

Paper for BISA Post-Structuralist Politics Workshop,

SOAS, 14 May 2004

From the Local to the Global: A Journey Away from Political Engagement?

Not to be cited without author's permission

David Chandler is Senior Lecturer in International Relations, the Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster. His recent publications include *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton* (Pluto Press, 1999, 2000), *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention* (Pluto Press, 2002), (as editor) *Rethinking Human Rights: Critical Approaches to International Politics* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2002) and *Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations* (Palgrave-Macmillan, 2004 forthcoming).

Email: d.chandler@westminster.ac.uk

Abstract

Rather than capturing state power, the goal of global civil society is to create alternative 'spaces' for politics and constitute new approaches to the political which escape the 'capture' or enclosure of territorially-based politics. Where state-based political action is held to reinforce frameworks and hierarchies of exclusion, new social movements 'from below' are seen to herald new forms of emancipatory political action, which seek to recognise and include diversity and build new forms of inclusive global 'counter-hegemonic' politics. This paper will examine the claims made on behalf of global civic activism and ask whether by placing the autonomy of the self at the centre of its ethical code, global civil society approaches tend to reduce the political to the personal, undermining community ties rather than strengthening or expanding them and confusing 'emancipation' with freedom from representative accountability.

Introduction

The approach of constructing global society 'from below' derives the radical ethics of global civil society from the methods and organisation of its members; from their refusal to participate in territorial state-based politics. This social movement approach sees global civil society as morally progressive in so far as its demands do not 'seek to replace one form of power with another' and instead have the 'objective of "whittling down" the capacity of concentrated centres of power'.¹

Radical global civil society theorists tend to focus less on theorising global civil society as a totality and more on the highlighting of new forms of informal political activism, activism which is held to reconnect politics and ethics. In this sense global civil society is narrowly defined on the basis of political activism and political advocacy, rather than purely non-governmental interactions.ⁱⁱ Advocates of this global civil society approach suggest that the radical movements, attempting to institute ‘globalisation from below’, bring politics and ethics together by expanding the sphere of moral concern and by developing political strategies which avoid and bypass the constraints of state-based politics.ⁱⁱⁱ

In this perspective, political activity at the level of the state is inherently problematic. States, far from the focus for political organisation and political demands, are the central barrier to emancipatory political practice. Operating on the terms of the state can only legitimise and perpetuate discourses and practices of political regulation which are built on - and maintained by - exclusion and war.^{iv} According to Andrew Linklater, global civil society seeks to challenge the ‘totalising project’ of the state which is based on ‘accentuat[ing] the differences between citizens and aliens in order to meet the challenges of inter-state war’.^v Here the state’s drive to war necessitates the exclusionary practices of citizenship. For Mary Kaldor, this relationship is inverted, following Carl Schmitt, she suggests that the limited freedoms of democracy could only be permitted at a domestic level if this was overshadowed by the manipulated fear of an external threat which ensures political debate takes place within the narrow confines of support for the security-state.^{vi} Either way, an intimate link is established between state-based liberal democratic politics and exclusion, war and conflict.

Whereas state-based political action is held to reinforce frameworks and hierarchies of exclusion, new social movements ‘from below’ are seen to herald new forms of emancipatory political action, which seek to recognise and include diversity and build new forms of global ‘counter-hegemonic’ politics. Rather than capturing state power, the goal of radical ‘bottom-up’ global civil society approaches is to constitute alternatives to the enclosed space of territorial politics. The rejection of state-based approaches marks out this project as distinct from those of the past and its development can be traced from the post-1968 ‘new left’ through to the 1980s civic ‘oppositionists’ in Eastern Europe to the Seattle protests and the anti-globalisation and anti-capitalism movements of today.

The following sections draw out the historical development of the core ideas at the heart of radical ‘bottom-up’ global civil society approaches, focusing on the grounds for rejection the formal political framework of state-based politics, the centrality of individual autonomy and the importance of the global or transnational dimension. The concluding sections dwell on the limitations of this political approach, highlighting the problems involved in privileging individual ethics over societal accountability and the consequences of this approach in legitimising highly individualised political responses which tend to fragment and atomise political practices rather than constitute a new and more inclusive form of politics.

Bypassing the State

The post-1989 genesis of global civil society is often rooted in the development of the concept by East European and Latin American opposition movements and groupings which operated in the context of authoritarian state regulation. As Mary Kaldor argues:

As the term emerged in Eastern Europe and Latin America, the emphasis was on self-organization and civic autonomy in reaction to the vast increase in the reach of the modern state, and on the creation of independent spaces, in which individuals can act according to their consciences in the face of the powerful influences from the state on culture and ideology.^{vii}

In the 1990s, it was not just under the circumstances of authoritarian state regulation that the opening up of 'independent spaces' was held to be necessary. As Kaldor notes: 'This concept was taken up by Western radicals who saw civil society as a check both on the power and arbitrariness of the contemporary state and on the power of unbridled capitalism.'^{viii} She sees the recent rise of interest in - and support for - global civil society as intimately connected to current Western concerns 'about personal autonomy, self-organization [and] private space', which were initially given political and ethical importance by oppositionists in Eastern Europe as 'a way of getting round the totalitarian militaristic state'.^{ix}

However, the argument that it was the strength of the contemporary Western state and the 'power of unbridled capitalism' which led to a focus on empowerment through the search for 'personal autonomy' and 'private space' is open to challenge. There were

other factors at work drawing global civil society theorists to the experience of East European dissidents; one factor was their similar experience of social isolation:

After 1968, the main form of [East European] opposition was the individual dissident. The dissidents saw themselves not as precursors of a political movement but as individuals who wanted to retain their personal integrity. Dissidence was about the dignity of the individual as much as about politics. It was about the possibility of honest interaction even at a private and personal level, about being able to read, think and discuss freely.^x

Kaldor expands, outlining the aspirations of leading dissident intellectuals, such as Adam Michnik in Poland, credited with rediscovering the concept of civil society. For Michnik, the task of the opposition was ‘not to seize power but to change the relationship between state and society’. This was to be achieved through ‘self-organization’, with the aim of creating ‘autonomous spaces in society’.^{xi} While the term ‘civil society’ was used in Poland, perhaps more explanatory is the similar concept of ‘anti-politics’, the title of a book by Hungarian dissident George Konrad.^{xii} For Kaldor, ‘anti-politics is the ethos of civil society’.^{xiii}

The realm of “anti-politics” or the parallel polis was one where the individual would refuse such [political] collaboration... In all these discussions, the role of the individual and the importance of personal links, something that was central to individual dissidence, were considered primary, overriding claims to political authority... [A]nti-politics... was a new type of politics because it was

not about the capture of state power; it was the politics of those who don't want to be politicians and don't want to share power.^{xiv}

The dissident movement was one of political refusal rather than political participation. The individual ethical rejection of the 'political' was held to be potentially more inclusive than political engagement through formal representative parties, leading advocates to argue the virtues of the 'non-party political process'.^{xv} This rejection of political engagement has enabled global civil society activists to assert that they represent the disengaged and marginalized in ways that formal political parties could never do. Kaldor cites Rajni Kothari:

...this is a whole new space. It is a different space, which is essentially a non-party space. Its role is to deepen the democratic process in response to the state that has not only ditched the poor and the oppressed but has turned oppressive and violent. It is to highlight dimensions that were not hitherto considered political and make them part of the political process.^{xvi}

Global civil society has become increasingly popular as the concept, once associated with liberal protest, against the lack of democracy in Eastern Europe, has become explicitly transformed into a post-liberal critique of the limitations of democracy. This was not difficult as the East European intellectuals were no supporters of mass politics; 'anti-politics' was, in fact, a reflection of their disillusionment with the masses. Their 'refusal' was more about engagement with mass society than any reluctance to deal with the bureaucratic regimes themselves. Kaldor acknowledges the

impulse behind East European intellectual dissent: ‘They described themselves not as a movement but as a civic initiative, a “small island in a sea of apathy”.’^{xvii}

It is this disillusionment with the people, rather than the dissidents’ hostility to the state per se, which is highlighted by Kaldor’s application of Konrad’s ‘anti-politics’ and Havel’s ideas of ‘post-totalitarianism’ to Western democratic life. She quotes Havel:

It would appear that the traditional parliamentary democracies can offer no fundamental opposition to the automatism of technological civilisation and the industrial-consumer society, for they, too, are being dragged helplessly along. People are manipulated in ways that are infinitely more subtle and refined than the brutal methods used in post-totalitarian societies... In a democracy, human beings may enjoy many personal freedoms...[but] they too are ultimately victims of the same automatism, and are incapable of defending their concerns about their own identity or preventing their superficialisation...^{xviii}

Beneath the surface of post-liberal radicalism, which condemns the state as the site of power and control, stands a more traditional conservative thesis on the limits of popular democracy. It becomes clear that it is the disillusionment with mass politics, rather than the critique of the strong state, which has been the key to the concept’s appeal to radical Western activists. According to Richard Falk:

The modern media-shaped political life threatens individuals with a new type of postmodern serfdom, in which elections, political campaigns, and political

parties provide rituals without substance, a politics of sound bytes and manipulative images, reducing the citizen to a mechanical object to be controlled, rather than being the legitimating source of legitimate authority.^{xix}

Ronnie Lipschutz similarly argues that mass politics cannot lead to emancipatory progress because ‘in a sense, even societies in the West have been “colonized” by their states’.^{xx} William Connolly writes that Western mass politics are a form of ‘imprisonment’ because progressive demands can be derailed by national chauvinist sentiments:

Today the territorial/security state forms the space of democratic liberation and imprisonment. It liberates because it organises democratic accountability through electoral institutions. It imprisons because it confines and conceals democratic energies flowing over and through its dikes. The confinement of democracy to the territorial state...consolidates and exacerbates pressures to exclusive nationality... The state too often and too easily translates democratic energies into national chauvinist sentiments.^{xxi}

Advocates of global civic activism assert that the state-level focus of old movements limited their progressive potential:

...it was through the state that “old” movements were “tamed”. This was true both of workers’ movements, which became left political parties and trade unions, and anti-colonial struggles, which were transformed into new ruling parties.^{xxii}

Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, for example, write that sovereignty is a ‘poisoned gift’, where ostensible revolutionaries ‘get bogged down in “realism”’, resulting in ‘the opposite of the nationalist dream of an autonomous, self-centered development’ as new structures of domestic and international domination become established.^{xxiii} Their critique of national sovereignty raises a question-mark over the political and ethical legitimacy of the liberal democratic process:

The entire logical chain of representation might be summarized like this: the people representing the multitude, the nation representing the people, and the state representing the nation. Each link is an attempt to hold in suspension the crisis of modernity. Representation in each case means a further step of abstraction and control.^{xxiv}

The critique of the constraints of electoral competition for representation is a core theme of the global civil society approach. Representation is seen as a mechanism of domination over civil society, whereby political identities and interests are imposed from above. Ricardo Blaug, for example, argues that engaging in the formal political framework of states only increases the legitimacy of political hierarchies by channelling ‘the utopian energies of the lifeworld’ into legalistic arguments about rights on terms set by the state.^{xxv} For Gideon Baker: ‘a discursive-institutional division between representatives and represented actually constitutes subjects as citizens’.^{xxvi} Instead, Baker argues for the freedom of ‘self-legislation’ and ‘doing politics for ourselves rather than on behalf of others’, allowing identities to remain fluid and avoiding the ‘game of power’.^{xxvii} He argues that, given their ‘permanent

domination of the political’, states ‘cannot be legitimate’ and that new social movements can be, ‘but only for as long as they resist incorporation’ into the statist framework of law and rights.^{xxviii} The radical ‘bottom-up’ approach of global civil society rejects any attempt to reconstitute traditional understandings of the political, which are territorially tied, even the ‘post-national’ frameworks of cosmopolitan democracy.^{xxix}

Radical ‘Autonomy’

The disillusionment with mass politics, highlighted in the 1980s in Central Europe and in the 1990s and beyond in the West, can be understood better in relation to the first movements to put the ‘bottom-up’ ethics of autonomy before power: the ‘new social movements’, generally considered to be the offspring of the 1968 student protests.^{xxx} The new social movements were defined in opposition to the ‘old’ social movements of trade unions and Communist Party politics. Rather than engaging in formal politics, monopolised by the ‘old’ left, these groups stressed their radical opposition to traditional political engagement. As James Heartfield notes:

The new generation of radicals did not, as a rule, challenge the official leadership of the trade unions, but side-stepped the organised working class altogether, to find new constituencies and fields of activism. Taking the path of least resistance, these radicals took their struggle elsewhere.^{xxxi}

The radical struggle was shaped by a rejection of the conservative politics of the organised left. Particularly in France, where the left (including the Communist Party)

supported the war in Algeria, discrediting its claim of representing universal interests.^{xxxii} However, rather than dispute the claims of the old left to represent a collective political subject, the new left rejected the existence of collective political interests per se. This resulted, by default, in either a reduction of emancipatory claims to the ‘self-realisation’ of the individual (expressed, for example, in the women’s movement and the *movement autogestionnaire* in France or the *Alternativbewegung* in Germany) or in the search for subaltern subjects on the margins of society.^{xxxiii} Instead of the construction of new collectivities, radical consciousness was dominated by a critical approach to organisation, a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’, which derided mass politics and inevitably reduced political aspirations.^{xxxiv}

The critique of, and political distancing from, organised labour, on the grounds of the rejection of any collective political subject, went hand-in-hand with a critique of mass politics and liberal democracy, which similarly implied a collective political subject: i.e., the electorate. Leading theorists of the ‘new left’ Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, argued that democratic struggles were not necessarily popular struggles, to be legitimated through the formal equality of the ballot-box.^{xxxv} They denied the central importance of state-based politics of democratic representation, arguing that there was no one ontologically privileged political space.^{xxxvi} For these theorists of ‘radical democracy’, democratic struggles (for example, the feminist or anti-racist struggles) took place in a ‘plurality of political spaces’ shaped by their own, relatively autonomous ‘ensemble of practices and discourses’.^{xxxvii} There was no longer one ‘political space’; the key demands were therefore not for equal political rights of participation but for the recognition of difference and ‘autonomy’.^{xxxviii}

The centrality of autonomy to the definition and nature of new social movements makes them implicitly anti-state, not so much because of their subjective political views but because of their organisational practices. The radical approach sees the bearers of a new globalised democracy as social organisations which reject formal political processes and work at the sub-political level. For Alberto Melucci, new social movements exist outside of the traditional civil society-state nexus, submerged in everyday life and ‘have created meanings and definitions of identity’ which contrast with traditional political boundaries.^{xxxix} He argues that traditional electoral measures of political success miss the point: ‘This is because conflict takes place principally on symbolic ground... The mere existence of a symbolic challenge is in itself a method of unmasking the dominant codes, a different way of perceiving and naming the world.’^{xi}

Melucci highlights the choices thrown up by new social movements and their ambiguous relationship to the political:

A new political space is designed beyond the traditional distinction between state and ‘civil society’: an intermediate *public space*, whose function is not to institutionalise the movements or to transform them into parties, but to make society hear their messages...while the movements maintain their autonomy.^{xli}

This ambiguity is the key to the ‘bottom-up’ ethics of global civil society, understood as a space whereby political movements can make their claims but also maintain their difference and specificity. They become ‘visible’ but are not institutionalised, that is they do not have to make claims to legitimacy based on public electoral or financial

support.^{xlii} This, in Melucci's words, is the 'democracy of everyday life', where legitimacy and recognition stem from 'mere existence' rather than the power of argument or representation.^{xliii}

The focus on the everyday and the marginal has led to a growing appreciation of non-state networks least linked into political institutions and a celebration of the 'everyday' survival strategies of the Southern poor, which are held to 'reposition the locus of power' and 'transform the nature of power'. From this perspective, isolation and the reliance on contacts within 'local communities result in a decentralized strength, rooted in the autonomy of the national and local process'.^{xliv} Unlike the formal political struggle for representation, the struggle of global civil society 'from below' is for autonomy, held to be a self-constituting goal or end-point.

The radical self-constitution of the political subject avoids the mediating link of the political process. Political legitimacy is no longer derived from the political process of building support in society but rather from recognition of the movement's social isolation. This is a logical consequence of the new left's rejection of any legitimate collective political subject. As Laclau and Mouffe assert in their summation of the essence of 'radical democracy':

Pluralism is *radical* only to the extent that each term of this plurality of identities finds within itself the principle of its own validity... And this radical pluralism is *democratic* to the extent that the autoconstitutivity of each one of its terms is the result of displacements of the egalitarian imaginary. Hence, the project for a radical and plural democracy, *in a primary sense*, is nothing other

than the struggle for a maximum autonomization of spheres on the basis of the generalization of the equivalential-egalitarian logic.^{xlv}

In plain language - the claim is not for equality but for autonomy; for recognition on the basis of self-constituted difference rather than collective or shared support.

New Global Agency?

The radical proponents of globalisation 'from below' seek to discover a new source of political agency to replace those of the past. As Hardt and Negri note: 'The proletariat is not what it used to be' - the task is, therefore, to discover new forms of global agency.^{xlvi} Martin Shaw argues that the progressive movement of global politics is one of 'conscious human agency' but that while 'there is no single guiding force, such as a revolutionary party...there are many actors whose conscious interactions shape the new era'.^{xlvii} This is a 'global revolution' with a difference; there is no collective conscious agency but rather a new pluralist 'agency' which 'involves a radical redefinition of the idea of revolution'.^{xlviii}

For Hardt and Negri, the plural source of global agency is to be found in disparate forms of resistance 'from below', from the 1992 Los Angeles riots, to the Palestinian Intifada and the uprising in Chiapas. These are local struggles with little in common and little that could be generalisable. This local character and isolation from any broader political movement, is described by Hardt and Negri as 'incommunicability': 'This paradox of incommunicability makes it extremely difficult to grasp and express the new power posed by the struggles that have emerged.'^{xlix} Because these struggles

are isolated and marginal, and express no broader political aspirations, they do not at first sight appear to be particularly powerful. However, for Hardt and Negri, a focus on their purely local and immediate character, for this reason, would be a mistake. They are also seen to have a universal character, in that they challenge facets of global capitalist domination. For example, the Los Angeles rioters are held to challenge racial and hierarchical forms of 'post-Fordist' social control, the Chiapas rebels to challenge the regional construction of world markets, etc. The key point is that: 'Perhaps precisely because all these struggles are incommunicable and thus blocked from travelling horizontally in the form of a cycle, they are forced instead to leap vertically and touch immediately on the global level.'¹

It would appear that the decline of traditional international social movements, capable of generating mass support, has led radical theorists to see a new importance in increasingly disparate and isolated struggles. As Hardt and Negri illustrate:

We ought to be able to recognize that this is not the appearance of a new cycle of internationalist struggles, but rather the emergence of a new quality of social movements. We ought to be able to recognize, in other words, the fundamentally new characteristics these struggles all present, despite their radical diversity. First, each struggle, though firmly rooted in local conditions, leaps immediately to the global level and attacks the imperial constitution in its generality. Second, all the struggles destroy the traditional distinction between economic and political struggles. The struggles are at once economic, political, and cultural – and hence they are biopolitical struggles, struggles

over the form of life. They are constituent struggles, creating new public spaces and new forms of community.^{li}

Until the Seattle protests, the most noted example of global civil society globalisation ‘from below’ was the Zapatistas, whose use of the internet to promote their struggle over land rights was picked up by Western academics, who turned the limited success of the Chiapas rising into a revolutionary ‘postmodern social movement’.^{lii} The Zapatistas’ message was held to transcend the local. Charismatic leader, and former university lecturer, Subcomandante Marcos has promoted the movement as embodying the essence of global civil society. In response to the question ‘who is he?’ the reply was given:

Marcos is gay in San Francisco, a black person in South Africa, Asian in Europe, a Jew in Germany...a feminist in a political party. In other words, Marcos is a human being in this world. Marcos is every untolerated, oppressed, exploited minority that is beginning to speak and every majority must shut up and listen.^{liii}

Rather than political leadership the Zapatistas argue they offer a mirror reflecting the struggles of others.^{liv} Instead of a political or ideological struggle for a political programme, the Zapatista movement claims to seek support within the diverse heterogeneous movements of global civil society.^{lv} The message is that subaltern subjects should celebrate difference rather than seek integration on the terms of power. Baker, for example, cites Marcos on the need to operate not on the state’s

terms but on those of global civil society, ‘underground’ and ‘subterranean’, rather than taking up formal avenues where they would be ‘admitted only as losers’.^{lvi}

The EZLN (Zapatista Army of National Liberation) at its founding congress decreed it would not take part in elections or even allow its members to join political parties and the rejection of all ambition to hold political office became a condition of membership.^{lvii} Despite the geographic distance, the Zapatistas have a very similar approach to that of the East European ‘anti-politics’ intellectuals of the 1980s, accepting their weakness vis-à-vis the state and, instead of challenging governing power, following the less ambitious project of creating ‘autonomous counter-publics’ and thereby demonstrating the exclusionary practices of the Mexican state.^{lviii} As Naomi Klein notes: ‘Marcos is convinced that these free spaces, born of reclaimed land, communal agriculture, resistance to privatisation, will eventually create counter-powers to the state simply by existing as alternatives’.^{lix} Baker highlights that what really makes the Zapatista struggle part of global civil society is not just the rejection of engagement with state-level politics but the declaration that their struggle is a global one, against transnational capitalism and neo-liberalism or just ‘Power’ - a conceptual shorthand for capitalism and its enforcers at a global and national level.^{lx}

This rhetoric of global resistance coexists with a remarkable failure of the struggle to achieve any relief from abject poverty for the indigenous villagers of the area. Ten years after the Zapatistas’ twelve day rebellion, which began on New Year’s Day 1994, the Zapatista’s demands are still ignored by the government of President Vicente Fox. The EZLN argue that their failure to deliver resources is a secondary

question since they ‘know their “dignity” is worth more than any government development project’.^{lxi}

This contrast between the claims made for global civic actors and the reality of their marginal influence was clear in the alternative anti-globalisation conference held at the same time as the World Trade Organisation talks at Cancun in September 2003. Meeting in a badminton court in central Cancun, overhung with pictures of Che Guevara and Emiliano Zapata, WTO protestors could allege they represented 100 million peasant farmers - who would have been there but couldn’t afford to come - while radical Western publishers launched their new books to an audience of Western spokesmen and women who talked-up the event. For example, Peter Rossett, from US think tank Food First, argued that the Cancun meeting demonstrated the strength of new social movements: ‘These movements are growing fast, everywhere. For the first time you have global alliances forming....’^{lxii} Barry Coates, of the World Development Movement, concurred: ‘What we are seeing is the emergence of mass movements from across the spectrum of the developing world.’^{lxiii} Even at this event, the highlight was a message of international support from Zapatista leaders; their first international message for four years.^{lxiv}

Whether we would need the self-appointed spokespeople of Food First, the World Development Movement or the countless other think tanks and NGOs which advocate for the ‘millions of dispossessed’ if there was really the emergence of any type of mass movement is a mute point. It seems that, from anarchist squatters in Italy to the Landless Peasant’s Movement in Brazil, the smaller or more marginal the struggle the more pregnant with possibility it is and the more it transgresses traditional political

boundaries, whether conceptual or spatial. One might wonder whether there is an inverse relationship between the amount of progressive ‘new characteristics’ these struggles have and their strength and influence. A sceptical observer would no doubt suggest that the more marginal an opposition movement is, the more academic commentators can invest it with their own ideas and aspirations, and then these normative claims can be used by any institution or individual to promote their own importance and moral legitimacy.

If this is the case, it seems possible that if global civil society did not exist it would have had to have been invented. As Rob Walker notes, liberal and radical commentators have drawn ‘heavily on the notion of a global civil society, not least so as to avoid falling back on some pre-political or even anti-political claim about an existing ethics of world politics’.^{lxv}

The Narrowing Sphere of Political Community

It has been noted elsewhere that the dynamic towards state-driven ethical foreign policy and foreign intervention lies in part in the domestic political malaise of Western societies and their governments’ search for defining values and legitimacy.^{lxvi} The search by Western governments for new ways of ‘doing politics’, in the absence of the collective social bonds which shaped and cohered state-based political projects, is a fairly recent phenomena. The search for an international identity to make up for domestic failings was, until the end of the Cold War, essentially a problem for those groups most reliant on a collective political identity, those on the political left.

While the ‘new left’ emphasises the moral distinctiveness of new social movements engaged in ‘globalization from below’ they are also keen to stress the ‘global’ nature of these ‘movements’. The claims put forward for global civil society as a new way of doing politics attempts to overcome the isolation of radical activists in their own societies – or put another way – their inability to engage with people, now seen to be only arbitrarily connected by the territorial (rather than political) ties of the nation. John Keane argues that this view of new social movements as the ‘world proletariat in civvies’, while comforting for the left, is highly misleading.^{lxvii} In contrast, Richard Falk describes this process in glowing terms:

...transnational solidarities, whether between women, lawyers, environmentalists, human rights activists, or other varieties of ‘citizen pilgrim’ associated with globalisation from below... [who have] already transferred their loyalties to the invisible political community of their hopes and dreams, one which could exist in future time but is nowhere currently embodied in the life-world of the planet.^{lxviii}

The interconnectedness which is celebrated is, in fact, the flip-side of a lack of connection domestically: ‘Air travel and the Internet create new horizontal communities of people, who perhaps have more in common, than with those who live close by.’^{lxix} What these ‘citizen pilgrims’ have in common is their isolation from and rejection of their own political communities. The transfer of loyalties to an ‘invisible political community’ is merely a radical re-representation of their rejection of a real and all too visible political community – the electorate.

In fact, the global movement for emancipation ‘from below’ could be read as a product of the end of any genuine transnational struggle. When radical theorists celebrate ‘the early 1990s’ as ‘the time when civic transnationalism really came of age’,^{lxx} they betray a certain lack of historical imagination. Alejandro Colás in *International Civil Society* makes the point that the idea that transnational politics has recently emerged demonstrates a lack of historical awareness on the part of the advocates of ‘globalization from below’.^{lxxi}

In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the main political currents, whether they were conservatives, communists, anarchists, socialists, pacifists, feminists or even nationalists were in fact internationally- as much as nationally-orientated. For example, the People’s International League, a cross-European association of nationalists, was established by Mazzini in 1847, the International Working Men’s Association or First International was formed in 1864, and the International Congress of Women was established in 1888.^{lxxii} Rather than being new or on the rise, transnational political activism is in a parlous state today. The transnational social movements of modernity had the independence of aim and capacity to effect meaningful political change at both domestic and international levels without either relying on states to act on their behalf or, at the other extreme, avoiding any engagement with formal politics for fear of losing their ‘autonomy’.

The fiction of global civil society as an ethical alternative approach to the problems of the political, has its roots in the politics of the left, whose lack of support within their own societies was historically softened by the illusion of being part of an international

movement. While their own groups may have been marginal to domestic politics adherents took heart in messages of ‘solidarity’ or success from other parts of the world. These international props were initially the mainstay of the ‘old left’, dependent on the Communist International or international trade union federations. However, the post-’68 ‘new left’ soon followed the trend as peace, environmental and women’s groups sought legitimacy more in their international connections than their capacity to win a domestic audience.

The transformations in Eastern Europe in 1989 leant new life to this narcissistic form of internationalism. Isolated dissident groups in Eastern Europe, whose oppositional politics was influenced by the new left’s rejection of mass politics and claims for ‘recognition’, found themselves to be the short-term beneficiaries of the collapsing Soviet systems and the bureaucracy’s search for a negotiated regime change. A new ‘East-West’ dialogue between Central and East European dissidents and the West European peace movement gave an international legitimacy to both sets of participants which were marginal in their own states.

Kaldor’s own experience of active involvement in the waning European peace movements in the 1980s was an instructive one. Perceiving themselves as isolated due to being ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘pro-Soviet’, the European Nuclear Disarmament (END) group took their critics’ rejection literally when they said ‘Why not demonstrate in Moscow?’.^{lxxiii}

Hundreds of activists travelled to Eastern Europe and identified local groups, individuals, town councils and churches, with whom they could talk and

exchange ideas. I have before me as I write a leaflet published by END called “Go East”: “Forget smoke-filled rooms, this political organisation is asking you to take a holiday – in Eastern Europe.”^{lxxiv}

The new strategy of ‘Going East’ was hardly a sign of political dynamism, but rather of giving up on winning the arguments at home. In the same way, today liberal and radical commentators are drawn to the international realm, not because it is a sphere of political struggle but, precisely because it appears to be an easier option where there is less accountability and little pressure for representational legitimacy.

It would seem that the dynamic towards the creation of global civil society is one of domestic marginalization and the attempt to avoid the pressures and accountability of domestic politics rather than the attraction of the international sphere per se. As Kaldor states: ‘almost all social movements and NGOs...have some kind of transnational relations. Precisely because these groups inhabit a political space outside formal national politics (parties and elections).’^{lxxv} Claire Fox, writing about the burgeoning international activities of British local authorities, ranging from multiple twinning, to capacity–building partnerships as far a field as Indonesia, Vietnam and Kosovo, notes that it seems that easy-sounding solutions to problems elsewhere are more attractive than engaging with domestic difficulties. For her, it appears that ‘New Internationalism is in danger of becoming a con-trick, a worthy sounding escape-route from the angst and insecurity of running and representing local areas’.^{lxxvi}

Rather than be exposed through a formal struggle to win the argument with people in a genuine debate, isolated activists are drawn to the forums of international financial

and inter-state institutions where there is no democratic discussion and they have no formal rights or responsibilities. Protesting outside meetings of the WTO or the G8 does not involve winning any arguments. At best it is a matter of courtier politics and elite lobbying, shortcutting any attempt to win popular representative support, and at worst it is a radical justification for the refusal to engage politically and for a retreat into personal solipsism.

Courtier politics

The attempt to give elite lobbying a moral legitimacy leads to the exploitation of marginal struggles in the non-Western world, where people are least likely to complain about Western advocates claiming to represent them and guide their struggle. Mary Kaldor, for example, echoes network theorists Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink in their use of the ‘boomerang effect’ to describe the way civil society groups could ‘bypass the state’ through appealing to transnational networks, international institutions and foreign governments.^{lxxvii} Kaldor describes the relationship as ‘a kind of two-way street’:

[which links Southern] groups and individuals who directly represent victims, whether it be the victims of human rights violations, poverty or environmental degradation, with the so-called Northern solidarity “outsiders”. The former provide testimony, stories and information about their situation and they confer legitimacy on those who campaign on their behalf. The latter provide access to global institutions, funders or global media as well as “interpretations” more suited to the global context.^{lxxviii}

The popularity of building global civil society from the bottom up for Western radicals would seem to be a reflection of similar problems to those faced by East European oppositionist figures in the 1980s – the weakness of their own domestic position. While East European activists justified their ‘anti-politics’ on the basis of the state’s domination of the political sphere, the Western radicals argue that theirs is based on the state’s lack of relevance to policy-making. Instead, they have talked-up the importance of international institutional gatherings which previously attracted little interest. Pianta arguing, for example, that ‘the new power of summits of states and inter-governmental organisations’ needs to be confronted through the invention of parallel summits.^{lxxxix} In the face of an inability to make an impact at home, the transnational activists have sought to latch on to the ready-made agenda of international institutions. It is increasingly apparent that these radical movements are shaped and cohered by external agendas, by the timetable of meetings of the G7, WTO or the UN, more than by any collective drive of their own.

Ironically, rather than bringing pressure to bear on institutions, it is these institutions, particularly the UN, which have been largely responsible for creating a global activist network, providing an agenda of forums which could act as a cohering focus for the establishment of a ‘loose coalition of groups and individuals worldwide’.^{lxxx} Rather than being seen as a threat to the powers that be, in the international establishment, the ‘new’ social movements are more often than not seen as making a positive contribution. For example, following the G8 summit in Genoa in 2001 global institutions responded by welcoming the dialogue. The IMF and the World Bank invited lobby groups including Global Exchange, Jobs with Justice, 50 Years is

Enough and Essential Action to engage in public debate. Guy Verhofstadt, Prime Minister of Belgium and President of the European Union at the time, wrote an open letter to the anti-globalization movement, published in major national newspapers around the world, and collected the responses. The French Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, welcomed ‘the emergence of a citizen’s movement at the planetary level’.^{lxxxix}

As highlighted by George W. Bush’s relationship with U2 rock star Bono, governments and international institutions can only gain from their association with radical advocates.^{lxxxii} The reason for the positive approach of the establishment lies in the fact that the relationship of advocacy implies a mutual interest rather than any radical opposition.^{lxxxiii} The power of the advocate depends more on their access to governing elites than any authority gained independently through representation. This lack of representational accountability (at any level) leaves control in the hands of the powerful, while offering the appearance of ‘openness’, ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’. Under these circumstances, the more ‘radical’ global civic actors become the more the doors of inter-state forums have been opened to them.^{lxxxiv}

Despite the claims of many critical theorists, there are few indications that operating outside the formal political sphere of electoral representation facilitates a radical challenge to political power and existing hierarchies of control. Compared to ‘political’ social movements of the past, new social movements based on advocacy pose much less of a threat to the status quo. However, for Kaldor:

[the advocacy movement] represents, in some respects, a revival of the great anti-capitalist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

At the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre in 2002, the activists defined themselves as a “global movement for social justice and solidarity”.^{lxxxv}

The activists may have declared themselves to constitute a ‘global movement’ but it could be argued that what is distinctive about global civic activism is precisely the individual character of global civic activism rather than the collective mass character of the ‘great anti-capitalist movements’ of the last two centuries. According to Grugel:

Recent anti-globalisation movements include: the Jubilee 2000 campaign against third world debt; mass protest against the policies and strictures imposed by the IMF, the symbol of global regulation; street protests at European Union summits; and local protests against the onward march of globalising capitalism, such as that encapsulated within the Chiapas rebellion in Mexico... *These organisations privilege lobbying at the global level over national strategies of mobilisation.* As a result, even the voices of communities geographically isolated from, and economically unimportant to, the core of the global economy and decision-making can now be heard in the decision-making centres of the global political economy.(emphasis added)^{lxxxvi}

The anti-globalisation movement brings together disparate groups and organisations which choose to prioritise global lobbying and advocacy politics over the struggle for democratic legitimacy at the national level. The rejection of the mass politics of liberal democracy is radically re-represented as the claim to be operating on a higher ethical level, that of making common cause with the most marginalized social groups

least influential to the workings of the global economy. Ethical advocates who take up the (selective) demands of (selective) marginal groups, and provide “‘interpretations” more suited to the global context’, can then lobby for their political ends without the trouble of democratic legitimacy.

The advantage of the politics of ethical advocacy is that individuals can engage in politics without having to win electoral accountability. As Slavoj Žižek notes, this limited interactivity is based on ‘interpassivity’, the virtuous activity of a minority being presupposed by the passivity of others, who are spoken for.^{lxxxvii} Rather than expand the horizon of democratic politics, this is a form of politics which is neither ‘democratic’ nor ‘inclusive’.^{lxxxviii} It is focused around the ‘freedoms’ of the individual advocate who engages in courtly politics and elite lobbying.

This highly individualised approach is reflected in the work of Mary Kaldor, who argues: ‘I develop my own definition of civil society as the medium through which social contracts or bargains between the *individual* and centres of political and economic power are negotiated, discussed and mediated.’^{lxxxix} Where, in the past, the ‘social contract’ was made through collective and egalitarian political engagement, for Kaldor, civil society takes the place of collective politics and facilitates an individual ‘negotiation’ with centres of power. The radical ‘bottom-up’ project of global civil society ends up rejecting democratic accountability for the courtier politics of elite advocacy.

Living in truth

In the same way as the courtier politics of elite advocates makes the personal act a political one, through bypassing the mediation of a collective political process, there has also been a startling emergence of a new type of individuated civic activism, one which engages in politics through personal ethical acts. Ann Mische highlights that this is a ‘type of civic participation in which human subjectivity is not sacrificed to politics’.^{xc} This is a form of politics which privileges the individual subject above the collective one. The ‘anti-politics’ or ‘living in truth’ of East European intellectual oppositionists, such as Havel, is the model of today’s political activism which seeks to blur the distinction between the private and the public life of an individual:

...the aim is not to maintain two mutually opposed realms, but rather to understand the one as a ‘holding area’ of the self, from which the self must necessarily emerge to act publicly within the other. In Havel’s view, it is the recovery of the ‘hidden sphere’ of subjectivity that provides the basis for the ‘independent life of society’.^{xcii}

Gideon Baker suggests that personal ethics should be the basis of the public resistance to power. This blurring of the private and the public is central to the liberatory promise of post-political activism: ‘This holds out the hope of both personal and political autonomy, in short, of self-rule.’^{xciii}

Twenty-three-year-old Caoimhe Butterly is a leading example of the new breed of transnational political activists. Brought up in a culture of liberation theology and with her father working around the world as an economic advisor to the UN, she worked in soup kitchens in New York, in Guatemala and with the Zapatista

communities in Mexico before working in pre-war Iraq with an activist group opposing sanctions and then moving to Palestine working in Jenin camp. Interviewed in the *Guardian*, after being shot by Israeli troops, she was asked if she planned to leave. Her reply was “I’m going nowhere. I am staying until this occupation ends. I have the right to be here, a responsibility to be here. So does anyone who knows what is going on here.”^{xccc}

This is a very different form of political activism from the solidarity work of trade unionist and political activists in the past. Rather than engaging in political debate and discussion with colleagues and workmates or raising concerns in election campaigns, the new breed of postmodern activist is more concerned to act as a moral individual than to engage in collective political action. The rights which are claimed are those of individual engagement with other people’s struggles rather than any specific political claims of the Palestinians or of others. Caiomhe argues she has a duty to be in Palestine, to bear witness and to negotiate with Israeli forces on behalf of Palestinian victims, and, implicitly, that any morally-aware person has a similar duty. The self-centredness of this type of ethical politics is highlighted in the title of leftist British comedian Jeremy Hardy’s film of his experience in the region: *Jeremy Hardy versus the Israeli Army*.^{xciv}

Ken Nichols O’Keefe, leading the volunteer mission of peace activists acting as human shields during the 2003 Iraq war, spells out the transnational ethos. According to O’Keefe ‘we the “citizens” are responsible for the actions of “our” governments...we are collectively guilty for what we allow to be done in our name’.^{xcv} For this reason O’Keefe has renounced his US citizenship and would ‘invite

everybody to join me in declaring themselves not citizens of nations but world citizens prepared to act in solidarity with the most wretched on our planet and to join us.^{'xcvi} Along with Caiomhe, O'Keefe is implicitly critical of those who do not take up the invitation to put morality first. O'Keefe would 'rather die in defense of justice and peace than "prosper" in complicity with mass murder and war'.^{xcvii}

It would appear that the motivation of the global civic activists acting as human shields and witnesses in Iraq and the West Bank has less to do with the politics of the conflicts and more to do with their own personal need to make a moral statement. Ronald Forthofer, from the Episcopal Church in Longmont, Colorado, a human shield in Beit Jalla on the West Bank, stated: 'We believe that we who are protected in America should experience and live in the same way that Palestinians are living in the suffering.'^{xcviii} Kate Edwards, a community worker from Manchester, explained why she joined the International Solidarity Movement in the occupied territories: 'I wanted to challenge myself to see if I could cope working in a place like this. I have good friends and a comfortable life. I wanted to do something for those who were not as fortunate as me.'^{xcix} But rather than donate to the International Red Cross or another professionally trained organisation, Kate felt the need to put her own life at risk, suffering severe internal injuries from bullet wounds in Bethlehem, after refusing to follow Israeli troop orders to halt. A similar individual mission has driven young British Muslims to volunteer as suicide bombers in conflicts abroad. As Josie Appleton notes:

This is less a case of militants finding common cause in Palestinians' fight for their land and livelihood, than of finding themselves – of finding their own

individual identity and mission... In this context, the nihilistic tactic of suicide bombing seems to allow these young Western militants to fight their own war. Unlike fighting in an army over a sustained period of time, suicide bombing is an individual act that requires no engagement with the conflict itself. It is *my* act, the sacrifice of *my* life – it allows suicide bombers to construct in their heads the mission that they are making the sacrifice for.^c

In the not so recent past it was religious leaders and moral authority figures who ‘intervened’ in other people’s struggles in the hope of bringing a peaceful resolution by bearing witness to the suffering and attempting to help. Today, the collapse of a broader political or moral framework has led to individuals claiming their own moral right of ‘intervention’ without any legitimacy derived from a collective authority.

Conclusion

The celebration of global civil society ‘from the bottom up’ would appear to be less about global change than the attempt to justify the avoidance of accountability to any collective source of political community or elected authority. The focus on the shared interests with those ‘excluded’, or the global community of radical activists, is a way of legitimising the avoidance of connection with those still ‘trapped inside’ - the electorate. William Connolly highlights this:

Cross-national, non-state democratic movements...contest the cultural assumption of alignment between a citizen’s commitment to democracy and her commitments to the priorities of a particular state... To the extent that

such movements unfold...a fundamental imperative of the late-modern time becomes more clear to more people: today a decent democrat must sometimes be disloyal to the state that seeks to own her morally and politically; she must do so in the name of allegiances to a global condition that transcends the confines of any state. As things stand now, corporate elites, financial institutions, criminal networks, communication media and intelligence agencies exercise considerable independence in this regard. Only democratic citizens remain locked behind the bars of the state in the late-modern time.^{ci}

The corrosive essence of the ‘anti-politics’ of global civil society is that it legitimates a highly individual political ethics as one that can be advocated in the name of a spurious ‘global allegiance’. As Kaldor states:

Advocates of transnational civil society share with the eighteenth-century theorists of civil society the notion of a public morality based on individual conscience. This is indeed the reason for retaining the term. The difference is that the ethical arena, the realm of public morality, is greatly extended. It is a plea for cosmopolitan rights that takes us well beyond the [Kantian] right to hospitality.^{cii}

The problem is that the area of ‘public morality’ is not extended through this moral claim on behalf of ‘individual conscience’; instead the political is reduced to the personal and no claim on behalf of a collective community is sustainable. Rather than address the ‘global wrongs’ of the world, the radical normative project of global civil society is a retreat into ‘individual conscience’. As Ellen Meiskins Wood notes, the

focus on identity and difference differs greatly from the early view of interest group politics in that it rejects ‘an inclusive political totality – like the “political system”, the nation, or the body of citizens’ and instead insists on the primacy and ‘irreducibility of fragmentation and “difference”’.^{ciii}

The struggle for individual ethical and political autonomy, the claim for the recognition of separate ‘political spaces’ and for the ‘incommunicability’ of political causes, demonstrates the limits of the radical claims for the normative project of global civil society ‘from below’. The rejection of the formal political sphere, as a way of mediating between the individual and the social, leaves political struggles isolated from any shared framework of meaning or from any formal processes of democratic accountability. Rather than constituting a challenge to unaccountable frameworks of global governance, the struggle for ‘autonomy’ from below, in fact, further legitimises the narrowing of the political sphere to a small circle of unaccountable elites.

ⁱ N. Stammers, ‘Social Movements and the Social Construction of Human Rights’, *Human Rights Quarterly*, (1999) Vol.21, No.4, pp.980-1008, p.1006.

ⁱⁱ For example, J. Keane, *Global Civil Society?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

ⁱⁱⁱ For example, R. A. Falk, and A. Strauss, ‘The Deeper Challenges of Global Terrorism: A Democratizing Response’, in D. Archibugi (ed.) *Debating Cosmopolitics* (London: Verso, 2003), pp.209-10; M. Pianta, ‘Democracy vs Globalization: The Growth of Parallel Summits and Global Movements’, in Archibugi (ed.) *Debating Cosmopolitics*, p.237.

^{iv} M. Foucault, *Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège De France, 1975-76* (London: Allen Lane/ Penguin, 2003), pp.98-99; W. E. Connolly, ‘Democracy and Territoriality’, *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1991), Vol.20, No.3, pp.463-484, pp.465-6; T. Pogge, ‘An Egalitarian Law of Peoples’, *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, (1994), Vol.23, pp.195-224, p.198; D. Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

^v A. Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community* (Cambridge: Polity, 1998), p.6.

-
- ^{vi} M. Kaldor, *Global Civil Society: An Answer to War* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003), p.36.
- ^{vii} Ibid., p.21.
- ^{viii} Ibid.
- ^{ix} Ibid., p.4.
- ^x Ibid., p.53.
- ^{xi} Ibid., p.55.
- ^{xii} G. Konrad, *Anti-Politics: An Essay* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Janovich, 1984).
- ^{xiii} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.57.
- ^{xiv} Ibid., p 56.
- ^{xv} Ibid., p 85.
- ^{xvi} Ibid.
- ^{xvii} Ibid., p.56.
- ^{xviii} Ibid., p.57.
- ^{xix} R. A. Falk, *On Humane Governance: Toward a New Global Politics* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p.253.
- ^{xx} R. Lipschutz, 'Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1992), Vol.21, No.3, pp.389-420, p.392.
- ^{xxi} Connolly, 'Democracy and Territoriality', p.476.
- ^{xxii} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.86.
- ^{xxiii} M. Hardt, and A. Negri, *Empire* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001), p.133.
- ^{xxiv} Ibid., p.134.
- ^{xxv} R. Blaug, *Democracy, Real and Ideal: Discourse Ethics and Radical Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), p.121.
- ^{xxvi} G. Baker, 'Unstable Subjects and Unknowable Others: Is Political Representation Possible?', paper presented to the 'Political Representation' workshop ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Edinburgh, 28 March – 2 April 2003, p.10.
- ^{xxvii} Baker, 'Unstable Subjects and Unknowable Others'.
- ^{xxviii} G. Baker, 'Problems in the Theorisation of Global Civil Society', *Political Studies*, (2002), Vol.50, No.5, pp.928-943, p.942.
- ^{xxix} Baker, 'Problems in the Theorisation of Global Civil Society'; K. Hutchings, 'Modelling Democracy', in H. Smith (ed.) *Democracy and International Relations: Critical Theories/ Problematic Practices* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2000); V. Jabri, 'Discourse Ethics, Democratic Practice and the Possibility of Intercultural Understanding', in Smith (ed.) *Democracy and International Relations*.
- ^{xxx} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.84.
- ^{xxxi} J. Heartfield, *The 'Death of the Subject' Explained* (Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University Press, 2002), p.142.
- ^{xxxii} Ibid., p.120.
- ^{xxxiii} P. Wagner, 'The Project of Emancipation and the Possibility of Politics, or, What's Wrong with Post-1968 Individualism?', *Thesis Eleven*, (2002), No.68, pp.31-45.
- ^{xxxiv} Ibid.
- ^{xxxv} E. Laclau, and C. Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics* (2nd ed.) (London: Verso, 2001).

- ^{xxxvi} Ibid.; see also B. Jessop, *State Theory: Putting Capitalist States in their Place* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990).
- ^{xxxvii} Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, p.132.
- ^{xxxviii} Ibid., p.184.
- ^{xxxix} A. Melucci, 'Social Movements and the Democratization of Everyday Life', in J. Keane (ed.) *Civil Society and the State: New European Perspectives* (London: Verso, 1988), p.247.
- ^{xl} Ibid., p.248.
- ^{xli} Melucci, 'The Symbolic Challenge of Contemporary Movements', *Social Research*, (1985), Vol.52, No.4, pp.789-816, p.815.
- ^{xlii} See G. Martin, 'New Social Movements and Democracy', in G. Taylor and M. Todds (eds) *Democracy and Protest* (Sheffield: Sheffield Hallam University Press, 2003).
- ^{xliii} Melucci, 'Social Movements and the Democratization of Everyday Life', p.259.
- ^{xliv} S. Patel, J. Bolnick, and M. Mitlin, 'Squatting on the Global Highway: Community Exchanges for Urban Transformation', in M. Edwards and J. Gaventa (eds) *Global Citizen Action* (London: Earthscan, 2001), p.244.
- ^{xlv} Laclau and Mouffe, *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, p.167.
- ^{xlvi} Hardt, and Negri, *Empire*, p.53.
- ^{xlvii} M. Shaw, *Theory of the Global State: Globality as Unfinished Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.18.
- ^{xlviii} Ibid.
- ^{xlix} Hardt, and Negri, *Empire*, p.54.
- ^l Ibid., p.56.
- ^{li} Ibid.
- ^{lii} R. Debray, 'A Guerrilla with a Difference', *New Left Review*, (1996), No.218, pp.128-137; G. Esteva, 'The Zapatistas and People's Power', *Capital and Class*, No.68, (1999), pp.153-182; G. Esteva, and M. Prakash, *Grassroots Post-modernism: Re-making the Soil of Cultures* (London: Zed Books, 1998).
- ^{liii} Cited in M. Giles, and K. Stokke, 'Participatory Development and Empowerment: The Dangers of Localism', *Third World Quarterly*, (2000), Vol.21, No.2, pp.247-258.
- ^{liv} N. Klein, *Fences and Windows: Dispatches from the Front Lines of the Globalization Debate* (London: Flamingo, 2002), pp.210-12.
- ^{lv} J. Holloway, 'Dignity's Revolt', in J. Holloway and E. Peláez (eds) *Zapatista! Reinventing Revolution in Mexico* (London: Pluto Press, 1998), p.180.
- ^{lvi} Baker, 'Problems in the Theorisation of Global Civil Society', p.941.
- ^{lvii} P. Cunninghame, and B. C. Corona, 'A Rainbow at Midnight: Zapatistas and Autonomy', *Capital and Class*, (1998), No.66, pp.12-22, p.16.
- ^{lviii} G. Baker, *Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices* (London: Routledge, 2002), p.140.
- ^{lix} Klein, *Fences and Windows*, p.220.
- ^{lx} Baker, *Civil Society and Democratic Theory*, pp.142-3; see also J. Vidal, 'Peasant Farmers Show Strength in Cauldron of Grassroots Politics', *Guardian*, 10 September 2003.
- ^{lxi} J. Tuckman, 'Zapatistas Go Back to the Grassroots', *Guardian*, 27 December 2003.
- ^{lxii} Cited in Vidal, 'Peasant Farmers Show Strength in Cauldron of Grassroots Politics'.
- ^{lxiii} Cited in Ibid.

- ^{lxiv} S. Marcos, 'The Slaves of Money – and Our Rebellion', *Guardian*, 11 September 2003; Vidal, 'Peasant Farmers Show Strength in Cauldron of Grassroots Politics'.
- ^{lxv} R. B. J. Walker, 'Social Movements/World Politics', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, (1994), Vol.23, No.3, pp.669-700, p.674.
- ^{lxvi} See for example, D. Chandler, 'Rhetoric without Responsibility: The Attraction of "Ethical" Foreign Policy', *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, Vol.5, No.3, 2003, pp.295-316; and 'Culture Wars and International Intervention: An 'Inside/Out' View of the Decline of the National Interest', *International Politics*, Vol.41, No.3, forthcoming Autumn 2004.
- ^{lxvii} Keane, *Global Civil Society?*, p.65.
- ^{lxviii} Falk, *On Humane Governance*, p.212.
- ^{lxix} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, pp.111-112.
- ^{lxx} Falk, and A. Strauss, 'The Deeper Challenges of Global Terrorism: A Democratizing Response', p.211.
- ^{lxxi} A. Colás, *International Civil Society: Social Movements in World Politics* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).
- ^{lxxii} *Ibid.*, pp.55-57.
- ^{lxxiii} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.48.
- ^{lxxiv} *Ibid.*, p.64.
- ^{lxxv} *Ibid.*, p.82.
- ^{lxxvi} C. Fox, 'Thinking Global, Not Local', *Municipal Journal*, 10 July 2003.
- ^{lxxvii} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.5; M. E. Keck, and K. Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).
- ^{lxxviii} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.95.
- ^{lxxix} Pianta, 'Democracy vs Globalization: The Growth of Parallel Summits and Global Movements', p.238.
- ^{lxxx} C. Bunch, 'International Networking for Women's Human Rights', in Edwards and Gaventa (eds) *Global Citizen Action*, pp.217-21.
- ^{lxxxii} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.103.
- ^{lxxxiii} J. Vidal, 'Odd Couple's African Tour Highlights Battle over Debt', *Guardian*, 22 May 2002; R. Carroll, 'Pop Star's Relations with Bush Turn Sour', *Guardian*, 18 September 2003.
- ^{lxxxiv} Heartfield, 'Contextualising the 'Anti-Capitalist' Movement in Global Civil Society', in D. Chandler and G. Baker (eds), *Global Civil Society: Contested Futures* (London: Routledge, forthcoming 2004).
- ^{lxxxv} V. Heins, 'Global Civil Society as the Politics of Faith', in Chandler and Baker (eds), *Global Civil Society*.
- ^{lxxxvi} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.101.
- ^{lxxxvii} J. Grugel, 'Democratisation Studies Globalisation: the Coming of Age of a Paradigm', *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, (2003), Vol.5, No.2, pp.258-283, p.276.
- ^{lxxxviii} S. Zizek, 'The Interpassive Subject', 20 May 2003. Available from: <http://www.lacan.com/interpass.htm>; see also J. Mendel, 'Reading the "War on Terror": Psychoanalysis and Beyond', paper presented at the British International Studies Association 28th annual conference, University of Birmingham, 15-17 December 2003.
- ^{lxxxviii} Lipschutz, 'Global Civil Society and Global Governmentality: Resistance, Reform or Resignation?', in Chandler and Baker (eds), *Global Civil Society*.

-
- ^{lxxxix} Kaldor, *Global Civil Society*, p.12.
- ^{xc} A. Mische, 'Post-communism's "Lost Treasure": Subjectivity and Gender in a Shifting Public Place', *Praxis International*, (1993), Vol.13, No.3, pp.242-267, p.245.
- ^{xcⁱ} Ibid.
- ^{xcⁱⁱ} Baker, *Civil Society and Democratic Theory*, p.149.
- ^{xcⁱⁱⁱ} K. Barlow, 'Courage under Fire', *Guardian*, 27 November 2002.
- ^{xc^{iv}} See also J. Hardy, 'Four Days in Hell', *Guardian*, 15 April 2003.
- ^{xc^v} O'Keefe, K. N. 'Back to Iraq as a Human Shield', *Observer Comment Extra*, 29 December 2002. Available from: <http://observer.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,866254,00.html>.
- ^{xc^{vi}} Ibid.
- ^{xc^{vii}} Ibid.
- ^{xc^{viii}} I. Hazboun, 'Volunteers Act as Human Shields', *Associated Press*, 2 August 2001.
- ^{xc^{ix}} P. Beaumont, and M. Wainwright, "I Never Thought They Would Fire Live Rounds", *Guardian*, 3 April 2002.
- ^c J. Appleton, 'Suicidal Tendencies', *Spiked Online*, 7 May 2003. Available from: <http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/00000006DD8B.htm>.
- ^{ci} Connolly, 'Democracy and Territoriality', p.479.
- ^{cⁱⁱ} Kaldor, 'Transnational Civil Society', in T. Dunne and N. J. Wheeler (eds) *Human Rights in Global Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p.211.
- ^{cⁱⁱⁱ} E. M. Wood, *Democracy against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p.260.