



**CRISE** • Centre for Research on Inequality,  
• Human Security and Ethnicity

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

AND

UNIVERSITY OF  
BIRMINGHAM

**Political Science and International Studies**

## WORKSHOP ON CRITICAL APPROACHES TO POST-CONFLICT POLICY: POST-CONFLICT DEVELOPMENT OR DEVELOPMENT FOR CONFLICT?

DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,  
25-26 JUNE 2008

WEDNESDAY 25 JUNE

10.00 – 11.00 Registration + Coffee

11.00 – 12.00 **Panel I: Theoretical perspectives**

Too much and not enough: The limits of critical approaches to post-conflict reconstruction

Prof. David Chandler, University of Westminster

Chair: Dr Graham Brown, University of Oxford

12.00 – 13.30 Lunch

13.30 – 15.00 **Panel II: What's so 'post-' about 'post-conflict'?: Peace processes, ceasefires and development**

Problematizing 'post-conflict' in Burma: Ceasefires, construction and jostling for control

Nicholas Farrelly, University of Oxford

The role of the post-conflict development agenda in the collapse of Sri Lanka's peace process

Rajesh Venugopal, University of Oxford

Chair: Dr Caroline Hughes, University of Birmingham

15.00 – 15.30 Coffee + Tea

15.30 – 17.00 **Panel III: Donor interventions I: Working in, around, or for conflict?**

Interventionist politics at the local interface: Post-conflict Sierra Leone, Christine Cubitt,  
University of Bradford

Mindanao: Development in conflict, Anna Bowden, University of Oxford

Chair: Prof. Joakim Öjendal, Göteborg University

19.00 Conference Dinner

THURSDAY 26 JUNE

- 9.00 – 11.00 **Panel IV: Donor interventions II: Getting it wrong, getting it right, or just not getting it?**  
Stronger without post-conflict development? The contradictory experiences of Bosnia, Dr Vanessa Pupavac, University of Nottingham  
Is greed really dead? Donor responses to conflict in Nepal, Dr Graham Brown, University of Oxford  
From Nation of Heroes to ethnic conflict: Aid, institutions and the failure of development in post-conflict Timor Leste, Dr Caroline Hughes, University of Birmingham  
Chair: Rajesh Venugopal, University of Oxford
- 11.00 – 11.30 Coffee and Tea
- 11.30 – 13.00 **Panel V: Democracy, governance, and stability**  
Post-conflict institutional development: The perversities of Black Hat and White Hat governance in Cambodia, Dr David Craig, University of Auckland (with Dr Doug Porter, Asian Development Bank)  
Reconstruction in a post-conflict society: Trade-offs between democracy and reconstruction in Cambodia?, Prof. Joakim Öjendal, Göteborg University  
Chair: Dr Graham Brown, SOAS
- 13.00 – 14.00 Lunch
- 14.00 – 15.30 **Roundtable Discussion**  
Chair: Dr Caroline Hughes, University of Birmingham
- 15.30 Coffee, Tea, and Departures

# Abstracts

**Anna Bowden**, MPhil Candidate, Dept. of International Development, University of Oxford

## Mindanao: Development in Conflict

This research is an examination of 'post-conflict development' in Mindanao. Using both theoretical critiques and empirical analyses conducted in the Philippines, it assesses the policy of donors and international organisations working in the 'post-conflict' context in Mindanao. It argues that the type of development being employed in Mindanao is entirely inappropriate in its attempt to assuage conflict on the island for a number of reasons. Firstly, there is a prevalent misconception of the term 'post'-conflict. Secondly, there is a common consensus that 'development' per se, leads in some unilinear way to 'peace'. Thirdly, development in Mindanao is exacerbating issues such as state discrimination and landlessness, which have always been at the heart of Moro grievances. Finally, in light of these problematic tendencies, it is fundamental to recognise that since its inception, the Moro separatist movement has always been prone to rejuvenation and transmogrification in response to prevailing conditions, particularly in opposition to the Philippine state. Thus, it is unlikely that development in Mindanao as it is currently deployed will placate the concerns of the Moro separatist movements, and institutionalise 'peace'.

Email: [anna.bowden@qeh.ox.ac.uk](mailto:anna.bowden@qeh.ox.ac.uk)

**Dr Graham K. Brown**, Research Officer, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, Department of International Development, University of Oxford

## Is Greed Really Dead?: Donor Responses to Conflict in Nepal

Since the mid-1990s, the in-flux of development economists working on the causes and impacts of civil war has seen the emergence of a new 'greed' orthodoxy, which interprets civil war as an activity undertaken by individuals – mostly young unemployed men – motivated primarily by private gain. Aid-supported post-conflict activities have fallen into two broad arenas – aid aimed at restoring economic growth which, in line with the broader development orthodoxy, is seen as virtually the only objective of aid more generally; and, projects aimed at DDR activities. As such, this is an agenda that almost exclusively reflects the 'greed' framework of civil war. Alternative explanations of civil war, such as the 'horizontal inequalities' – social exclusion or 'grievance' - hypothesis, ought to have rather different implications for aid policy responses to conflict. This paper examines how these different approaches have affected donor activity in Nepal, during the Maoist insurgency of 1996-2006. Anthropologists, NGOs and development scholars, including from the World Bank, argued that conflict dynamics and intensity in Nepal could best be explained in terms of country's extreme and complex hierarchical social structure of gender, caste and ethnicity, whether phrased in terms of 'horizontal inequalities', 'social exclusion', or simply 'discrimination'. This was reflected in the latest tranche of donor assistance documentation. Nepal has hence become something of a test-ground for this new approach to donor activity in post-conflict contexts. This paper will critically examine the donor response to the conflict and post-conflict context in Nepal. Drawing on field work and policy analysis, it answers two main questions. First, does the shifting donor discourse in Nepal reflect a genuine change in approach to aiding post-conflict societies, or is it merely a discursive shift legitimizing the same old policy bundle? Second, how far are donor activities in Nepal reflective of understandings of the causes, impacts and legacies of the conflict generated and acted upon by the Nepalese political leaders who are engaged in efforts to promote post-conflict reconstruction? Or, do they merely represent 'top-down' donor-imposed generic models of conflict and conflict recovery, whether from the 'greed' or 'grievance' school?

Email: [graham.brown@qeh.ox.ac.uk](mailto:graham.brown@qeh.ox.ac.uk)

**Prof. David Chandler**, Professor of International Relations, Centre for the Study of Democracy, University of Westminster

## Too Much and Not Enough: The Limits of Critical Approaches to Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Today it seems that every commentator and analyst is critical of post-conflict reconstruction. In this context, what does it mean to be critical? Should we be critical of international policy-makers for doing too little or attempting to do too much? The RAND/Dobbins approach is that the West attempts too much - we should be wary of over expectation and redefine downwards what can be achieved - this could well be seen as self-serving defensiveness post-Iraq, but can also be seen in the 'good enough governance' approach of Merilee Grindle pre-Iraq. The opposite, much more interventionist, approach can be seen in the critical

security/Human Security framework which argues that the West does not do enough - better coordination and earlier planning and intervention around an extended agenda, focusing on the victims and excluded, would be able to overcome problems of sustainable peace. A third position, is the ostensibly more radical one that the West does too much and not enough - too much in that policy involves an exercise of power and control, asserted in ethical or post-political or bio-political terms, and too little in that the concern is a selfish one of 'liddism' or containment' (Rogers/Duffield). This paper seeks to argue that all three critical perspectives help to describe the contradictions of post-conflict reconstruction but obscure the dynamics driving international policy in this area.

Email: [d.chandler@westminster.ac.uk](mailto:d.chandler@westminster.ac.uk)

**Dr David Craig**, Senior Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of Auckland; and,

**Dr Doug Porter**, Asian Development Bank.

#### Post Conflict Institutional Development: The Perversities of Black Hat and White Hat Governance in Cambodia

Institution building, usually under the rubric of 'good governance', has been a staple of development prescriptions in recent years, not least in post-conflict situations. Re-building the state and investment in institutional reform, it was imagined, would achieve both immediate and longer term transformational results. In the short term, improved governance would merit increased aid for services and infrastructure for the poor. There would be less waste and corruption, better targeting, and more security for the poor. The approach also carried a longer term, transformational agenda: building a capable, responsive state. Reformed institutions would create more certainty for markets, bring sustained growth, and security and opportunities for the poor. By re-scaling governance through decentralisation, more responsive relations between citizens and the state should arise. Around this consensus, donors saw prospects to harmonise aid delivery, and align with nationally owned strategies. Reflecting on Cambodian experience, this paper explores how good governance (or what, referring to a wider literature, we call 'new institutional') reforms have had uneven impacts: short and long term reform goals have proven contradictory, and the mix of donor led reforms and entrenched local practices has produced perversely complex institutional outcomes which render ongoing reform uncertain. Government has in many areas been left binarised between 'white hat' fragmented islands of strong and transparent donor funded (vertical/ parallel) programs delivering local development and Millennium Development Goal outcomes, and a public sector mainstream is still dominated by 'black hat' neopatrimonial practices focussed on territorial security and regime stability, itself involving parallel 'off budget' rent arrangements. Decentralised territorial planning, budgeting and management of development resources, even when backed by laws and support for institution building, have struggled with these difficulties. These approaches may have efficiently delivered local services or infrastructure, but their service delivery orientation and delivery modalities have seen uncertain outcomes in wider capability and responsiveness contexts. In Cambodia and elsewhere, many are now persuaded that by distorting state structures and fragmenting accountabilities, new institutional approaches including decentralisation have enabled neopatrimonial forms of governance, or at least have done little substantive to protect the poor in key institutional areas. Particularly vulnerable here are institutional areas vital to the protection of everyday livelihoods for the poorest: those institutions which might secure access to common property and primary resources, and guarantee public safety and human security

Email: [da.craig@auckland.ac.nz](mailto:da.craig@auckland.ac.nz)

**Christine Cubitt**, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford.

#### Interventionist Politics at the Local Interface: Post-Conflict Sierra Leone"

This paper analyses interventionist politics in post-conflict Sierra Leone in the context of local culture, local history and local need. It builds on a paper presented to the PSA in April last year that asked the question: who is accountable for interventionist policies in Sierra Leone? It is no secret that interventionist politics have had the potential to recreate the conditions which led society to implode in Sierra Leone and many analysts conclude that this has already happened. The character of modern politics in the locale now embodies the same historic power dynamics and political culture which existed before the war. This illustrates the divisive potential of post-conflict policy programming. The policies of interventionism have promoted a model of democracy which has consistently failed the people of Sierra Leone and the prioritising of macro-economic reform is an example of the myopic approach the international community has taken to

the challenges of the post-conflict environment and the needs of local people. A return to the status quo has not addressed the key fractures which led to the breakdown of society.

The question this paper raises is that if there is consensus among analysts, and the World Bank itself has been critical of the emphasis on macroeconomic stabilising programmes, then one has to wonder why the needs of the local community have yet to be respected and why policy programming reflects very little cognisance of historical and cultural tensions. This paper presents the argument that the schema of the liberal peace is not compatible with local need, local conditions or local culture and that a different approach is needed if a durable peace is to be secured.

**Nicholas Farrelly**, DPhil Candidate, Department of International Development, University of Oxford

Problematizing 'Post-Conflict' in Burma: Ceasefires, Construction and Jostling for Control,"

Burma's recent history has been dominated by intrastate conflict. Recognising this challenge, the ruling junta moved, starting in 1989, to neutralise the major armed threats to its government, which were the insurgencies that still raged along every fringe of the country. 20 ceasefires were subsequently agreed between the government and regional "ethnic" armies. After decades of civil strife many parts of the country have now experienced a period of "post-conflict" development. The character of this development has important implications for understanding the creation of "post-conflict" consensus. Such a "post-conflict" consensus—which ideally fosters conditions for disarmament, reconciliation and peaceful coexistence—justifies the normative impetus that is implicit to "post-conflict" development. In this paper I discuss the ongoing negotiation of development in some ceasefire areas of northern Burma. By examining the agency of elite groups from both sides of these conflicts, I clarify the contested nature of development and "post-conflict" consensus in contexts where neither side can claim full control.

Email: [nicholas.farrelly@balliol.ox.ac.uk](mailto:nicholas.farrelly@balliol.ox.ac.uk)

**Dr Caroline Hughes**, Senior Lecturer, Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham.

From Nation of Heroes to Ethnic Conflict: Aid, Institutions, and the Failure of Development in Timor Leste

This paper examines the transformation of Timorese politics and economy between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, focusing on impact of international intervention and neoliberal aid policies on local governance. The centralizing and top-down approach to statebuilding adopted by the UN transitional administration in Timor has been widely criticized and often compared unfavourably to the World Bank's Community Empowerment Scheme intended to stimulate local participatory development. This paper argues that the debate between 'top-down' and 'bottom-up' development has distracted attention in the Timorese context from a broader debate about how newly built state institutions can be rooted in a local reality in a manner which promotes legitimacy and permits the making and implementation of policy.

To interrogate this question, the paper examines economic policy in Timor Leste between independence in 2002 and the months of rioting and violence that threatened to erupt into identity conflict in Dili in 2006. The Timorese government, under Mari Alkatiri, from 2002 formulated policies based upon ideas of 'economic nationalism' and 'self-reliance' which accorded with FRETILIN's historical ideological position of leftist social activism; but which in the context of contemporary international aid structures had a strongly deflationary impact upon the economy. Coinciding with inflexible and highly ideological pressures from the international aid community and from the Australian government, with whom the Timorese were negotiating over revenues from disputed oil fields in the Timor Sea, FRETILIN ideology was transformed from an inclusive and highly mobilizing form of nationalism into an elitist, politically divisive, and economically deflationary set of policies, exacerbating tensions between the mestizo elite and the mass of the population; between returnees from the diaspora and the Indonesian-educated middle class; and, ultimately, between the population of the eastern districts and the population of the western districts.

Email: [c.hughes.1@bham.ac.uk](mailto:c.hughes.1@bham.ac.uk)

**Prof. Joakim Öjendal**, Senior Lecturer, Department of Peace and Development Studies, SGS, Göteborg University

Reconstruction in a Post-conflict society: Trade-offs between Democracy and Reconstruction in Cambodia?

Cambodia was one of the globally highlighted cases of attempted enforced democratization in the early 1990s, with a massive UN-intervention and subsequent aid flows targeted for 'good governance'. Polarized and ideological debates on pros and cons of the viability of such an approach and of the resulting political regime ensued. Little clarity has emerged from this debate. Possibly this is the case due to that the growing reconstruction efforts of rebuilding the state machinery gathering popular legitimacy as well as upholding constitutional credibility, came to coincide with an accelerating accommodation to the demands of a neo-liberal globalization, in the process constructing conflicting demands of simultaneous 're-building' and 'dismantling' of the state. Hence, 'roadmaps' of reconstruction emerging in great numbers in policy circles have been difficult to adopt and apply. One of the few processes where this is pursued seemingly successfully is with the 'decentralisation reform' since 2002. Although initiated as a reform of limited local democratization, it is bit-by-bit growing into a major overhaul of the entire state apparatus, containing progressive, experimental, and democratic dimensions far from the prevailing political culture that has been defining politics in Cambodia for a long time. Interestingly, the dominant party may, however, be able to combine the introduction of these undeniably 'democratic' features with mechanisms that will safeguard their continued domination of the contemporary political arena for the foreseeable future.

The paradox being that strategic democratic reforms are introduced leading to the maintaining of the impotence of the 'democratic' qualities of the current system. The nature of these 'strategic democratic reforms' will be described and the combined effect of them will be analyzed. This paper takes, thus, an interest in the political economy of the emerging state reforms in Cambodia, including the re—building of its state institutions and scrutinizes critically the emerging pattern of governance with a focus on how the political power struggle and 'democratic' dimensions are combined in order to overcome the above-mentioned incompatibilities of state reconstruction.

Email: [joakim.ojendal@globalstudies.gu.se](mailto:joakim.ojendal@globalstudies.gu.se)

**Dr Vanessa Pupavac**, Lecturer in International Relations, School of Politics, University of Nottingham

Stronger without Post-Conflict Development?: The Contradictory Experiences of Bosnia

The paper will critically consider the post-conflict development of Bosnia under international post-conflict development models. Within Bosnia, it will compare the differing patterns of development in the Federation and RS, exploring to what extent international development models have contributed to post-conflict development. The international post-conflict development models have emphasised a) addressing the past b) integration into the EU as key to post-conflict development c) micro-enterprise. In the decade following the war, the Federation appeared to be following international reforms better than RS and in a relatively better position economically than the RS. RS has persistently been criticised for failing to follow international reforms and its politicians warned that they were holding back their economic development. Nevertheless RS's economic development has begun to improve relative to the Federation's economic development despite continuing Western condemnation of its failure to reform politically. I will compare annual growth rates in the Federation and RS and other post-Yugoslav states, particularly Serbia, which seem to go against the assumptions of international models. The paper will raise questions over the efficacy of international post-conflict development models when key basic economic indicators suggest that those who depart from them might actually do better economically in the long-run.

Email: [vanessa.pupavac@nottingham.ac.uk](mailto:vanessa.pupavac@nottingham.ac.uk)

**Rajesh Venugopal**, DPhil Candidate, Department of International Development, University of Oxford

The Role of the Post-Conflict Development Agenda in the Collapse of Sri Lanka's Peace Process

This paper explores the creation of a 'neo-liberal peace agenda' in Sri Lanka in the late-1990s by a coalition of domestic and international actors. Using documentary evidence from the government, donors, NGOs, and political parties, combined with extensive interviews across the political spectrum collected during fieldwork, I argue that the collapse of the 2002-2004 peace process owed much to the fact that it was tethered to a politically unviable economic agenda of market reforms.

Email: [rajesh.venugopal@qeh.ox.ac.uk](mailto:rajesh.venugopal@qeh.ox.ac.uk)