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Introduction: Peace without Politics?

DAVID CHANDLER

It is ten years since the Dayton peace settlement, which formally ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) in November 1995. Since then there has been much discussion about the steep learning curve necessary for the new international tasks of state-building and post-conflict peacebuilding. BiH was the first such extensive international project since the post-Second World War US-led occupations of the defeated Axis powers Germany and Japan. Today, with the end of cold war geo-political divisions, BiH has become widely seen as a template for new experiments in international administration and external assistance in state reconstruction and post-conflict reconciliation. The contributions in this specially commissioned collection seek to probe the lessons of the BiH experience and highlight the nature of the problems confronted by international policy-making institutions; exploring the limitations and possibilities for external influence and drawing attention to some of the unintended consequences of projects of this kind.

The in-depth analysis offered by the contributors to this volume comes at an important time when the issue of post-conflict state-building and international attempts to prevent and manage the consequences of state failure have become major questions on the international policy agenda. In the wake of 9/11 and the problems of international intervention and administrative regulation in Afghanistan and Iraq, international engagement in state capacity-building initiatives has become central to international concerns.

This interventionist desire to shape the political process and reconstruct state institutions, where states are perceived to be 'failing', is in marked contrast to the political norms and possibilities of the cold war period where the geo-political divide between the Soviet Union and the United States meant there was little international consensus on how states should be governed or on which policies they should follow in the domestic realm. In the second half of the twentieth century, the reaction against colonial practices meant that the United Nations upheld the formal political equality of all sovereign states, regardless of their level of political, economic or social development or of the capacity or willingness of their regimes to uphold the rights of their citizens.¹ Changed international power relations and changed political sensibilities have meant that today there is much less of a divide between how states are treated internationally and what they do domestically.

A new normative framework has emerged which has placed international regulation of, and intervention in, the domestic affairs of states firmly on the agenda. However, even in leading policy-making circles there is a concern that the development and assessment of international practices has lagged behind

the demand that international actions be undertaken.² After ten years of international experience and experimentation in state-building in BiH, the successes and failures of the international post-war administration of BiH should be at the centre of debate regarding the development of new international policy practices. It is to be hoped that this collection can assist in helping analysis of state-building initiatives catch up with the world of state-building practice.

Politics as a Barrier to Peace

The one theme that comes out clearly in the contributions below is that of the tendency for the international administrative authority in BiH to separate state-building from politics. There is a tendency to see state-building as a technical or administrative process, one which does not require building a popular consensus for policy-making. The post-Second World War external administrations of Germany and Japan engaged the local populations in a major project of social, economic and political reconstruction and, through doing so, won a high level of popular legitimacy and support. In contrast, the international administration of BiH has excluded all but token local input in the making and implementation of policy, criticizing the programmes and personnel of the main political parties and asserting that the BiH electorate is not yet to be trusted with a meaningful vote. Rather than deriving policy from Bosnians' concerns and needs, the legislative process has been driven by technical and administrative 'experts' in Brussels and Washington. Policies have then been imposed through the international Office of the High Representative, forcing locally accountable political leaders to accede to demands under the threat of being dismissed on the grounds of 'obstruction'.

The powers of the international administration have grown in an ad hoc way since Dayton, reflecting a greater international consensus behind new, and more interventionist, state-building practices. BiH, unlike Germany and Japan, was not defeated by its administrating powers in a war; there was no formal ceding of sovereignty and political control over decision-making. Close international oversight was intended to last for one year only, until the first state elections in September 1996. However, ten years on from Dayton, not one piece of substantial legislation had been devised, ratified and implemented by Bosnian politicians and civil servants.³ This is in marked contrast to Japan and West Germany where, in the first case, the external occupation lasted nearly seven years and in the latter, there were four years of occupation, and full control over industrial and security policy was returned ten years after the end of the war.⁴

A decade on from Dayton – in a context where external state-building is taking place with the maintenance of the trappings of formal sovereignty – the lack of political autonomy for Bosnian representatives, and of political accountability for Bosnian citizens, is possibly the most remarkable feature of the Bosnian settlement. However, the lack of democracy in BiH has posed little barrier to negotiations over the European Union accession process. In fact, the European Union has given its formal blessing to the maintenance of a highly restricted political sphere, with the establishment of the EU's Special

Representative as the international High Representative in 2002. There would appear to be a clear international consensus that, for state-building to be a success, rule by externally-appointed bureaucrats is preferential to rule by Bosnian representatives accountable to BiH's citizens.

The contributors to this volume vary in their assessments of the results of this experiment in external oversight; however, whether they ultimately judge this approach as useful or as counterproductive, all the authors highlight the secondary importance of the participatory political process in today's discussions of state-building and post-conflict reconstruction. It is this aspect which this Introduction seeks to briefly examine before outlining the contributions themselves.

States without Politics?

In the past, the political process was generally understood as key to the creation of stable and viable states. Samuel Huntington's pioneering late-1960s study, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, was the key text for students of political development studies during the last 30 years of the twentieth century.⁵ His concern was not the creation of states, which had the stamp of international approval because the ruling clique supported the policies of those in power in Washington, nor was he trying to design the perfect constitution for export around the world, with a bill of rights and a separation of powers and human rights protections. For Huntington, the key to state stability was a political question of building a domestic consensus, a sense of political community, and establishing a government with popular legitimacy. Huntington argued that bureaucratic rule or government by isolated cliques may be able to produce stability in simple pre-industrialized societies but that modernization and the development of democratic, participatory societies depended on the strengthening and institutionalization of the political sphere.

Political institutions could only cohere society if they emerged out of existing social forces, if they represented real interests and real clashes of interest which then led to the establishment of mechanisms and organizational rules and procedures which were capable of resolving those disagreements.⁶ It was the links between political institutions, political parties and individuals which were considered key to strengthening the state both institutionally and in terms of its popular legitimacy. Huntington's findings challenge those who argue that international bureaucrats can draw up all the necessary legislation for state-building and post-conflict reconciliation. He argued that the powerful were always tempted to bypass the political sphere:

Inevitably a ruling monarch tends to view political parties as divisive forces which either challenge his authority or greatly complicate his efforts to unify and modernize his country... The modernizing monarch necessarily sees himself as the 'Patriot King' who is 'to espouse no party, but to govern like the common father of his people'.⁷

The desire of those in power to avoid popular accountability and to legitimize their authority on the basis of their direct and unmediated representation of the 'public interest' will sound familiar to anyone who has read the statements of

the succession of internationally-appointed High Representatives in BiH. High Representative Carlos Westendorp saw the Bosnian Presidency, Council of Ministers and Parliamentary Assembly as ‘painfully cumbersome and ineffective’ when compared to the alternative possibility of the swift signature of his administrator’s pen.⁸ Westendorp thrived on being the unaccountable judge of his own policy-making prowess, arguing: ‘You do not [have] power handed to you on a platter. You just seize it, if you use this power well, no-one will contest it.’⁹ Lord Paddy Ashdown, the current incumbent, has used very similar phraseology, for example, in his inaugural speech of May 2002, stating:

I have concluded that there are two ways I can make my decisions. One is with a tape measure, measuring the precise equidistant position between three sides. The other is by doing what I think is right for the country as a whole. I prefer the second of these. So when I act, I shall seek to do so in defence of the interests of all the people of BiH, putting their priorities first.¹⁰

For Lord Ashdown, as for his predecessors, rather than facilitating consensus-building between the three main political parties – representing Bosnian Muslims (also referred to as Bosniacs), Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats – his own personal perspective of ‘what I think is right’ was held to directly coincide with the interests of the population as a whole.

This high-handed approach, which has marked the ten years of international regulation in the tiny post-war state, is at the centre of the analysis in the collection here. While some commentators focus on the achievements of this approach and others on the shortcomings, all the analysts suggest that there are important lessons to be learned in the study of the efficiency and sustainability of policy-making by international imposition. That this is the case should not be altogether surprising considering earlier accepted wisdom on the importance of the political process to strengthening state capacity. To return to Huntington:

The administrator opposed to parties accepts the need to rationalize social and economic structures. He is unwilling, however, to accept the implications of modernization for broadening the scope of popular participation in politics. His is a bureaucratic model; the goal is efficiency and the elimination of conflict. Parties simply introduce irrational and corrupt considerations into the efficient pursuit of goals upon which everyone should be agreed. The administrative opponent of parties may wear any dress, but he is less likely to be in mufti than in uniform.¹¹

For Huntington, leaving aside the acuteness of his observation on the link between the military-mindset and the administrative one – captured well by Ashdown the ex-Royal Marine Commando who had never enjoyed elected government office – the point is that hostility to the political sphere is essentially counterproductive. While kings and bureaucrats understand their legitimacy as existing independently of society, links between individuals and the state – provided by the political sphere, and the mediation of political party

competition – are crucial both to creating identities which transcend parochial and particularist groupings and to legitimizing state-level institutions.¹²

Huntington's assertion of the centrality of the political sphere and the need for strong connections between states and their citizens is entirely missing from today's international policy documents outlining 'best practices' for international administrations. In fact, where his 1960s work is referred to, his points about the importance of strong state institutions are taken out of any political context. This later approach is exemplified in Roland Paris's well-received book, *At War's End*, published in 2004.¹³ Paris critiques the idea that a market economy and liberal democracy are the two preconditions for a stable peace. He argues that it is necessary to have 'Institutionalization before Liberalization', to focus on strong institutions, the rule of law and human rights protections before giving post-conflict societies the right to have a say in their own affairs.

For Paris, elections are important, but secondary. The process of political reconciliation and the development of a shared sense of political community should precede competitive elections: 'Peacebuilders' should proceed with elections only when there is evidence that "moderate" parties...have sufficient popular support...to prevail over "immoderate" parties at the polls.¹⁴ This interventionist project attempts not merely to reconstruct a state but also to transform the attitudes of the inhabitants of a post-conflict state. This latter task is to be undertaken through: civil society building; the encouragement of cross-cutting links and interests; international attention to educational curricula from primary school through to university level; the strict control and regulation of the media; trauma counselling and other therapeutic practices; and through punishing political parties or elected representatives held to be 'obstructing' progress. Clearly this state-building agenda is an ambitious one, but one that reflects the existing practices of international institutions, states and non-governmental organizations in BiH.

State-building practices are increasingly informed by the assumption that democracy is good for Western states but tutelage is better for non-Western states variously judged to be 'under stress', at 'risk of failure' or in post-conflict 'recovery'. This assumption rests on a transformed view of centrality of the political process to state legitimacy. The argument that it is possible to create the institutional framework of a strong and stable state before liberalization – that is, opening up the political process to democratic competition – suggests that citizens (and states) can be socially-engineered by correct practices of external regulation. The assumption is that the problems of politics can be resolved outside the realm of the political, in the realms of law, social policy and administration.¹⁵ It would seem, as Alejandro Bendaña notes, that 'good governance or state-building...has deep ideological presumptions which purport to offer technical solutions to what in essence are political problems'.¹⁶

It is this view of the feasibility of 'peace without politics' which has been central to current discussions of the external state-building agenda: an agenda which asserts that it is possible to have good governance without democratic participatory politics. In BiH, the international administration argues that the rule of law and even 'respect for democracy' can be developed before elected

representatives are allowed to assume political responsibility. In the wake of the US-led Iraq occupation, High Representative Ashdown toured Western capitals arguing that the 'rule of law' had to precede elections and political liberalization.¹⁷ This view of 'sequencing' formally relegates the political process to an optional extra, to be considered only after the mechanisms of governance are already firmly established.¹⁸

War without Politics?

The new international dispensation for military intervention – the undermining of state sovereignty in the case of gross human rights abuses and international support for intervention to address the threats posed by 'failed states' – has reflected broader calls for a reconsideration of the relationship between Western military intervention and international law. For example, there has been a growing tendency for international theorists and international security actors to perceive internal conflicts in the non-Western world as crimes to be judged and righted rather than as political conflicts to be mediated.¹⁹ Kalevi Holsti captured this new perception of conflict as 'wars of the third kind', stating that: 'In these wars, ordinary cost-benefit analyses that underlie wars as a "continuation of politics by other means" no longer apply.'²⁰ Mary Kaldor developed Holsti's themes with the concept of 'New Wars'.²¹

Politics was removed from the understanding of conflict in two ways. First, conflict in the non-Western state was held to be the domestic product of irrational, rapacious or criminal elites representing their own private interests – and therefore lacking any political legitimacy. Second, the intervention (military or otherwise) of Western powers was also divorced from any political interest and equated with a universal or ethical interest. Interventions of this sort were now likened to domestic policing, that is, merely the enforcement of pre-existing norms and laws.

War – understood as a conflict of political interests – was replaced by either war crimes and human rights abuses (conflict in the non-Western world) or policing and law enforcement (armed conflict undertaken by Western powers).²² Neither non-Western state 'failure', nor the international response to this, was conceived in traditional terms of political interests. This discursive dichotomy, between the failed state and the post-national or post-political intervention, in one move delegitimated the political process of the state intervened in, while at the same time setting up the intervening powers as being beyond or above political interests. Rather than being neutral observers of a legitimate conflict of interests, the international intervener became the judge, jury and administrator in a situation where there were no legitimate political interests to be taken into account.

The relationship between external intervening powers (increasingly seen as legitimate) and domestic political actors (now increasingly portrayed as pursuing illegitimate interests) has been transformed through a succession of innovative international policy-shifts since the end of the cold war. At the heart of this transformation has been the United Nations itself, which has extended its remit and reinterpreted the formal restrictions of the UN Charter while increasingly giving free reign to self-selected 'coalitions of the willing' to set their own

conditions on when and how interventions should take place and be formally brought to an end.²³

Ten years on from Dayton, a process that developed in BiH in a relatively arbitrary and ad hoc way has been increasingly institutionalized. At the end of 2004, the Report of the UN Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, advised the establishment of a Peacebuilding Commission to oversee the international administration of failing and post-conflict states.²⁴ According to the UN advisers and the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, a select committee of the 'great and the good' from around the world, acting under UN auspices, would have the requisite skills to help co-ordinate a panoply of international intervention mechanisms – from early warning, through preventative action, and onto post-conflict transitional administrations – where states were held to be 'under stress or recovering from conflict'.²⁵

The 'Ethical Turn' in International Theorizing

The rejection of the domestic political sphere as a constitutive sphere – in which social and political bonds are shaped and strengthened – and the re-representation of this sphere as purely one of corruption and conflict has received relatively little critical evaluation from academic commentators involved in international relations and international security studies. In fact, since the end of the cold war, new approaches to theorizing security have stressed that states are part of the problem rather than part of the solution to conflict and political and social division.²⁶ Many of these critical approaches draw on post-structuralist theorizing and follow Foucault's widely cited inversion of Clausewitz, seeing 'politics as a continuation of war by other means'.²⁷ The existence of states, in this reading, is the result of war and domestic social conflict, with the domination of victorious elites being enforced and reproduced by political processes of representation rather than military force. For these theorists, states inevitably engage in war and internal conflict as they are based on domination and relations of exclusion and exclusivity.²⁸

For critical, post-structuralist and normative theorists of international relations and international security, the political sphere is the problem to be addressed, not the sphere where solutions are to be found. Rather than starting from politics – from social forces and the clash of interests in society, as many realist theorists did²⁹ – many theorists start from ethics and norms and then seek to derive (non-exclusionary) political frameworks from this basis.³⁰ The approach of privileging ethics above the political process, central to the 'ethical turn' in international theorizing, fits closely with international state-building practices which privilege bureaucracy, law and administration above the political and may in part explain why there is little critical focus on these developments in many academic circles.³¹

The focus of 'human security' doctrines is no longer on the defence of states but on the rights of individuals wherever they might be in the world. This is construed to be a moral or ethical duty, placed upon the powerful, to take responsibility for the protection of the rights of those elsewhere.³² The 2004 Barcelona

Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, argues, for example, that: 'A human security approach for the European Union means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of the Union's borders, as was the security approach of nation-states.'³³ Here it is assumed that the EU has risen above the politics of state interests and that, as a post-national or post-political entity, it is capable of judging upon and acting in the interests of 'every individual' regardless of which state they happen to be a citizen of. The UN High-level Panel Report, referred to above, also explicitly awards might with the badge of righteousness, suggesting that when it comes to the new tasks of external state-building, 'all those in a position to help others...[have] the responsibility to do so'.³⁴

It could be argued that the ten years of state-building experience in BiH serve as a symbol of the return of liberal faith in the science of law and administration, analogous to the inter-war period of the last century. This is evidenced in the return of the idea of conditional sovereignty, reminiscent of the Versailles restrictions on the sovereignty of the new states established in central and eastern Europe, and in the renewed faith in the powers of international conferences and committees to establish the borders of states (the European Community Badinter Commission did this for the former Yugoslavia) and to appoint external governors (as the Peace Implementation Council did for BiH and the United Nations for Kosovo). There is without doubt a growing consensus that international experts and bureaucrats can better govern a country than politicians accountable to the people who have to live with the consequences of their policy-making.

However, in our post-colonial era, there is little support for the return of traditional empire, for a new network of colonial protectorates bringing 'order' to the regions of the world threatened by failing states. Rather, new international administrative regimes are, in the terminology of Michael Ignatieff, most often run on the basis of 'Empire Lite'.³⁵ International administrators are loath to be held to account for the policies they pursue or the outcome of their interventions into the political process. At the same time, local actors are denied the political autonomy to reach their own compromise solutions and assume accountability themselves. BiH highlights the contradictions of having the existence of a formally sovereign state with regularly contested elections at state, entity and local levels and, alongside this, the existence of a parallel administration headed by unaccountable international appointees with the power to draw up and impose legislation and sack elected officials.

Uniquely, the political process is squeezed from above and below. There is no accountability for policy-making either domestically or internationally. In this sense the borders between the domestic and international have been effectively erased. However, the external regulation of Bosnian people as 'humans', rather than as 'citizens' with rights of political equality, has done little to overcome the 'politics of exclusion'. Bosnian political representatives who have been elected are accountable to international overseers rather than to Bosnian voters, reducing political institutions to irrelevant talking shops. In this context, elections

are not a judgement on government policies; in fact, the inverse relationship is in play. Elections are openly seen as educational exercises whereby Bosnian voters submit to the judgement of the international administrators as to their political capacities.

A few international analysts have stood out against the view that the political process can be short-cut or replaced by bureaucratic and administrative edict. Amitai Etzioni and Francis Fukuyama have, for example, questioned 'over-ambitious societal engineering'.³⁶ Gerald Knaus and others at the Brussels-based think tank, the European Stability Initiative, have attempted to initiate a debate on the 'Travails of the European Raj' in BiH, highlighting the limitations of the high-handed approach taken to post-conflict reconstruction.³⁷ William Bain has also challenged the 'New Paternalism' of the failed states discourse and highlighted the return of a more hierarchical world order with the institutionalization of new forms of political inequality between states and between individuals.³⁸ Simon Chesterman's study of post-conflict international administrations points out that today's international rule over BiH provides even less local accountability than the last century's mandate system or that under the presently defunct UN Trusteeship Council.³⁹ Chesterman's in-depth comparative study also concludes that current international state-building practices are prone to a number of fundamental flaws which stem from the inequalities built into the relationship of political pedagogy and external regulation: the means are often inconsistent with the declared ends; the resources are often inadequate to achieve the ends sought; and finally, much policy-making is more declaratory than practical, being largely irrelevant to the tasks at hand.⁴⁰

This collection hopes to extend this discussion of the questions and contradictions raised by international state-building in the specific 'post-imperial' context of our times. It is for this reason that the collection focuses on the case-study of BiH, where the greatest amount of international institutional effort has been expended in developing new techniques and state-building practices. The contributions analyse both initiatives from above, by international administrators and other external actors, and initiatives at a local level which seek to encourage or reflect Bosnian political initiatives or to empower and give voice to those otherwise excluded from the political process. Having established the context for the collection, the following section outlines the structure of the volume and the layout of the individual contributions.

Structure and Content

The volume is divided into four sections. Part 1, 'Reassessing Dayton' contains two introductory essays which assess the development of the Dayton process from 1995 to 2005. In Part 2, 'Imposing Reform from Above', three contributions assess international reforms in the key areas of economic reform, police reform and refugee return and the resettlement of internally displaced people. Part 3, 'Encouraging Reform from Below', contains four contributions which analyse initiatives seeking to achieve change at a local level through the reform of local

government, or attempts to empower or give voice to those otherwise excluded from the political process at a local level, such as refugee return groups, women's groups and civil society voices. Part 4, 'Bosnia Today' concludes with two essays which seek to understand, and move beyond, the current stasis of the state-building process – in both the economic and political spheres.

In 'The Bosnian State a Decade after Dayton', Sumantra Bose examines the post-Dayton process through raising two central questions. First, whether the federal consociational power-sharing framework, established at Dayton, has proved to be viable. He answers in the affirmative, arguing that attempts to impose a unitary structure without any social consensus between the three main ethnic groups would be undemocratic and unworkable in practice, while greater secession for entities or regions would be equally unworkable. Second, he addresses the crucial role of the international community in constructing and enforcing the Dayton settlement. Bose highlights the extent to which international pressure, or direct enforcement, has contributed to the major state-building measures undertaken over the last decade, from refugee return to the issue of Bosnian currency.

In the following contribution, 'From Dayton to Europe', highlight that while, on the one hand, Dayton institutionalized a complex mechanism of consociational federalism, it also created a free hand for international administrators to set the limits to their own authority and establish a further set of complex and ad hoc mechanisms of policy development and implementation. I trace the reforms to administrative mechanisms such as the High Representative, illustrating how the international administration has increasingly come under direct European Union administrative control from 1999 onwards. While the governance side of the Dayton framework – under international control – has been extended and transformed, there has been little change to the government side – the input into policy-making by Bosnian citizens or their representatives.

The following three contributions highlight the advantages and problems of post-conflict administration and state-building which, in the context of external authority, is inevitably driven at least as much by externally- as by domestically-generated concerns. One of the key themes to emerge is the instrumental use of policy to support and encourage aims outside of the immediate sphere of policy concern. In the cases below – of economic reform, police reform and refugee return – the contributions draw out the potential contradictions caused by subsuming these policy areas to wider strategic concerns of the international peacebuilding and state-building process.

Dominik Zaum, in his contribution on 'Economic Reform and the Transformation of the Payment Bureaux', argues that economic reforms, which have had a major impact on the political authority of the Bosnian entities (and on the living standards of the population), have been pushed through as technical and managerial necessities. While, on the one hand, international coordination in this area has seen major successes in implementing reforming legislation, Zaum raises a cautionary note that taking the politics out of economic reform has done little to give Bosnian people a stake in the reform process or to strengthen the legitimacy or authority of Bosnian political institutions themselves.

In her contribution, 'Police Reform: Peacebuilding through Democratic Policing', Gemma Collantes Celador suggests that police reform, while valuable in its own terms, has produced unnecessary pressures on the institution through raising unrealistic expectations that multi-ethnic policing can act as a catalyst for broader social change. Her research suggests that the instrumental use of police reform for social engineering purposes, in isolation from broader social changes, has been unsuccessful and, indeed, counterproductive. She further argues that the 'democratization' of the police force, demanded by external administrators, has undermined the morale and efficiency of the police.

Daniela Heimerl, in 'The Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: From Coercion to Sustainability?' suggests that the international administration's attempt to use the return of refugees and internally displaced persons as a mechanism for undermining the electoral hold of nationalist political parties has necessitated a very restrictive and prescriptive approach to the question. This approach is seen as problematic in that it does not take into account the economic and social needs of the vulnerable or the lack of alternative options available to many choosing to return. She also suggests that international returns policy fails to take into account the changed social, political and economic circumstances in Bosnia: these necessitate a forward looking agenda rather than the unrealistic desire to turn the clock back to the status quo ante of 1991.

The following four contributions analyse international policy attempts to encourage reform from below and consider the impact of Bosnian activity at the local level. The authors suggest that international policy has often had the unintended effect of institutionalizing political and social fragmentation rather than overcoming it.

Vanessa Pupavac, in her analysis, 'Empowering Women? An Assessment of International Gender Policies in Bosnia', argues that international policies in this area have shifted away from seeing women as victims, in need of counselling, towards an emphasis on empowering women to play a greater role in Bosnian politics and in civil society. However, her research highlights that these policies have, in effect, institutionalized women's subordinate role in society rather than challenging it. This has particularly been the case with attempts to increase women's political participation through quota regimes – which have merely reinforced dominant political influences, whether domestic or external – and with the reliance on micro-credit and small business initiatives which have tended to cohere social and economic relations in which women have little economic independence.

In 'Civil Society in Bosnia Ten Years after Dayton', Adam Fagan reassesses international policy aimed at encouraging a vibrant NGO sector capable of political advocacy in the civil society sphere. He suggests that international policy has changed in two directions: first, there is, today, greater emphasis on internationally-supported NGOs working more closely in tandem with Bosnian local authorities, often through involvement in training and educational regimes; second, there has been a shift away from a project-focus, where international needs are foremost, to an emphasis on NGO sustainability through skills-training. He concludes that despite a shift in the language of NGO and civil society development

policies, the Bosnian NGO sector remains heavily reliant on international sponsorship, making it difficult for these institutions to play a normal civil society advocacy role through engaging and advocating on behalf of Bosnian people's needs.

Florian Bieber's contribution, 'Local Institutional Engineering: A Tale of Two Cities, Mostar and Brčko', considers the impact of local political and electoral arrangements in post-conflict peace-building. He compares two different approaches at the local level: Mostar, where international administrators allowed regular elections and, alongside, developed complex mechanisms of ethnic quotas; and Brčko, where the international arbitration commission created an 'autonomous district' run directly by an international appointee who selected Bosnian officials, enabling a greater emphasis on imposing consensus-building at a local level. Bieber suggests that direct international regulation was a major factor in encouraging important policy reforms in Brčko, but that neither direct regulation nor complex ethnic quotas have facilitated the creation of political frameworks capable of breaking down post-war ethno-political divisions.

Roberto Belloni's contribution, 'Peace-building at the Local Level: Refugee Return to Prijedor', provides an example of the importance of international policy-makers considering Bosnian people, especially refugee groups, as political subjects in their own right, rather than just as objects of political intervention. He suggests that international policy regarding refugee return after Dayton was often counterproductive, institutionalizing rather than overcoming ethnic segmentation. His research highlights the role of groups of refugees and displaced persons in forcing the agenda of minority return, against the wishes of international agencies, and the important political role of minority returnees in challenging the post-war political establishment in Prijedor.

The concluding two contributions provide an overview of the situation in BiH today. Michael Pugh, in 'Transformation in the Political Economy of Bosnia since Dayton', analyses the impact of internationally-imposed economic policies and questions the elitist view of Western policy-makers who often portray the problems arising from their promotion of market economic policies as the result of a clash between neo-liberal modernity and a pre-modern 'Balkan way'. He makes the point that this perspective is problematic in its dyadic assumptions and in its underestimation of the important linkages between the spheres of neo-liberalism and nationalist-clientism. Ironically, international policies in the economic sphere appear to have reinforced the social and political fragmentation of Bosnian life, further undermining the policy-making capacity and political legitimacy of the BiH state.

In 'Who Guards the Guardians? International Accountability in Bosnia', Richard Caplan considers the limited political accountability which the international administration has to its Bosnian subjects. Importantly, he highlights a number of contradictions in the operation of an externally-appointed international administration above the level of elected Bosnian institutions. These contradictions are not open to any easy resolution, and he contends that attempts to make these external institutions of governance more accountable to the people of Bosnia would only further undermine elected political institutions. He suggests

that, while international administrations cannot be liberal democracies and therefore cannot be judged on this basis, there is a need to increase both the level of local accountability of external institutions and Bosnian 'ownership' over policy-making.

The contributions to this volume establish that, in the case of BiH, it is undoubtedly true that it is possible to have peace without politics. Dayton itself established that peace could be achieved through the external pressure of military intervention and economic and political sanctions. This external pressure created a state, but one with no real basis in Bosnian society and little popular legitimacy. Since Dayton, external administrators have built roads and schools, issued banknotes, restructured economic institutions, provided incentives for refugee return, banned political parties or removed their elected leaders, and pushed through a broad package of external policy proposals. The successful assertion of external influence is, of course, hardly surprising considering the small size of the Bosnian state, its dependency on external assistance and direct international control over the mechanisms of governance.

However, as is clear from the contributions here, it is also becoming apparent that state-building requires more than the largess – and coercive power – of external benefactors. Ten years after Dayton, the Bosnian state still lacks a secure basis in Bosnian society and commands little social or political legitimacy. To this extent, the critics of the Dayton settlement – who allege that Dayton ended a war but did not create a state – have a justifiable point. Post-Dayton Bosnia has changed relatively little in this respect. The Bosnian state still bears the imprint of its creation by powers external to the region, and it seems unlikely that Bosnian society can move forward until this legacy has been overcome. While the international administration has been able to institute a large number of administrative and policy reforms to meet the externally-decided needs of 'good governance', it has been unable to establish Bosnian institutions of *government* – those institutions which are crucial to legitimizing the Bosnian state and are capable of overcoming the divisions of the war. In this respect, the international experiment in state-building without politics has revealed major short-comings.

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NOTES

1. See for example, United Nations General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples', at www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/c_coloni.htm.
2. See for example, RAND Corporation, *America's Role in Nation-building: From Germany to Iraq*, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003; The Conflict, Security and Development Group, *A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change*, London: Kings College, 2003; M. Lund, 'What Kind of

- Peace is Being Built?: Taking Stock of Post-Conflict Peacebuilding and Charting Future Directions', discussion paper for the International Development Research Centre, Ottawa, Canada, January 2003, at http://web.idrc.ca/uploads/user-S/10527469720lund_final_mar_20.pdf.
3. For further reading on the post-Dayton international regime see the website of the international Office of the High Representative, at www.ohr.int/; see also D. Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy after Dayton*, 2nd edn., London: Pluto Press, 2000; E.M. Cousens and C.K. Cater, *Toward Peace in Bosnia: Implementing the Dayton Accords*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001; D. Sololović and F. Bieber (eds), *Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001; S. Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention*, London: Hurst, 2002.
 4. For background on post-war state-building in Germany and Japan, see for example, J.W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*, New York: W.W. Norton, 1999; D.G. Williamson, *Germany from Defeat to Partition, 1945-1963*, London: Longman, 2001.
 5. S. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
 6. *Ibid.*, p.11.
 7. *Ibid.*, p.403.
 8. *Office of the High Representative Bulletin*, No.62, 11 Oct. 1997.
 9. J. Rodriguez, 'Our Man in Sarajevo', *El Pais*, 29 March 1998 (trans. Office of the High Representative).
 10. Lord Ashdown, 'Inaugural Speech by the new High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina', BiH State Parliament, 27 May 2002, at www.ohr.int/ohr-dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=8417; see also discussion in Chandler, 'Bosnia's New Colonial Governor', *Guardian*, 9 July 2002, at <http://politics.guardian.co.uk/comment/story/0,9115,751918,00.html>.
 11. Huntington (n.5 above), p.404.
 12. *Ibid.*, p.405.
 13. R. Paris, *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
 14. *Ibid.*, pp.189–90.
 15. The potential hubris of the desire to externally reshape 'failed states' in isolation from social forces, is captured in the RAND Corporation recommendations for Iraq, (n.2 above), which suggest that rather than co-opt existing Iraqi institutions, the sounder approach is that of a 'root and branch overhaul of state and political structures', involving 'the creation of wholly new organizations at the local and national levels and the recruitment, training, and management of new staff', p.205.
 16. A. Bendaña, 'From Peace-building to State-building: One Step Forward and Two Backwards', presentation at 'Nation-building, State-building and International Intervention: Between "Liberation" and Symptom Relief', CERI, Paris, 15 Oct. 2004. See also, J. Demmers et al. (eds), *Good Governance in the Era of Global Neoliberalism: Conflict and Depoliticisation in Latin America, Eastern Europe, Asia and Africa*, London: Routledge, 2004.
 17. See, for example, Ashdown, 'What Baghdad can learn from BiH', *Guardian*, 22 April 2003; and 'Broken Communities, Shattered Lives: Winning the Savage War of Peace', speech to the International Rescue Committee, London, 19 June 2003, at www.ohr.int/print/?content_id=30130.
 18. See further, Chandler, "'Imposing the Rule of Law": The Lessons of BiH for Peacebuilding in Iraq', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.2, 2004, pp.312–33.
 19. See A. Colombo, 'Asymmetrical Warfare or Asymmetrical Society? The Changing Form of War and the Collapse of International Society', in A. Gobbi (ed.), *Globalization, Armed Conflicts and Security*, Rome: Cemis-Rubbettino, 2004, pp.111–27.
 20. K. Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
 21. M. Kaldor, *New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era*, London: Polity Press, 1998.
 22. See further, Chandler, *From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention*, London: Pluto Press, 2002.
 23. Holsti (n.20 above), pp.190–91. For an excellent survey see S. Chesterman, *Just War or Just Peace?: Humanitarian Intervention and International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
 24. Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility*, New York: United Nations, 2004, at www.un.org/secureworld/.
 25. *Ibid.*, p.83.
 26. See for example, K. Booth, 'Security and Emancipation', *Review of International Studies*, Vol.17, No.4, 1991, pp.313–26; K. Krause and M.C. Williams (eds), *Critical Security Studies*,

- London: UCL Press, 1997; K. Booth (ed.), *Critical Security Studies and World Politics*, Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 2005.
27. M. Foucault, *Society must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-76*, trans. D. Macey, London: Allen Lane/Penguin, 2003.
 28. See, for example, D. Campbell, *National Deconstruction: Violence, Identity and Justice in Bosnia*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998; R. Keane, *Reconstituting Sovereignty: Post-Dayton Bosnia Uncovered*, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.
 29. Where 'realist' theorists often highlighted the autonomy of the political and the limits of bureaucratic attempts to impose law and administration over clashes of power and interest, today's intellectual fashion is to focus on the indeterminacy and socially constructed nature of power and interest, emphasizing the importance of norms and law. For 'realist' critiques of the privileging of law and administration above the political, see, for example, the classic texts, E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001 [orig. 1939]; and H.J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 1992 [orig. 1948]. For a more in-depth discussion, see Chandler, *Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and Power in International Relations*, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2004.
 30. See, for example, R. Falk, *On Humane Governance*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995; D. Archibugi and D. Held (eds), *Cosmopolitan Democracy: An Agenda for a New World Order*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995; A. Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998.
 31. Kenneth Minogue highlights the despotic dangers of 'political moralism', which sees autonomy and independence – i.e., the political sphere – as a barrier to ethically-derived notions of justice, and argues that this approach to politics is especially strong in discussions of international relations. See, for example, his *Politics: A Very Short Introduction*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp.104–5.
 32. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, *The Responsibility to Protect*, Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001.
 33. Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe*, Barcelona: 15 Sept. 2004, p.9, at www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/Human%20Security%20Report%20Full.pdf.
 34. Report of the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (n.24 above), p.18; see also Chandler, 'The Responsibility to Protect: Imposing the 'Liberal Peace'?', *International Peacekeeping*, Vol.11, No.1, 2004, Special Issue: Peace Operations and Global Order, pp.59–81.
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 36. A. Etzioni, 'A Self-Restrained Approach to Nation-Building by Foreign Powers', *International Affairs*, Vol.80, No.1, 2004, p.15; see also F. Fukuyama, *State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty-First Century*, London: Profile Books, 2004, p.123.
 37. See, for example, G. Knaus and F. Martin, 'Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina: Travails of the European Raj', *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.14, No.3, 2003, pp.60–74; see also the European Stability Initiative website at www.esiweb.org/.
 38. W. Bain, *Between Anarchy and Society: Trusteeship and the Obligations of Power*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
 39. Chesterman, *You, the People: the United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, p.45.
 40. *Ibid.*, pp.238–49.