

Democratization in Bosnia: The Limits of Civil Society Building Strategies

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For many commentators, the construction of civil society in East European states is considered a precondition for the development of consolidated democratic institutions. Nowhere is this more the case than within Bosnia-Herzegovina where ethnic and nationalist identification indicate a deeply politically segmented society. To challenge this segmentation international institutions are providing financial and technical support to a growing NGO-based civil society sector. Research into the civil society support work of the OSCE Democratization Branch indicates that the predominantly middle-class constituency of these groups reflects the extensive external international regulation of the new state under the Dayton Peace Agreement. It is suggested that the extension of autonomy and self-government may well create more fruitful conditions for the growth of civil society alternatives.

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Since the signing of the Dayton Accords, in December 1995, the international community has been involved in the management of the democratization process in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As the UN Secretary-General has noted 'democratization is predominantly a new area' for the UN, nevertheless it is already seen as 'a key component of peace-building' addressing the 'economic, social, cultural, humanitarian and political roots of conflict'.¹ Democratization is broadly defined by the UN to constitute a 'comprehensive approach' covering the broad range of new peace-building priorities, 'top-down' international regulation of elections, institutional development, and economic management, and also 'bottom-up' assistance to develop a democratic political culture through civil society-building.²

Civil society development is generally viewed to involve support for the associational sphere of interest groups which stand between the private economic sphere and the public sphere of the state and government. A richly pluralistic civil society, generating a wide range of interests, is held to mitigate polarities of political conflict and develop a democratic culture of tolerance, moderation and compromise.³ The main focus of civil society-building has often been local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) as a sphere for articulating needs independently of vested political interests and involving grassroots community 'voices'. The UN's internet web-site incorporates nearly 2,000 documents referring to 'civil society',⁴ while the Secretary-General's *Agenda for Development* Report explains that:

A vigorous civil society is indispensable to creating lasting and successful development... Locally based NGOs, in particular, can serve as intermediaries and give people a voice and an opportunity to articulate their needs, preferences and vision of a better society... in countries where civil society is weak, strengthening civil society should be a major purpose of public policy.⁵

The discussion of civil society-building as a priority for democratic consolidation has been sharply focused by the democratic transitions of Eastern Europe and the conflict in former Yugoslavia.⁶ It has often been viewed that the wars of Yugoslavia's dissolution were the product of ethnic segmentation, reflecting a lack of civil society and leading to a failed transition to democracy.⁷ In Bosnia-Herzegovina, war resulted in thousands of casualties and nearly half the population becoming displaced or refugees and was only brought to an end by forceful US-led international intervention. In December 1995, the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed. This created an independent Bosnian state divided between two separate entities, the Muslim (Bosniak)-Croat Federation, occupying 51% of the territory, and the Serb-held area, Republika Srpska (RS), occupying 49%.

For the Dayton Peace Agreement to hold, many commentators argue that civil society development should be central to the democratization and peace-building process. Without civil society, economic reconstruction aid is held to have little impact on political and social division within Bosnia. Leading analysts have argued that European Union funding of over US\$2,500 per head to residents of Muslim and Croat-divided Mostar has done little to reduce tensions and that US aid to Bosnia, amounting to US\$1,200 per head in fiscal year 1998, is creating dependency and acting as a disincentive for Bosnians to resolve problems.⁸ There is similar disillusionment with the political sphere, where influential commentators have stated that 'elections without civil society will not produce democracy', and that elections in Bosnia are 'deeply flawed', legitimising nationalist elites responsible for the war and division.⁹

While top-down economic and political interventions are often seen to perpetuate social segmentation and ethnic nationalism, bottom-up support for the sphere of civil society is held to have an empowering and transformative content. For example, Ian Smilie, author of an influential CARE Canada report on non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society building in Bosnia, argues:

Rebuilding tolerance and pluralism in Bosnia and Herzegovina is perhaps more important than anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia. It is important because without it, the Dayton Accord... and the hope of a united Bosnia and Herzegovina will be lost... Accountability, legitimacy and competence in public life are the key, and these can only be achieved through the active participation of the electorate, buoyed by a strong, plural, associational base, by a web of social, cultural and functional relationships which can act as a 'societal glue' and as counterbalance to the market and the state. The alternative for Bosnia and Herzegovina... is paternalism, exploitation, corruption, and war.¹⁰

Dialogue Development, preparing the 1998 European Union PHARE Civil Society Development Programme for Bosnia, state:

The strong emergence of a Third Sector in the form of civil society in Bosnia will be instrumental in the gradual emergence of a pluralistic and democratic society... NGOs are... destined to play an important role in this post-conflict situation as they have a vast potential for transcending the faultlines of society through the creation of new partnerships and alliances. They can moderate and mediate in addressing the relevant needs of society, not always within the realm of the state.¹¹

The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Mission in Bosnia was restructured at the end of 1996 to enable it to carry out a more long-term approach to democratization, focusing on the challenges of creating or restoring civil society in the region. This perspective was informed by the consensus that peace and stability in Bosnia was 'still very much dependent on the development of a democratic civil society'.¹² The first monthly report of the OSCE Mission's Democratization Branch outlined the institutions's view of the obstacles to the development of democratic civil society. The obstacles listed were all connected to the incapacity of the Bosnian people in general, or specific sections of them, to act and think in a manner suited to meet the 'challenges' of democratization. For the Bosnian elites, the problem was seen to be a lack of technical and organisational abilities. These incapacities were highlighted by the people involved in building local NGOs in Republika Srpska, who 'continue to struggle for funding, programme ideas and the acquisition of administrative skills', and in leaders of opposition parties more broadly, because 'even though the number of political parties is increasing, they are only now beginning to receive training on how to enlarge their popular appeal'.¹³

While the skill-shortages of the elites could be overcome by training and aid, the other obstacles, located at the level of Bosnian society in general, were seen to be more long-term. Firstly, the problem of an ethnic mentality: 'the passive acceptance of prejudices [which] must be overcome for real and psychological barriers to inter-ethnic reconciliation to be dismantled'. Secondly, the problems stemming from a lack of awareness of the workings of a democratic society, which meant that it was difficult to make informed choices at elections: 'The elections served as the basis for the establishment of democratic institutions, yet more efforts are required to increase citizen's awareness of the working and roles of their authorities, the rule of law, and democratic rule and procedures.'¹⁴

The barriers to local NGOs and civic groups empowering communities are either viewed as technical problems which the Bosnian elites are seemingly unable to grasp or as deeper problems of Bosnian culture. This approach appears to sideline the fact that the citizens of Bosnia and the former Yugoslavia had extensive higher education provision, an historical record of inter-ethnic tolerance and understanding and a relatively high level of involvement in local political and civic life.¹⁵ This paper investigates the possibility that paying sole attention to the incapacities of Bosnian citizens may result in a lack of attention to any failings within international democratization practice itself. Empirical research indicates that the top-down approach of international regulation and the bottom-up approach of empowerment and civil society development may have a conflicting impact on Bosnian society, rather than the complimentary one assumed by the proponents of extended internationally-led peace-building. If it is the case that the comprehensive nature of international mandates does act to constrain the emergence of civil society initiatives, then the

extension of external regulation could make international withdrawal problematic and lead towards the development of an international protectorate rather than facilitating the creation of a stable self-governing democracy.

Building Civil Society

The focus on civil society, going beyond the governing institutions of the country, gave the international community a much broader remit of involvement in Bosnian affairs by extending the role of the OSCE under Dayton. Annex 3 of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the *Agreement on Elections*, gave the OSCE the authority to 'lay the foundation for representative government and ensure the progressive achievement of democratic goals throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina'.¹⁶ Under the broader interpretation of the 'spirit of Dayton' this was now seen to include the promotion of civil society through support for the work of Bosnian NGOs and civic groups.¹⁷

This broader remit facilitated the development of a separate Democratization Branch, a unique step for an international institution. The OSCE Democratization Programme for 1997 was designed to bring the international community into a closer relationship with grassroots groups and associations which could provide a counterpoint to the politics of the governing authorities and nationalist parties and, through this, to open up political debate and create new opportunities for alternative voices to be heard.¹⁸ As Jasna Malkoc, the Senior Co-ordinator for Democratization/NGO Development explained: 'Establishing NGOs is a first principle for democratization. NGOs are vital for the reconstruction of civil society. Political parties deal with majorities. It is important to address issues without thinking about minorities and majorities'.¹⁹

The OSCE strategy for encouraging political participation is a three stage process: firstly, identifying targeted individuals or groups who are open to external support and influence secondly, providing training and building a civil society agenda within these groups; thirdly, mobilising active NGOs as political voices in the domestic and international environment.

Targeting

The Democratization Branch works through the extensive OSCE field presence covering the whole of Bosnia, and co-ordinated through five regional centres of operation, based in Mostar, Tuzla, Bihac, Banja Luka and Sokolac. This means that they are strategically placed to play a key role in identifying individuals and groups for democratization initiatives.²⁰ Based in the field, the Democratization Officers have the role of assessing which groups are most open to OSCE influence and to develop strategies in relation to them.

OSCE strategy has a regional approach because the receptiveness to external intervention and support is dependent on the local political situation. In the Federation there are many active NGOs, partly because of the influx of foreign donors and partly because the political climate is more receptive to external influence. The OSCE feels that in many urban areas in the Federation there is a 'diverse and vibrant NGO community'.²¹ The climate has been less receptive in RS, with the Banja Luka area being the centre for NGO activities and parts of Eastern RS having virtually no NGOs.

The strategy is to integrate the ‘more developed’, politically active, NGOs into the broader OSCE perspective, and under OSCE ‘facilitation’ for them to link up with groups and individuals in areas with ‘less developed’ NGOs and a low NGO presence. In the Tuzla region experienced local NGOs are encouraged to expand their networks to give the OSCE new areas of influence.²² In areas with little organised NGO presence the OSCE has to trawl for prospective partners, staff in Banja Luka created a workshop on proposal drafting for NGOs with plans to travel outside the city to the surrounding areas. In Velika Kladusa, a targeted area where the OSCE was concerned about the ‘clear dearth of local initiatives’ the OSCE organised a one day seminar *How to Establish an NGO*, which targeted teachers, students, political party representatives, women, intellectuals and local journalists, to enable them to ‘form a clearer idea of what fields NGOs work in, their legal status, and funding possibilities’.²³

The target groups for developing networking and community-building initiatives are essentially those that the OSCE feels it can influence. Within this, the more social weight a group has, the better it is. Elite groups, such as lawyers, journalists, religious leaders, teachers, academics and intellectuals are therefore of great importance. Outside this, the OSCE has been able to establish links with groups that are either excluded from the mainstream political processes, in need of funding and resources, or unhappy with their current situation, such as self-help initiatives including women’s groups, youth associations, and displaced persons’ associations.

Any activity that can be undertaken in a cross-entity form, and thereby a potential challenge to ethnic segmentation and division, is likely to be supported. The OSCE’s interest is not so much in the activity itself but in locating people who are willing to organise around alternative political focus points to the majority parties. However, the OSCE fears that being up-front about its aims may put off potential supporters: ‘When groups focus on non-political matters they have an optimal chance of making gains’.²⁴ The Democratization Branch monthly report, for March 1997, demonstrates this in relation to sponsorship and other information: ‘While promoting inter-ethnic tolerance and responsibility is the main goal of confidence building, events this month show how this is sometimes easiest done when it is not an activity’s explicit goal’.²⁵

Developing a Civil Society Agenda

Regardless of the humanitarian aid or information needs which an NGO was initially established to meet, it will be expected to participate in cross-entity forums and training and to become part of the NGO lobbying network dominated by the more openly political ‘civic groups’. The OSCE involvement with local NGOs (LNGOs) has a directly political goal:

The goal of the NGO development work is to assist LNGOs [to] become self-sufficient, participatory, and actively involved in working on behalf of their communities. The kind of LNGO projects which most closely reach this aim, offering a new political voice to citizens, are those which focus on advocacy and are willing to tackle actual political or social issues. As more and more LNGOs accept the responsibility of implementing these kinds of programmes, they gradually strengthen Bosnia’s civil society.²⁶

There is no hiding the feelings of frustration that the officers of the OSCE have for the local NGOs which they see as 'less developed' because they are concentrating on needs, as opposed to becoming part of a political opposition, or their willingness to use their influence to alter the approaches and goals of local NGOs. The following extract from a Democratization Branch monthly report is worth quoting at length to illustrate the support and guidance available from the OSCE:

In areas where LNGOs are barely developed, as a start they implement humanitarian-type programmes which seek to satisfy basic needs. Over the past month, local groups identified in Eastern Republika Srpska (excluding Bijeljina) correspond to this. As true civil actors however, LNGOs must do more; otherwise they will be providing temporary solutions to what remains long term problems. An early step was taken [when] the Helsinki Committee Bijeljina started monitoring and investigating human rights abuses in mid-1996... In the Bihac area [of operations], the Centre for Civic Co-operation (CCC) in Livno has gradually gone with OSCE support from a humanitarian LNGO working with children to one which seeks to increase awareness about human rights and democracy.²⁷

The OSCE women's development work demonstrates how this process works. Reporting on the OSCE organised Mostar Women's Conference, in March 1997, it is noted that nine women currently living as displaced persons in Republika Srpska attended. The OSCE was disappointed that while the Federation women were willing to organise politically, the women from RS clearly had not grasped the OSCE's agenda:

...while the Federation women appeared poised to work on joint activities, those from the RS seemed more keen on fulfilling their immediate personal wish of visiting Mostar. Whether the RS participants recognise that working with other Mostar women they have a chance of addressing some of the deeper underlining obstacles to freedom of movement and return, is thus likely to determine future conferences' success.²⁸

The work with women's organisations seems to be having some success as the OSCE has noted that 'women are increasingly finding ways to take on political roles, even though frequently outside of political parties'.²⁹ The report notes that in Bihac a women's NGO is reportedly keen to organise a radio broadcast on elections related issues with OSCE support and that women's groups in Mostar are considering a similar initiative. The women's groups most active in political activity have so impressed the OSCE that: 'In the coming months OSCE staff may consider encouraging these women to become electoral monitors... This is a step towards preparing civic groups to take on bigger responsibilities in the political process'.³⁰

The OSCE also runs the election process and the regulations of the OSCE chaired Provisional Election Commission allow for citizens' organisations as well as political party representatives to monitor the electoral process, after receiving accreditation from a Local Election Committee. From the OSCE's perspective this is 'an important chance to involve a greater number of actors in the political process'.³¹ Of course, the new actors involved in this process are those that have already been carefully hand-picked by the OSCE itself. As the Mostar strategy report advises:

‘Field Officers and the Regional Centre should begin identifying local partners who could benefit from poll watching training’.³² Democratization Officers have been instructed by the OSCE Democratization Branch to facilitate training for these groups with the assistance of the US funded National Democratic Initiative and the Council of Europe.³³

For the OSCE, the sign of successful civil society building is when the new local NGOs begin to act as political actors in their own right. The third monthly report of the Democratization Branch celebrates the success of their work in northern Republika Srpska, where ‘local NGOs are independently addressing more and more sensitive political subjects’.³⁴ Examples include an internationally-financed inter-entity roundtable, initiated by the Forum of Citizens of Banja Luka, entitled *The Legal Aspects of Return for Refugees and Displaced Persons* and the establishment of preliminary contacts between a new Dobojo NGO and displaced persons in Zenica. The OSCE is full of praise for the two NGOs which are raising an issue that it sees as a major part of its own agenda: ‘The fact that the two groups are addressing the politically sensitive issue of return points to their ability to take on the kind of independent stance necessary in any democratic society’.³⁵

The Voice of Civil Society

The directly political impact of this NGO work can be seen in initiatives like the Citizens’ Alternative Parliament and the Coalition for Return, actively supported by the OSCE backed NGOs. The Citizens’ Alternative Parliament (CAP) is a network of Bosnian NGOs which the OSCE sees as strengthening and co-ordinating the work of NGOs in Bosnia. To strengthen the impact of the CAP the OSCE intends to focus on developing the ‘member organisations’ commitment and capabilities of taking action in their regions’.³⁶ The OSCE’s work with displaced persons’ groups is designed to feed in with the activities of the Coalition for Return (CFR). The CFR is an association of more than forty refugee and displaced persons groups from Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia and Germany.

In advance of the September 1996 elections, Deputy High Representative Steiner had already raised the prospect of refugee associations being used to put pressure on political parties ‘from below’. In July he promised that: ‘In the future we will aim to include representatives of refugee associations in our meetings in order to speed up the work of the authorities on both sides which has so far been very slow’.³⁷ The decision to form the CFR was taken at the Office of the High Representative (OHR), following the nationalist parties’ success in the September 1996 polls.³⁸ The Deputy High Representative discussed plans to establish the association with representatives from associations of displaced persons and refugees and gave full support for the formation of a strategy planning group to liaise directly with international organisations and the relevant authorities. The CFR, meeting under the chair of the Office of the High Representative then worked to encourage return and to raise the profile of the issue with international organisations. In December 1996, the CFR decided to extend its remit to the directly political questions related to the issue of return and to develop an integrated approach to reconstruction and economic recovery.

By February 1997 this political role had extended to developing information and aid networks calling on displaced persons and refugees to vote for candidates committed to the issue of return in the forthcoming municipal elections. The Deputy

High Representative then sought to promote the CFR as a popular ‘grassroots movement’ and, in July 1997, at its first meeting not organised and chaired by the OHR, the CFR finally came of age, as an independent organ of civil society.³⁹ It then requested observer status for the municipal elections and equal partnership with elected political representatives in negotiations on donations and reconstruction implementation projects.

The Limits of Civil Society Development

International attempts to ensure that the ‘different voices’ in Bosnia are heard by the outside world have involved giving support to a variety of groups and organisations within Bosnia which attempt to challenge the political domination of the main political parties. Groups such as Circle 99, the Tuzla Citizens’ Forum, the Citizens’ Alternative Parliament and the Coalition for Return have been actively supported by many international funders and have logistical and training support from the OSCE Democratization Branch.

However, as the OSCE Reporting Officer, Sabine Freizer, explained: ‘The central problem we have is how to encourage participation’.⁴⁰ It may seem surprising that these groups with an international reputation should have problems involving Bosnian people in their work, especially as they represent a grassroots movement for a different voice to be heard. Adrien Marti, the Co-ordinator for Political Party Development, explained the problem of the lack of popular support for the citizens’ groups:

The Citizens’ Alternative Parliament, the Shadow Government and the Coalition for Return are basically the same 20 people when you scratch the surface a little. There is really no depth to this. The nationalist parties have a lot of good and respected people, they play on people’s fears but also deliver security and a feeling that you can live normally. They are also much closer to the average person than the elitist Sarajevans. The overqualified Yugoslavs are seen as elitist, whereas the HDZ, SDS and the SDA [the leading political parties] have members and supporters on the ground facing the same problems as you.⁴¹

When asked why, if there was so little support within Bosnia for the approach of these groups, the OSCE considered it a priority to assist their development, Marti’s response was: ‘They need the money to make them more efficient. But it should be up to the public at the end of the day. I think there is a balance, the public wants the nationalist parties for security, but they also want an opposition.’⁴²

The problem with this approach is that the opposition is in this case one that has not been chosen by the electorate but the OSCE and other international agencies. Jens Sorenson notes that:

The local NGO sector is primarily the creation of an urban middle class, which has been squeezed in the social transformation in the new republics. With polarisation increasing... as the ethnic states reward supporters of the ruling party, what remains of the politicised middle class can find a new niche in NGOs. Here the distinction between NGOs as social movements or as service providers becomes unclear.⁴³

Zoran Jorgakieski, the OSCE Democratization Branch Co-ordinator for Dialogue and Reconciliation, expanded on the problem:

These groups are all run by intellectuals but they have very little influence. During the war they stayed aside and withdrew from politics. These are the people we have to focus upon. They are a minority, but the best, the cream of Bosnian intellectual society. They have good relations with their colleagues across the Inter-Entity Boundary Line. They are top intellectuals, you can't expect ordinary people to understand them. The language they use is too complicated. People doubt they are good patriots.⁴⁴

There seems to be a large gap between the civil society associations funded and supported by the OSCE, and other international institutions, and Bosnian people. For the OSCE and the international community, this gap demonstrates the lack of a democratic culture in Bosnia. While few people are actively involved in civil society associations, leaving them predominantly middle-class based, the main nationalist parties still easily attain the majority of the votes in elections. In response to this gap Adrien Marti is advising some of the new civil society groups, which became established as political parties before the September 1997 municipal elections, to abandon electoral competition after the local polls and become NGOs instead: 'They have no chance as political parties', he said, these 'groups would have much more influence as NGOs and lobby groups than as political parties with 0.001 per cent of the vote'.⁴⁵

There is little evidence that this civil society strategy is helping to challenge support for the nationalist parties or to overcome ethnic segmentation and division in Bosnia. The OSCE Democratization Branch, in its attempts to celebrate cross-community co-operation and turn this into an alternative political voice, unfortunately tends to politicise, and consequently problematize, everyday activity which organically contributes to confidence-building. While thousands of people cross the Inter-Entity Boundary Line every day, to work, shop, see relatives, or go to school, this is seen as everyday life going on and making the best of the situation.⁴⁶ The people whose lives involve cross-entity co-operation do not necessarily want to turn everyday survival into a political movement. The moment these actions become politicised they become an implicit threat to the status-quo and create a backlash to a perceived threat that did not exist previously. As an experienced Senior Democratization Officer related: 'I'm surprised they tell us anything anymore. Inter-entity contacts are very common with businesses etc. If I was a businessman I wouldn't report it, not just for tax reasons - no one pays tax anyway - but because it just creates problems'.⁴⁷ The OSCE Youth and Education Co-ordinator explained that the teachers she worked with had not wanted attention to be drawn to them and had told her not to park her OSCE car near to their houses.⁴⁸ Similarly, people were much more willing to use the cross-entity bus-line once the OSCE license plates were removed.⁴⁹ People want to cross the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, and in some cases to return to their pre-war homes, but without drawing attention to themselves and without their actions being seen as threatening the security of others. Returns that have been organised spontaneously have had much more success than internationally enforced return under the threat of sanctions which have both angered and raised the fears of current residents.⁵⁰

Ironically the more support given to the ‘grassroots’ civil associations by the OSCE, the less effective they tend to be. The unintended consequence of creating civil society NGOs which are reliant on external support has been that they are never forced to build their own base of popular support or take on the arguments or political programmes of the nationalists. Guaranteed funding and the ear of international policy-makers, the Citizens’ Parliament and other favoured groups are in fact more likely to prevent or impede the development of an opposition with roots in society. As Jens Sorensen notes, the reliance on external funders can tend to fragment society rather than create a pluralistic exchange of political opinions.⁵¹ Because the funding of civil society NGOs is portrayed as apolitical assistance to democratization this has led to a variety of projects and NGOs being funded with no overall strategy. Instead of building bridges within a society, as political parties who have to argue for their political programme would have to, these NGOs relying on outside funding have no need to engage in discussion or create broader links to society.

International Regulation and Civil Society Development

The points raised above about the democratic status of raising unelected minority groups over political parties elected by majorities, and the dangers of downplaying the electoral process of discussion and debate, highlight general questions over the democratic deficit created by international regulation which attempts to shape the political process. However, consideration of the specific context in which civil society building is being promoted in Bosnia demands a further clarification of these questions. While commentators often write of the need to develop Bosnia-specific programmes of civic capacity-building, they rarely consider the broader context of their work. Discussion tends to focus on the problems faced by local civic groups without consideration of the impact of the post-Dayton international administration, nor of its legitimation through a denial of Bosnian people’s capacity for self-rule.

The advocates of civil society democratization strategies are undoubtedly correct in their assertions that democracy is more than elections every few years, and in their emphasis on the need for the consent of the governed, the accountability of policies to the electorate, the opportunity for participation in decision-making, and for the decision-making process to be transparent.⁵² In Bosnia there are elections but Bosnian society lacks all the above factors. However, before greater international attention to the promotion of NGOs is called for, it is worth taking a step back to consider the democratic framework in Bosnia.

Since the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement, Bosnia has been undergoing a process of internationally imposed democratization. This process has been implemented by the major international powers, including the US, Britain, France, Germany and Russia, under the co-ordination of the Peace Implementation Council. The plans drawn up by this body have then been implemented by leading international institutions, such as the UN, NATO, OSCE, Council of Europe, IMF, World Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, under their own mandates, creating a network of regulating and policy-making bodies.⁵³ Co-ordinating the civilian side of this project has been the UN’s High Representative for Bosnia, the state’s chief administrator with the authority to make and enforce law at both state and entity levels and dismiss obstructive Bosnian officials.

Dayton initially established this interlocking network of international policy-making forums as part of a one year transition to limited Bosnian self-government.

The Dayton Agreement assumed that with state and entity elections, run under OSCE auspices in September 1996, the external international administration of the state would come to an end. Guarantees of long-term stability were built in to the Bosnian constitution which gave key regulating powers to an IMF appointed director of the Central Bank and to European Union appointed judges as final arbiters of law through the Constitutional Court. Other Dayton annexes gave the international community further regulating powers through the establishment of key commissions run by international appointees from the UN, OSCE, Council of Europe and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.⁵⁴

Within a few months of the Dayton settlement the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) began to consider the prospects of extending the international peacekeeping process and, by June 1996, were already discussing a two year 'consolidation period', duly ratified by the PIC in December 1996. The UN High Representative was mandated to draw up twelve-month policy 'action plans' to be ratified and reviewed at six-monthly PIC meetings. This meant that the newly-elected state and entity governments were reduced to little more than rubber-stamps for predetermined international policies. There was little opportunity for the elected politicians to negotiate their own compromises on issues. Any opposition was met with the threat to cancel donors meetings and the World Bank and IMF refusal to release reconstruction aid. In December 1997, just one year into this extended consolidation period, the international administration of Bosnia became an open-ended international commitment, with no clearly defined point at which even the limited Bosnian self-government, promised by Dayton, could be realised.

This extended process of international regulation has involved a 'top-down' approach to democratization. Governing representatives at municipal, canton, entity and state levels have little choice but to follow international policy at the threat of being dismissed from their posts or having sanctions imposed. This process extends from the tripartite Presidency, from which the Serb member, Momcilo Krajisnik, was threatened with dismissal in October 1997, to the municipal level where the September 1997 election results will only be ratified post festum by the OSCE, not on the basis of any electoral irregularities but on the basis of policies pursued by elected representatives once in post. This level of external regulation has even extended to the international take-over of the state-run TV station in Republika Srpska and the High Representative deciding the national flag of the new country.

While the Bosnian politicians are fully accountable to the international community, there are no mechanisms making international policy-making accountable to the Bosnian people. The International Crisis Group (ICG) acknowledges this 'credibility gap' and their response to it serves to highlight the diminished nature of democracy in Bosnia under Dayton. The ICG argue that:

Respect for Bosnian authorities and basic notions of reciprocity argue for at least the degree of transparency necessary for the Bosnian authorities and people to understand the basis for decisions, and the decision-making processes, that so affect them. If the point of the international encampment in Bosnia is to 'teach' democracy, tolerance and good governance to the Bosnians then there is no better way to start than by example.⁵⁵

In this case democratic accountability is reduced to 'transparency'. 'Teaching democracy' ends up as a call for international institutions to widely make available

their future plans and policy goals for the region. This does little to alter the fact that the Bosnian people have no active role in decision making, and are instead reduced to the role of passive onlookers. This level of international regulation has given little opportunity for elected representatives, let alone the general public, to voice their concerns or have any input into policy-making. In a society where even elected officials and judges have to be instructed in what the laws of their own country are and compelled to rely on international institutions to provide translations and guidance for them, it is unsurprising that people outside the political elites feel excluded and marginalised from the policy-making process.⁵⁶

The guarantee of a measure of autonomy and political self-government for the three ethnic constituencies, all of whom are minorities in the new state, promised by Dayton, was never delivered. Far from international policy rebuilding links between communities, the division between the two entities has been increased through differential international treatment. For example, the US has re-trained and re-equipped a separate Federation army, and turned down RS calls for military integration. At the same time, economic aid and reconstruction projects have been concentrated narrowly within the Federation, with the weaker RS economy receiving less than 2% of the reconstruction aid in 1996 and less than 5% in 1997.

Limited political autonomy for the two entities, promised by Dayton to grant security to minorities fearful of domination in the new state, has been similarly undermined by international regulation. Within the Federation the formal divisions of power at cantonal and entity level have not facilitated self-government, instead policy at all levels is imposed from the top down through the US and UN co-chaired Federation Forum. Concerns of the Bosnian Serbs for equal treatment have been little assuaged by international policy: including what is generally perceived as a selective anti-Serb bias in The Hague war crimes tribunal; international community prevention of links with Serbia, allowed under Dayton; the extension of direct international rule over Serb-claimed Brcko; the overruling of the RS Constitutional Court and imposition of new Assembly elections; the international take-over of entity media prior to the 1997 elections; and a new government established through international intervention, which excludes the party which gained the most votes.⁵⁷

The lack of security caused by the still-born nature of the self-government proposed under Dayton would appear to be the major barrier for the cross-entity civil society groups funded by the international community. As long as basic political security is lacking from the Dayton framework, and there is no guarantee that entity borders or rights to land, housing or work can be assured, opposition parties and civic groups are seen by many as a potential threat to the status-quo which is guaranteeing peaceful co-existence. The OSCE Democratization Branch has no mandate to question Dayton, or the tensions resulting from this lack of autonomy, and therefore deals with symptoms rather than the underlying problems. This has led to seeing the problems as lying with Bosnian people rather than the framework imposed by external powers. Once the Dayton framework is taken out of the picture, Bosnian concerns about security are interpreted by OSCE Officers as either a product of nationalist propaganda, of war trauma, or of as ethnic prejudice against other Bosnian groups.

Civil Society and Democracy

The impetus behind the reorganisation of the OSCE Bosnia Mission and the establishment of the OSCE Democratization Branch was the international

community's plans to extend the peacekeeping mandate of the international institutions. It was only after the elections that the creation of civil society became a central issue in Bosnia. During 1996 many international officials were still referring to the establishment of joint institutions with the elections as the birth of Bosnian democracy.⁵⁸ The focus on civil society legitimated a unique situation. The September 1996 elections were held to have been democratic, and to have met the standards set by the OSCE for the recognition of the results, yet they were also declared to be not democratic enough to allow self-rule. A Democratization Branch information document explains this apparent contradiction:

In the biggest event since the signing of the Dayton Accords, Bosnia's citizens chose for themselves a legitimate democratically elected system of government in September, 1996... Accordingly the first foundations have been laid for Bosnia to become a democracy. Yet even though elections are essential for the creation of a legitimate democratic state, they are not enough to ensure that democracy in Bosnia prevails. It is a mistake to see elections as the endpoint of democratization. They are in fact an early stage of what remains by definition a long term process.⁵⁹

Many commentators would agree that elections can only be part of the broader democratization process, however there would appear to be a problem in asserting that democracy must be consolidated or democratization completed *before* self-government and electoral accountability are permitted. The focus on civil society development has avoided confronting this problem by moving the focus away from the fact that internationally-made policy is being externally imposed on Bosnian institutions. This new grassroots approach has been welcomed as a long-term international commitment to democratic transition, but it could also be seen as expressing a more disillusioned approach to the prospects of democracy in Bosnia.

The success of the nationalist parties came as a shock to international agencies which had assumed, prior to the September 1996 elections, that tighter international regulation over the political process would enable popular opposition groups to gain a hold on power. Their universally poor showing created a strong air of pessimism about the future of a united Bosnia.⁶⁰ This disillusionment with the choice expressed through the ballot box, resulted in a much more negative view of the capacities of the Bosnian people themselves.

Electoral results are seen to be unreliable by the OSCE and its partners. The OSCE chairman, Niels Helveg Peterson, for example, condemned the defeat of the pro-Dayton party in the 1997 Assembly elections in Republika Srpska stating that 'the political level of this vote was not very high'.⁶¹ For Christian Ahlund, the OSCE Director General for Human Rights: 'Elections are just the first primitive stage of democracy. Political parties are still a pretty blunt form.' He saw the OSCE's role as a 'pedagogic' one of informing Bosnian people about international standards and 'telling them what democratization is all about'.⁶² This view was supported by a Senior Democratization Co-ordinator: 'Political parties are a new appearance. People don't know how to cope and neither do their leaders, they have no political programme. People just follow the flock. It is the same with the independent parties, people vote for them just because they are the alternative.'⁶³

The disparaging attitude towards ordinary people, 'the flock', was not even diminished when they voted for opposition parties because it was assumed that they

were not capable of making an independent judgement. The widespread acceptance of this perspective amongst the NGO-building community was illustrated by the Helsinki Citizens' Assembly organiser in Sarajevo, who explained that the people had no democratic experience and were used to 'living under a strong hand', and that this lack of democratic education had to be challenged through NGOs 'teaching people how to behave and to know right from wrong'. She told a joke to illustrate the problem her NGO faced: 'The opposition party leader asks the peasant why he is not going to vote for him. The peasant says that he will vote for him. The opposition leader asks "when?". The peasant says "when you get in power"'.⁶⁴

Often the analogies about democracy tend to involve uneducated peasants as the symbol of ordinary people. One of the leading officers of the Democratization Branch went further, to the extent of seeing Bosnian people not supportive of civil society initiatives as caught up in the backward ideology of feudalism. At the OSCE in Sarajevo, Jasna Malkoc, one of the activists whose ideas lay behind the initiation of the Democratization Branch, openly explained that democratization would be a long process of changing the culture of the majority of the Bosnian people in order to 'implement the concept of individualism':

The lack of democratic values stems from the divisions of the Austro-Hungarian Empire which instilled individualistic ideas. Areas outside the Empire had feudal systems which continued as communist structures. Serbia is feudalist, Croatia is individualist. Bosnia is in-between and the division is between urban, individualist areas and peasant, feudal areas. For example, Banja Luka [in Republika Srpska] is urban and is influenced by the West and Croatia.⁶⁵

A similar perspective which emphasises the long-term problems of civil society construction is the psycho-social approach, also pursued by the Democratization Branch. Using this framework, one of the main barriers to building civil society in Bosnia is seen to be psycho-social problems. Much or even most of the population is adjudged by many democratizers to be unable to see the gains of a civil society approach due to the impact of their part as victims or as passive supporters of human rights violations during the war.⁶⁶ This approach puts psycho-social work at the centre of strategies for democratization because: 'These persons may offer special resistance to confidence-building, dialogue and reconciliation efforts due to the victims' mistrust, isolation, demoralisation and anger. Due to symptoms of victimisation, they are also less likely to be willing to take on new responsibilities as active members of civil society.'⁶⁷

Even its advocates admit that this work is 'entering new territory' where 'not much theory exists' in relation to psycho-social projects.⁶⁸ However, these doubts do not figure highly for the Democratization Branch, their Semi-Annual Report states categorically that 'trauma symptoms have become an obstacle to the implementation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace and the development of pluralistic society in Bosnia'.⁶⁹

Central to the OSCE Democratization Branch's approach is the understanding that the Bosnian population, 'damaged' or 'traumatised' by the war and the transition from one-party state regulation, are not capable of acting independently or making choices between 'right and wrong'. This approach was not universally popular with the OSCE Officers at the Democratization Branch, some Officers mentioned in

confidence the dangers of a gap between democratization in theory and in practice, with comments such as: 'It is easy to get patronising. Bosnian society pre-war was highly developed, it was not the civil society of the West, but these people were not illiterate, or not cultured, or not developed, just different'; 'Democratization is not a good term - it is like teaching them how to behave - naturally people are sensitive to this. Are lot of people are educated, they know theory, and they know right and wrong.'; 'Civil society and democratic values existed - Bosnia had a multi-cultural society, good nationalities policy and progressive policies regarding women'. However, those that felt awkward with the approach of their superiors did not feel it was possible to express this easily within the organisation: 'There is no discussion about what democracy is'; 'big principled questions you have to leave out and try to find a corner, an area where you can do good work'.⁷⁰

Taking over the language of empowerment from the psycho-social counselling work being developed in the war, the new focus of the senior officials within the Democratization Branch is on the capacity of individuals for democracy as opposed to that of governments. This means that the broader framework of political and economic regulation is ignored. If anything, the Democratization Branch work of civil society building from the bottom-up is more invidious to democracy than the enforced international administration because it implicitly assumes that Bosnian people are 'damaged' and incapable of rational choice. Once the capacity of Bosnian people as rational political actors is negated, whether this is understood as due to feudalism, to ethnic identity or to war trauma, there is little reason for the international administration of the new state to be seen as temporary or 'transitional' in the short-term, or for self-government and democracy to be seen as preferable.

At the end of the day, the civil society approach not only fails to build support for political alternatives, it also provides carte blanche for the international administrators to override democratic processes, on the grounds that Bosnian voters are not responsible enough to have the rights granted to citizens in Western states. Spokesman for the High Representative, Duncan Bullivant, for example, has argued that 'Bosnia is a deeply sick society, ill at ease with even the most basic principles of democracy'.⁷¹ As Klaus Kinkel openly confirmed, in December 1997, the international community has little hesitation in moving to make decisions contrary to the will of the Bosnian people.⁷² The implication of this approach is the end of formal democracy, of legitimacy through accountability to the electorate. Democracy is redefined as its opposite, adherence to outside standards not autonomy and accountability. High Representative Carlos Westendorp illustrated the new logic of this reversal of democratic accountability when overruling elected Bosnian representatives on the grounds that in his opinion: 'They have a wrong perspective. They are not serving their population properly'.⁷³

Conclusions

This paper has suggested that there is a link between the low level of support for civil society alternatives to the leading political parties and a lack of democracy in Bosnia. However the relationship between civil society and democracy seems to be very different from the one suggested by the advocates of greater international support for NGO-led civil society building strategies.

There is little disagreement that the lack of security is the main political resource of the leading nationalist parties.⁷⁴ It seems entirely possible that the extent

of international regulation over Bosnian life, the denial of self-government at local and state level, and with this the inability of Bosnian political actors to negotiate their own solutions to pressing problems, and thereby give their constituents a level of accountability for policy-making, is perpetuating a political climate unconducive to the development of political alternatives. For civil society to have the space to develop, and for alternative opinions to gain a broader audience, the basic questions of political self-government and security for entity borders would have to be settled. As long as there is no assurance that existing rights to land, homes and employment will not be put to question through international administrative decisions, taken above the heads of Bosnian people, the leading nationalist parties seem secure and civil society alternatives will remain marginalized.⁷⁵

With the indefinite extension of international mandates over Bosnia there seems to be little prioritisation of self-government. The OSCE's Democratization Branch has no way of assessing whether their civil society development strategy has had limited success due to the impact of extended international regulation or because of purely local factors which have so far been immune to international democratization initiatives. According to Siri Rustad, Deputy to the Head of Mission for Democratization:

It is difficult through the [OSCE] activities to measure the overall democratic level of the country. We can't say for definite that any particular activity in itself has changed anything. We propose a set of different activities but then measure them on other levels - the running of institutions, the role of NGOs, the views of the Peace Implementation Conference etc. We don't have a broader theoretical approach at all. That's how the Mission works - its concerned with practical results.⁷⁶

The lack of any way of accounting for the success or failure of civil society building projects means that the assumption of OSCE Officers that there are long-term cultural barriers to democracy is never an issue. Once extended democratization mandates ignore political power and relations between political elites and the international community and instead focus on ethnic segmentation and civil society, assessment becomes a subjective exercise in the measurement of attitudes and culture. The lack of progress only reinforces the idea that the people are too backward or traumatised to be able to cope with political choices. The solution then is not to question the theoretical framework which informs the approach of top-down imposition and bottom-up empowerment, but to tinker with the programmes and call for more resources. As the process continues a vicious circle is created in which the Bosnian people are seen to be less capable of political autonomy and the international community appears ever more necessary to guarantee peaceful and democratic development.

Notes

1. UN Secretary-General Report, *Agenda for Democratization*, A/51/761, Dec. 1996, pars.13 & 46.
2. Ibid., par.124. See also the UN Secretary-General Report, *Support by the UN System of the Efforts of Governments to Promote and Consolidate New or Restored Democracies*, A/50/332, Aug. 1995, par.13.
3. L. Diamond, 'Rethinking Civil Society: Toward Democratic Consolidation', *Journal of Democracy* (1994) 5, 3, pp.4-17. See also: A. B. Seligman, *The Idea of Civil Society*, New York: Free Press, 1992; J. L. Cohen and A. Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1992; and J. Keane, *Democracy and Civil Society*, London: Verso, 1988.

4. Available from: <<http://un.org>>.
5. UN Secretary-General Report, *Agenda for Development*, A/48/935, May 1994, par.107.
6. See for example: T. Gallagher, 'Democratization in the Balkans: Challenges and Prospects', *Democratization* (1995), 2, 3, pp.337-61; K. S. Fine, 'Fragile Stability and Change: Understanding Conflict during the Transitions in East Central Europe' in A. Chayes and A. H. Chayes (eds) *Preventing Conflict in the Post-Communist World*, Washington: Brookings Institution, 1996, pp.541-81; P. Sztompka, 'Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* (1996), 29, 2, pp.115-29; Z. Rau (ed), *The Reemergence of Civil Society in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1991; and E. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals*, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1994.
7. For example: S. L. Burg, 'Bosnia Herzegovina: a Case of Failed Democratization', in K. Dawisha and B. Parrot (eds) *Politics, Power, and the Struggle for Democracy in South-East Europe*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp.122-45; B. Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (revised ed.), London: University of Minnesota Press, 1996; P. Ferdinand, 'Nationalism, Community and Democratic Transition in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia', in D. Potter et al (eds) *Democratization*, Cambridge: Open University, 1997, pp.466-89; *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans*, Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/Aspen Institute Berlin, 1996; S. L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution After the Cold War*, Washington DC: The Brookings Institution, 1995, Chapter 5.
8. B. Deacon and P. Stubbs, 'International Actors and Social Policy Development in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Globalism and the "New Feudalism"', article forthcoming in *Journal of European Social Policy* (1998); G. Kenney, "'New Imperialism" of Bosnia Mission', *Times*, Letters, 20 Dec 1997.
9. See for example: Denitch, p.210; T. Gallagher, 'A Culture of Fatalism Towards the Balkans: Long-Term Western Attitudes and Approaches', paper presented at the British International Studies Association, 22nd Annual Conference, Leeds, 15-17 Dec 1997; S. Woodward, 'Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Post-Dayton Primer and Memorandum of Warning', *Brookings Discussion Papers*, Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1996, p.35; and M. Kaplan, 'Was Democracy Just a Moment?', *Atlantic Monthly* (1997) Dec, p.58.
10. I. Smilie, *Service Delivery or Civil Society?: Non-Governmental Organisations in Bosnia & Herzegovina*, CARE, Canada, 1996, p.13.
11. Dialogue Development, *Survey of Bosnian Civil Society Organisations: Mapping, Characteristics, and Strategy*, Copenhagen: Dialogue Development, 1997, Annex 1, p.1.
12. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 1, Feb. 1997, p.3.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. In the mid-1970s a third of all secondary school graduates entered 'higher schools', comparable to US community colleges, UNESCO figures for the same period place Yugoslavia highest among East European states for student enrolment in higher education and in university institutions, see R. E. Heath, 'Education', in S. Fischer-Galati (ed) *Eastern Europe in the 1980s*, London: Croom Helm, 1981, pp.225-255. On inter-ethnic tolerance, see for example: G. K. Bertsch, 'The Revival of Nationalisms', *Problems of Communism* (1973), XXII, 6, pp.1-15; and X. Bougarel, 'Bosnia and Herzegovina - State and Communitarianism' in D. A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda (eds) *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth*, London: Longman, 1996, pp.87-115. On political participation, see for example: B. McFarlane, *Yugoslavia: Politics, Economics and Society*, London: Pinter, 1988, pp.45-54; J. Seroka, 'The Interdependence of Institutional Revitalisation and Intra-Party reform in Yugoslavia', *Soviet Studies* (1988), XL, 1, pp.84-99; and J. Seroka 'Economic Stabilization and Communal Politics in Yugoslavia', *Journal of Communist Studies* (1989), 5, 2, pp.125-47.
16. *General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. Available from: <<http://www.state.gov/www/current/bosnia/dayton>>.
17. W. Woodger, *The Letter of Democracy and the Spirit of Censorship: The West Runs the Media in Bosnia*, unpublished paper, 1997.
18. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Democratization Programme: Strategies and Activities for 1997*.
19. Interview by the author with Jasna Malkoc, the Senior Co-ordinator for Democratization/NGO Development, Sarajevo, 16 June 1997.
20. Interview by the author with Sabine Freizer, OSCE Democratization Branch Reporting Officer, Sarajevo, 16 June 1997.
21. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 1, p.5.

22. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Regional Centre Tuzla priority and strategy paper: summary, planned activities, Head Office suggestions*, unpublished paper, 1997, p.4.
23. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 3, April 1997, p.6.
24. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 1, p.4.
25. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 2, March 1997, p.4.
26. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 1, p.5.
27. *Ibid.*, p.6.
28. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 2, p.3.
29. *Ibid.*, p.5.
30. *Ibid.*
31. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Regional Centre Sokolac priority and strategy paper: summary, planned activities, Head Office suggestions*, unpublished paper, 1997, p.3.
32. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Regional Centre Mostar priority and strategy paper: summary, planned activities, Head Office suggestions (first draft)*, unpublished paper, 1997, s.IIb.
33. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Regional Centre Sokolac*, p.3.
34. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 3, p.6.
35. *Ibid.*
36. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Monthly Report*, 1, p.6.
37. *Office of the High Representative Bulletin*, 8, 23 June 1996. Available from: <<http://www.ohr.int/bulletins/b960623.htm>>.
38. *Going Nowhere Fast: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina*. ICG Report, 30 April, Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, 1997, p.9.
39. *Office of the High Representative Bulletin*, 40, 13 Mar. 1997. Available from: <<http://www.ohr.int/bulletins/b970313.htm>>; *Office of the High Representative Bulletin*, 49, 28 May. Available from: <<http://www.ohr.int/bulletins/b970528.htm>>.
40. Interview by the author with Sabine Freizer, OSCE Democratization Branch Reporting Officer, Sarajevo, 16 June 1997.
41. Interview by the author with Adrien Marti, OSCE Co-ordinator for Political Party Development, Sarajevo, 14 June 1997.
42. *Ibid.*
43. J. S. Sorenson, 'Pluralism or Fragmentation?', *War Report*, May 1997, p. 35.
44. Interview by the author with Zoran Jorgakieski, OSCE Democratization Branch Co-ordinator for Dialogue and Reconciliation, Sarajevo, 16 June 1997.
45. Interview by the author with Adrien Marti, OSCE Co-ordinator for Political Party Development, Sarajevo, 14 June 1997.
46. *Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1996*. Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, 30 Jan. 1997. US Department of State, s.2d. Available from: <www.state.gov/www/issues/human_rights/1996_hrp_report/bosniahe.html>.
47. Confidential interview with the author, Sarajevo, 14 June 1997.
48. Interview by the author with Rannveig Rajendram, OSCE Democratization Branch Youth and Education Co-ordinator. Sarajevo, 14 June 1997.
49. *Bosnia and Herzegovina Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997*. Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labour, 30 Jan. 1998. US Department of State, s.2d. Available from: <www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/1997_hrp_report/bosniahe.html>.
50. *Bosnia - The International Community's Responsibility to Ensure Human Rights*. Amnesty International Report, 1996, s.V.A. Available from: <<http://www.io.org/amnesty/ailib/aipub/1996/EUR/46301496.htm>>; ICG, *Going Nowhere Fast*, p.13.
51. Sorensen, p.35.
52. For example, Smilie, p.10.
53. P Szasz, 'Current Developments: The Protection of Human Rights Through the Dayton/Paris Peace Agreement on Bosnia', *American Journal of International Law* (1996). Vol.90, p.304.
54. *General Framework Agreement*; D. Chandler, 'A New Look at the Democratisation Process: The Case Study of Bosnia-Herzegovina Post-Dayton' in Z. Sevic and G. Wright (eds) *Transition in Central and Eastern Europe*, Vol.2, Belgrade: Yugoslav Association of Sasakawa Fellows, 1997, pp.217-41.
55. *Aid and Accountability: Dayton Implementation*. ICG Bosnia Report No. 17, 24 Nov. Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, 1996, p.17.
56. *Rule of Law Analysis Report*, Feb. 1997, OSCE Democratization Branch, p.3; *Rule of Law Analysis Report*, Mar. 1997, OSCE Democratization Branch, p.2.

57. Prior to the November 1997 RS Assembly elections NATO troops seized four Republika Srpska TV transmitters, ending the system of shared broadcast control between Pale and Banja Luka, and giving control to the pro-Dayton opposition party led by RS President Biljana Plavsic, see *Office of the High Representative Bulletin*, 61, 1 Oct. 1997. Available from: <<http://www.ohr.int/bulletins/b971001.htm>>. There were prolonged negotiations to form a new government, the deadlock was broken after a parliamentary session was adjourned and many delegates had gone home. UN Deputy High Representative Jacques Klein asked NATO troops to intercept an opposition deputy to return him to parliament to give the opposition coalition a majority, a new government was elected which excluded the SDS which had obtained the most seats, see M. Kelly, 'Step by Step, Preventing Destruction of Bosnia', *International Herald Tribune*, 22 Jan. 1998, M. O'Connor, 'West sees Payoff from Backing Flexible Leaders in Bosnia', *New York Times*, 24 Jan. 1998, and table below:

Party composition of the National Assembly of Republika Srpska (November 1997)

Party	Seats	%
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	24	28.8
SDA-led Coalition	18	21.6
Serb Radical Party	15	18
Serb People's Alliance (SNS)	15	18
RS branch of Milosevic's Socialists	9	10.8
Independent Social Democrats	2	2.4
Bosnian Social Democratic Party	2	2.4

58. Statement by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on the Bosnian Elections. Released by the Office of the Spokesman 18 Sept. 1996. US Department of State. Available from: <www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/bosnia/1996_bosnia_speeches.html>; Chairman's Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Council. Florence, 13-14 June, 1996, Office of the High Representative, par.27. Available from: <<http://www.ohr.int/docu/d960613a.htm>>.

59. OSCE Democratization Branch, untitled information document, 26 Feb. 1997, p.1.

60. Despite the large number of parties and large turn out, the election results gave a substantial popular mandate to the three main pre-war nationalist parties, the Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ). The three main nationalist parties won about 86 percent of the seats and, including the Muslim Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbian Party for Peace and Progress, the ethnic political blocks account for about 95 percent of the seats, see M. Kasapovic, '1996 Parliamentary Elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina', *Electoral Studies* (1997), 16, 1, p.120, and table below:

Party composition of the Bosnian parliament, Sept 1996 elections

Party	Seats	%
Party of Democratic Action (SDA)	19	45.2
Serb Democratic Party (SDS)	9	21.4
Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ)	8	19.0
Party for Bosnia and Herzegovina	2	4.8
Joint List	2	4.8
Party for Peace and Progress	2	4.8

61. OSCE Criticises Bosnian Serb Vote. *RFE/RL Newline*, 1, 168, II, 26 Nov. 1997. Available from: <<http://www.omri.cz/Publications/DD>>.

62. Interview by the author with Christian Ahlund, OSCE Director General for Human Rights, Sarajevo, 16 June, 1997.

63. Interview by the author with Jasna Malkoc, OSCE Senior Co-ordinator for Democratization/NGO Development, Sarajevo, 16 June, 1997.

64. Interview by the author with Mirjana Malic, HCA, Sarajevo, 16 June, 1997.

65. Interview by the author with Jasna Malkoc, OSCE Senior Co-ordinator for Democratization/NGO Development, Sarajevo, 16 June 1997.

66. J. Mimica, 'Ethnically Mixed Marriages from the Perspective of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights' in I. Agger (ed) *Mixed Marriages: Voices from a Psycho-Social Workshop held in Zagreb, Croatia*, European Community Humanitarian Office, 1995, p.22.

67. OSCE Democratisation Branch, *Monthly Report*, 1, pp.7-8.
68. I. Agger, and J. Mimica, *Psycho-social Assistance to Victims of War: An Evaluation*, European Community Humanitarian Office, 1996, pp. 27-8.
69. OSCE Democratization Branch, *Semi-Annual Report*, 1997, p.15.
70. Interviews by the author with OSCE Democratization Branch Officers, Sarajevo, June 1997.
71. 'Clearing the Bosnian Air', *Washington Post*, Editorial, 6 Oct. 1997.
72. *SRT Banja Luka News Summary*, 10 Dec. 1997. Office of the High Representative. E-mail list available from: <LISTSERV@CC1.KULEUVEN.AC. BE>.
73. K. Coleman, 'Sceptic Serbs Doubt the Plavsic Revolution', *Guardian*, 22 Nov. 1997.
74. *Office of the High Representative Bulletin*, 50, 4 June 1997. Available from: <<http://www.ohr.int/bulletins/b970604.htm>>; *Changing the Logic of Bosnian Politics: ICG Discussion Paper on Electoral Reform*, ICG Bosnia Project, Sarajevo: International Crisis Group, 1998, p.2.
75. For further views of the possibility of civil society emerging once this uncertainty is removed see: Woodward, 'Implementing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina', p.83; and C. G. Boyd, 'Making Bosnia Work', *Foreign Affairs* (1998), 77, 1, pp.42-55.
76. Interview by the author with Siri Rustad, OSCE Deputy to Head of Mission for Democratization, Sarajevo, 14 June 1997.