials and civil servants. However, even if the High Representative's office is closed-down, as planned for the end of 2006, this will make little difference as EU policy and 'European Partnership' priorities dominate the legislative agenda and are overseen through the EU-supported office within the Bosnian state, the European Directorate for Integrations.<sup>69</sup> The EU also runs the police force, taking over from the United Nations at the end of 2002, and the military, taking over from NATO at the end of 2004, and manages Bosnia's negotiations with the World Bank. One look at the Bosnian flag - with the stars of the EU on a yellow and blue background chosen to be in exactly the same colours as used in the EU flag - demonstrates the Bosnia is more EU-orientated than any current member state.<sup>70</sup> However, the EU has distanced itself from any accountability for the power it exercises over Bosnia; formally Bosnia is an independent state and member of the United Nations and a long way off meeting the requirements of EU membership.

After ten years of state-building in Bosnia there is now a complete separation between power and accountability.<sup>71</sup> This clearly suits the EU which is in a position of exercising control over the tiny state without either admitting it into the EU or presenting its policy regime in strict terms of external conditionality. Bosnia is neither an EU member nor does it appear to be a colonial protectorate. Bosnia's formal international legal sovereignty gives the appearance that it is an independent entity, voluntarily asking for external EU assistance with state capacity-building. Questions of aligning domestic law with the large raft of regulations forming the EU *aquis* appear as ones of domestic politics. There is no international forum in which the contradictions between Bosnian social and economic demands and the external pressures of Brussels' policy prescriptions can be raised.

However, these questions are not ones of domestic politics. The Bosnian state has no independent or autonomous existence outside of the EU 'partnership'. There are no independent structures capable of articulating alternative policies. Politicians are subordinate to international institutions through the mechanisms of governance established which give state bureaucrats and administrators the final say over policy-making. The Bosnian state is a phantom state; but it is not a fictional creation. The Bosnian state plays a central role in the transmission of EU policy priorities in their

most intricate detail. The state here is an inversion of the sovereign state. Rather than representing a collective political expression of Bosnian interests - expressing self-government and autonomy, 'Westphalian sovereignty' in the terminology of state-builders - the Bosnian state is an expression of an externally-driven agenda.

The more Bosnia has been the subject of external state-building, the less like a traditional state it has become. Here, the state is a mediating link between the 'inside' of domestic politics and the 'outside' of international relations, but rather than clarifying the distinction it removes the distinction completely. The imposition of an international agenda of capacity-building and good governance appears internationally as a domestic question and appears domestically as an external, international matter. Where the sovereign state clearly demarcated lines of policy accountability, the state without sovereignty blurs them. In fact, accountability for policy-making disappears with the removal of the traditional content of state sovereignty.

In this context, domestic politics has no real content. There is very little at stake in the political process. For external state-builders, the subordination of politics to bureaucratic and administrative procedures of good governance is a positive development. In functional terms they argue that sovereignty, and the political competition it brings with it for control of state power, is a luxury that post-conflict states cannot afford. Keohane argues that many non-Western states are 'troubled societies' plagued by economic, social and ethnic divisions which mean that elections can be highly problematic 'winner-take-all' situations. In these states, unconditional sovereign independence is a curse rather than a blessing and conflict can be prevented by enabling 'external constraints' on autonomy in exchange for institutional capacity-building.<sup>72</sup>

Post-conflict states, such as Bosnia, stand in desperate need of a state-building project which can engage with and re-cohere society around a shared future-orientated perspective.<sup>73</sup> What Bosnia has received is external regulation which has, in effect, prevented the building of genuine state institutions which can engage with and represent social interests. Phantom states are an inevitable product of the technical, bureaucratic and administrative approach exported by international state-builders.

Where weak or post-conflict states stand in need of socially engaging state-based projects of development and transformation they are subject to external forms of domination which are uniquely unsuited to the task. It is the problems of the state form in the West that explain why there should be such a mismatch between need and policy prescription in the state-building approach.

Western states may sometimes appear to be happy with the traditional imperialist rhetoric of Great Power responsibility but are quick to recoil from any practical consequences of this. Despite the rhetoric of Great Power responsibility, the resulting ideological, legal and political forms are those of a rush to reject imperial responsibility. It is this dynamic which is essential to understanding the novel features of twenty-first century 'state-building'. State-building can best be grasped as a product of the exhaustion of the political process in the West. Government is increasingly seen as a matter of law and administration, rather than politics; as a matter of bureaucratic competence rather than political struggle. The projection of Western power abroad reflects the lack of any 'big ideas' or mobilising political project. This lack of transformative purpose can be seen in the focus on the processes of state-building rather than its ends.

International state-builders seek to focus on legal, administrative and bureaucratic processes rather than broader problems of social and economic transformation. 'Good governance', 'transparency', 'inclusion', and alignment with the EU *acquis communautaire* stand in as a weak substitute for any imperial 'reordering of the world'.<sup>74</sup> Even the international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are encouraged to drop earlier aspirations towards development and economic growth and to focus more narrowly on non-Western state frameworks of transparency and accountability.<sup>75</sup>

Traditional empire was confident in its ability to transform and improve societies being intervened in, today's empire is a fragile one, asserting power and influence but desiring to hide behind forms of formal sovereignty. The new international language of 'good governance', 'capacity-building', 'empowerment', 'partnership' and 'ownership' symbolises the politics of denial and evasion which mark every aspect of the state-building discourse.

## Conclusion

State-building does not seek to universalise the state form - as in the period of decolonisation - but rather to conceal the disintegration of this form under the interventionist pressures of the post-Cold War international order. The promise that 'state-building' holds out is that of relieving Western elites from the need to legitimise and clearly articulate the new hierarchy of domination revealed by the collapse of the UN Charter framework of state sovereignty and non-intervention. In a world where the Great Powers had more confidence in themselves and were able to coherently project a sense of purpose, it is unlikely that there would be such a demand for distance and the perceived need to create fictional 'partners' and phantom states to bear the responsibility for policy outcomes.

The lack of willingness of major Western states to take up the responsibilities of power, to be held to account for their interventions in the international arena, is resulting in a highly destabilising process where power and accountability are increasingly separated. Opposition to these new, more coercive yet less visible, mechanisms of intervention needs to highlight the real relations of power and argue against the mystifications of the state-building discourse – it is only on the basis of clarifying the corrosive consequences of external regulation that a new case for self-government and political autonomy can be made.

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### Notes

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<sup>2</sup> R. I. Rotberg, 'The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention and Repair', in R. I. Rotberg (ed.) *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p.42.

<sup>3</sup> *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, 2002. Section 1. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html>.

<sup>4</sup> The website of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is available at: <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43429.pdf>.

<sup>5</sup> UK Prime Minister's Strategy Unit Report, *Investing in Prevention - An International Strategy to Manage Risks of Instability and Improve Crisis Response*, February 2005. Available at:

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[http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/work\\_areas/countries\\_at\\_risk/report/index.htm](http://www.strategy.gov.uk/downloads/work_areas/countries_at_risk/report/index.htm)

<sup>6</sup> OECD *Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States*. OECD document DCD(2005)11/REV2, p.8 Available at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/4/25/35238282.pdf>.

<sup>7</sup> *Our Common Interest*, Commission for Africa, 11 March 2005, p.136. Available at: <http://www.commissionforafrica.org/english/report/introduction.html>.

<sup>8</sup> 2005 World Summit Outcome, United Nations General Assembly, A/60/L.1, 15 September 2005, §97-105. Available at: <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N05/511/30/PDF/N0551130.pdf?OpenElement>.

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<sup>10</sup> D. Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention* (London: Pluto Press, 2002), pp.157-66.

<sup>11</sup> Fukuyama, *State-Building*, p.161.

<sup>12</sup> D. Archibugi, D. Held and M. Kohler, (eds) *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (London: Polity Press, 1998); A. Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998); J. N. Rosenau and E. Czempiel (eds) *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

<sup>13</sup> C. Tilly, 'War Making and State Making as Organized Crime', in P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds) *Bringing the State Back In* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

<sup>14</sup> M. Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-76*, trans. D. Macey (London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2003).

<sup>15</sup> D. Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1998); M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era* (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998).

<sup>16</sup> For example, D. M. Malone, 'Foreword', in S. Chesterman, M. Ignatieff and R. Thakur (eds) *Making States Work: State Failure and the Crisis of Governance* (New York: UN University, 2005), p.xv.

<sup>17</sup> See for example, A. Ghani, C. Lockhart and M. Carnahan, 'Closing the Sovereignty Gap: an Approach to State-Building', *Overseas Development Institute Working Paper*, No.253, September 2005, p.10. Available at: [http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working\\_papers/wp253.pdf](http://www.odi.org.uk/publications/working_papers/wp253.pdf).

<sup>18</sup> *Our Common Interest*, p.94.

<sup>19</sup> For example, Fukuyama, *State-Building*, p.139; M. Ignatieff, *Empire Lite: Nation-Building in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan* (London: Vintage, 2003); European Stability Initiative, *The Helsinki Moment: European Member State Building in the Balkans*, 1 February 2005, p.10. Available at: [http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi\\_document\\_id\\_65.pdf](http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/esi_document_id_65.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> Highlighted in *Our Common Interest*, p.92.

<sup>21</sup> I. W. Zartman, 'Early and "Early Late" Prevention', in Chesterman, Ignatieff and Thakur, *Making States Work*.

<sup>22</sup> Rotberg, 'The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States', p.5.

<sup>23</sup> S. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton University Press, 1999), p.9; see also J. D. Fearon, and D. D. Laitin, 'Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States', *International Security*, Vol.28, No.4, (2004), pp.5-43; S. Krasner, 'Sharing

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<sup>26</sup> International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background* (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), p.11.

<sup>27</sup> G. Evans and M. Sahnoun, 'The Responsibility to Protect', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 6, (2002), p.101.

<sup>28</sup> Keohane, 'Political Authority after Intervention', p.276.

<sup>29</sup> R. Jackson, *Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.32.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p.33.

<sup>31</sup> M. Wight, *Power Politics* (ed.) H. Bull and C. Holbraad (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), p.23; H. Morgenthau, *Truth and Power: Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p.258-61.

<sup>32</sup> Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*.

<sup>33</sup> Jackson, *Quasi-states*.

<sup>34</sup> Krasner, 'Sharing Sovereignty', pp.87-88.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p.89.

<sup>36</sup> Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960. Available at: [http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c\\_coloni.htm](http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm).

<sup>37</sup> Jackson, *Quasi-states*, p.77.

<sup>38</sup> Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 1970. Available at: <http://www.hku.edu/law/conlawhk/conlaw/outline/Outline4/2625.htm>.

<sup>39</sup> Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 'Closing the Sovereignty Gap', p.4.

<sup>40</sup> See for example Tony Blair's Commission for Africa report (*Our Common Interest*, Chapter 4) and the Sachs report (UN Millennium Project, *Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Millennium Development Goals*, 2005. Available at: [http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/index\\_overview.htm](http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/index_overview.htm).)

<sup>41</sup> Ghani, Lockhart and Carnahan, 'Closing the Sovereignty Gap', p.13.

<sup>42</sup> EastWest Institute and European Stability Initiative, 'Democracy, Security and the Future of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe: A Framework for Debate', April 2001, p.18. Available from: [http://www.esiweb.org/docs/printdocument.php?document\\_ID=15](http://www.esiweb.org/docs/printdocument.php?document_ID=15).

<sup>43</sup> See, for example *Balkanologie*, Special issue, 'South-Eastern Europe: History, Concepts, Boundaries', Vol.3, No.2, (1999), pp.47-127; P. Hatzopoulos, 'Non-Nationalist Ideologies in the Balkans: The Interwar Years', Unpublished thesis, submitted 2005, London School of Economics.

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- <sup>47</sup> *Our Common Interest*, p.17.
- <sup>48</sup> UN Millennium Project, *Investing in Development*, p.53.
- <sup>49</sup> *Our Common Interest*, p.94.
- <sup>50</sup> G. Harrison, ‘Post-Conditionality Politics and Administrative Reform: Reflections on the Cases of Uganda and Tanzania’, *Development and Change*, Vol.32, (2001), p.669; see also Harrison, *The World Bank and Africa: The Construction of Governance States* (London: Routledge, 2004).
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- <sup>55</sup> Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty’.
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., p.108.
- <sup>57</sup> Chandler, ‘From Dayton to Europe’, *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.12, No.3, (2005), pp.336-349.
- <sup>58</sup> See A. Yannis, ‘The Concept of Suspended Sovereignty in International Law and its Implications in International Politics’, *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 13, No. 5, (2002), p.1049.
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- <sup>60</sup> Keohane, ‘Political Authority after Intervention’, p.277.
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid., pp.296-7.
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid., p.297.
- <sup>63</sup> International Commission on the Balkans, *The Balkans in Europe’s Future*, 2005, pp.18-23. Available at: <http://www.balkan-commission.org/activities/Report.pdf>.
- <sup>64</sup> Fearon, and Laitin, ‘Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States’, p.42.
- <sup>65</sup> Krasner, ‘Sharing Sovereignty’, p.108.
- <sup>66</sup> R. Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-first Century* (London: Atlantic Books, 2003).
- <sup>67</sup> M. Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (London: Fourth Estate, 2005), p.6.
- <sup>68</sup> *Our Common Interest*, p.376.
- <sup>69</sup> See, for example, the 280 page document outlining the timetable for implementing the EU’s medium priorities (European Partnership for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Medium Term Priorities Realisation Programme, 2005. Available at: [http://www.dei.gov.ba/en/pdf/Completo\\_EP\\_PSP.pdf](http://www.dei.gov.ba/en/pdf/Completo_EP_PSP.pdf)).
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<sup>71</sup> See Chandler (ed.) *Peace without Politics? Ten Years of International State-Building in Bosnia* (London: Routledge, 2005).

<sup>72</sup> Keohane, 'Ironies of Sovereignty', pp.755-56; see also R. Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp.187-194.

<sup>73</sup> See also C. Bickerton, 'Re-Constructing States, De-Constructing State-Building', paper presented in the SAID seminar series, Oxford University, 28 April 2005, who expands this argument to Eastern European accession states more generally.

<sup>74</sup> See, for example, Leonard, *Why Europe Will Run the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, pp.36-45.

<sup>75</sup> *Our Common Interest*, p.374.