

## **THE OSCE AND THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is the international institution generally acknowledged to have had most success in establishing new norms in the promotion of national minority rights. Between 1989 and 1991 the intergovernmental forum took qualitative steps forward with regard to normative standard setting and established the principle that national minority issues were a legitimate international concern, not merely an internal affair of the state concerned. At Helsinki, in 1992, the establishment of the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities was even more radical and unique in scope, establishing an early warning and international conflict resolution mechanism that could operate independently, without the consent of the OSCE member states. The framework of normative standards established by the OSCE has now become enshrined in international law with the Council of Europe *Framework Convention For The Protection Of National Minorities*, ratified in 1995.

This chapter seeks to consider how OSCE policy developed in both normative and regulative directions and the problems confronted in the process. It will be suggested that two related tensions were crucial to shaping policy. Firstly, the drive to regulate possible tensions in the East but equally to avoid encouraging minority group demands which may risk instability. Secondly, the desire to pose minority rights regulation in universal terms while facing reluctance from Western democracies to open their minority policies to international scrutiny. Both these tensions were addressed through the OSCE narrowing the focus of policy to national minorities that posed a security threat and shifting minority rights from being a human rights issue to a security concern.

This change of approach resulted in criticisms of the institution for reinforcing a negative view of national minorities, as a problem, and establishing a selective and differential framework for international involvement in minority issues. The study ends with an assessment of the OSCE national minority rights framework in relation to its stated aims of improving the status of minorities, regulating potential conflict in the 'new' democracies and preparing the groundwork for a more unified Europe.

### **THE OSCE BEFORE 1990:**

The OSCE is the institutionalised development of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) established in 1975 by the signatories to the Helsinki Final Act. In December 1994, in recognition of its permanent nature, the CSCE title was changed to OSCE, which for the sake of consistency will be used to refer to the organisation throughout this chapter. The institution was originally an informal and ad-hoc inter-governmental forum bridging both sides of Cold War Europe, involving the states of the former Soviet Bloc and of Western Europe, Canada and the United

States. Its main focus of activity was achieving agreements in the areas of three 'baskets': political and security issues, economic co-operation and humanitarian and other questions.

Prior to 1990, although the protection of national minorities had been on the agenda of the OSCE, it had received only a low priority (Bloed 1993b:4). However, the development of the organisation up to that point gave it the ability to transform the international regulation of minority rights issues in the early 1990s. A number of factors unique to the OSCE process were central:

Firstly, the OSCE was the only international forum that defined respect for human rights as an essential factor for international security and not a purely domestic concern. The linking of the three baskets, and inclusion of human rights concerns in the Helsinki Act clearly implied that human rights could no longer be defined as being exclusively an internal affair. Under the Helsinki Act supervision was organised through the 'thorough exchange of views on the implementation of the Final Act' held at the Follow-up Meetings (FUM) and at occasional expert meetings. At the Madrid FUM (1980-1983) the US raised 65 cases, at the Vienna FUM (1986-1989) Britain addressed 86 questions to the Soviet delegation (Brett 1993:144-9).

At Vienna the European Community states pushed for the establishment of a permanent mechanism to monitor compliance with OSCE undertakings on human rights. As a consequence the Human Dimension Mechanism was established consisting of four 'stages' or points: (1) the provision of information upon request from another participating state; (2) the holding of bilateral meetings; (3) notification of other states about the use of the procedures; (4) the provision of information to the review conferences (Bloed 1993a:60-61). The establishment of this Mechanism was a further vital step in institutionalising human rights issues as a legitimate subject to be discussed between states (Zaagman and Zaal 1994:101). It was only later that this mechanism was declared to be applicable to questions relating to national minorities.

The original West European proposal had been for stage four to include the convening of a special forum to resolve specific cases. This was adamantly opposed by East Europeans on the grounds that this would create supranational tribunals geared towards East-West confrontation. Even without this proposal it is clear that those concerns were well founded. Between January 1989 and April 1990, the Human Dimension Mechanism was used at least 103 times; 92 times against East European states. From the 103 there is only one known instance of usage between countries of the same geo-political group, Hungary's use against Romania over disturbances in Transylvania, this exception clearly underlined the predominantly confrontational nature of the procedure (Bloed 1993a:73, Brett 1993:146-53).

Secondly, although not legally binding, not abiding by OSCE policy put states in an 'almost untenable position' (Heraclides 1993:8). The East European states gained through the process through official recognition of the territorial status quo in Europe. Even more important, in practical terms, was the linkage with economic co-operation the central lever used to force acceptance of the more sensitive human rights issues against the initial protests of the Soviet Union's allies who alleged this was an interference in their own internal affairs.

Thirdly, what makes the OSCE process unique is the lack of any judicial or quasi-judicial institutions for establishing policy or for dealing with violations. Other traditional international human rights instruments have tended to proclaim a set of general principles, much as the Guiding Principles of the Helsinki Final Act that established the OSCE process. However, since the late 1980s the OSCE has not only expanded the catalogue of rights but introduced ever more detailed rules amplifying and clarifying their meaning and scope. This has established a novel interpretative rule-making procedure that escapes the ties of domestic legal and constitutional constraints (Buergethal 1993:11). In escaping the binds of domestic legislation and the slow process of drafting and voting on international treaties the OSCE was able 'to cover more ground and make bolder strides ahead' (Heraclides 1993:8). The OSCE developed a great flexibility and dynamism in comparison with its regulation-laden international competitors. This applied as much to the creation of rules as their application, interpretation, amendment and suspension (Bloed 1993a:52). In fact many OSCE commitments defied legal formulation as they actually questioned some sovereign state rights of control over territory (Heraclides 1993:8).

Fourthly, the OSCE by evolving into a developmental process of state-level meetings became 'ongoing and unidirectional' i.e. it had to keep coming up with results in the form of implementation of commitments or of new normative commitments or bring the Helsinki process to an end. This meant that every new development went further in penetrating the sphere of internal affairs of states, this 'increasing intrusiveness' was particularly prominent in the Human Dimension (Zaagman 1994b:233). One authoritative study points to four factors which together gave the OSCE process a dynamic which was not always a rational or calculated one. Firstly, the sheer inertia of the institution whereby the call for further intervention was practically a reflex reaction at any gathering. Secondly, the fact that supporting any worthwhile ideas often meant accepting others as part of the overall negotiating process. Thirdly, competition between the United States and European delegations over policy. Fourthly, the fact that any states accused of being slow to support international humanitarian measures could make up for it by proposing commitments in this sphere which were unlikely to mean any costs to it. This process threatened to increase normative commitments to the point where the OSCE risked being seen as 'trivial or far-fetched... as if locked in an absurd exercise... of trying to constantly raise standards so as to proclaim more and more states as wrongdoers' (Heraclides 1993:138-142).

### **1990 - NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE MAKING OF THE OSCE:**

During the Cold War the OSCE showed little interest in national minority rights protection, it was Yugoslavia that was the keenest on developing proposals in this area, including the protection of ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities, but there was little enthusiasm from other states East or West (Brett 1993:154). The Helsinki Final Act of August 1975, which established the OSCE framework, contained little precise provisions on national minorities, providing merely that participating states:

on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the

full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere (OSCE 1995:3).

These obligations were reaffirmed at follow-up meetings including the Vienna Meeting which established the Conference on Human Dimension (CHD) of the OSCE to develop commitments in the sphere of human rights. At this point there was still little indication that minority rights issues would be central to the OSCE's development. The first CHD meeting was held in Paris in June 1989, before the transformations in Eastern Europe. At the Paris meeting no new agreements were made in relation to minority rights.

The collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe was the catalyst for change within the OSCE. The second meeting of the CHD was held in Copenhagen in June 1990. The Copenhagen Document issued by that conference became a landmark in establishing normative standards of minority rights protection. Section Four of the Copenhagen Document went beyond previous measures against discrimination and for equal treatment to argue for positive rights. It marks the first reference to autonomous administrations (par.35) and the use of mother tongue in dealing with authorities. States were now obliged to protect 'the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territory and to create conditions for the promotion of that identity' (par.33) including provision of instruction in mother tongue and the use of mother tongue 'wherever possible or necessary' before public authorities (par.34) (OSCE 1995:9).

Before Copenhagen the existence of the OSCE itself was under question, however, the development of an extensive national minority rights policy demonstrated its unique policy-making capacity and helped secure its position (Heraclides 1993:16, 1994:287). The OSCE as a forum promoting democracy and human rights, where states met across the East/West divide, was uniquely placed to become 'the conscience of the continent', setting a 'moral and political tone for the new European political order' (Mastny 1992: 230&253). In November of the same year, at the Paris Summit, permanent institutions were established.

### **1991 - THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS PROMOTION:**

'Freedom', the by-word of the discussions on national minorities in 1989 and 1990, soon began to be replaced by 'danger'. Divisive international negotiations on the break-up of Yugoslavia made major powers think twice about encouraging national minority identities, rushing in to recognise the existence of new 'nations' and renegotiating the boundaries of the East European states (Guerra 1996:20). Copenhagen marked the high tide of normative standard setting to promote national minority rights. The follow-up conference, initially proposed in order to take this process further, at Geneva, instead set out the framework of a new approach to minority rights, one which changed the emphasis from standard-setting to conflict regulation.

The CSCE Meeting of Experts on Minorities in Geneva in July 1991 insisted that the normative standards laid down in the Copenhagen Document constituted the utmost

that could be achieved at the time. However, they did make changes which were crucial in two respects. Firstly, and most importantly, Geneva formally institutionalised the developing conception of national minority issues as a legitimate international concern, strengthening the regulative authority of the international community and, in doing so, altering the domestic authority of the state vis-à-vis national minorities, stressing:

Issues concerning national minorities, as well as compliance with international obligations and commitments concerning the rights of persons belonging to them, are matters of legitimate international concern and consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective state (Section II, OSCE 1995:15).

Secondly, Geneva sought to reign in minority claims that questioned the geo-political status-quo. There were concerns that the Copenhagen suggestion of ‘autonomous administrations’ could have a destabilising impact on Eastern Europe. This was achieved through creating a ‘shopping list’ of possible forms of minority representation, stressing that ‘no single approach is generally applicable’ (Section IV, OSCE 1995:17-8).

The Moscow CHD Meeting later in the year confirmed the policy direction established in Geneva. Firstly, it reaffirmed the end of the standard setting spiral, asserting that normative commitments had reached a limit beyond which it was difficult or even pointless to go (Heraclides 1993:18). Secondly, it gave additional powers to the international regulatory mechanisms of the OSCE after emphasising the security dangers of neglecting human rights issues. While the Vienna Human Dimension Mechanism left state sovereignty untouched, Moscow changed this radically. Four additional measures were introduced: (1) a member state may invite in a mission of experts; (2) ask another state to invite in a mission of experts; (3) if a state fails to accept a request from another state then with the support of at least five other participating states a mission may be established against the will of the state concerned; (4) if a state considers there to exist a particularly serious threat then the procedure in (3) may be established with the support of at least nine other states without asking the permission of the state concerned. This revolutionised the, previously consensual, procedural mechanism of the OSCE, which could now be initiated by a minority of states against the will of the state to be visited (Bloed 1993a:64). For some Western states this was going dangerously far in restricting their sovereignty, the British delegation made the most restrictive interpretative statement in order to circumscribe its reach on the basis of public safety or national security (Zaagman and Zaal 1994:102 & 108).

The new regulative mechanisms developed through a concern with the destabilising consequences of minority rights began to produce a second problem for the OSCE. States in the West began to grow concerned about the implications of pursuing a highly regulative, but at the same time universal, policy.

## **1992 ONWARDS - NATIONAL MINORITY RIGHTS AS A SECURITY ISSUE:**

Internationalising the question of minority rights was deemed useful as the OSCE sought to establish its international profile as a leading post-Cold War institution establishing the standards that the 'new democracies' would have to meet to ensure the creation of a united and peaceful Europe. However, the shift in importance of minority rights to the top of the international agenda, influencing Western approaches to East European states, and the spiral of increasing normative commitments began to raise the question of double standards in the treatment of minorities in the 'established democracies' in the West. The OSCE was keen to draw a clear distinction between the promotion of minority rights after the First World War and the situation of a united Europe in the early 1990s. In the First World War settlement the Minority Treaties were imposed on the new Eastern states but not in the West. This provoked hostility from many states who felt that they were being treated as second class. For the OSCE, the solution was to pose the minority rights policy in universal terms yet develop the standards restrictively (Barcz 1992:94).

The major Western OSCE powers had no conception of applying such policies in relation to their own minorities or to accepting such a level of international regulation in their affairs of state. Concerns were voiced by Western states at the possibility of their sovereignty being questioned. The OSCE had never defined 'national minority', this had already caused problems at Copenhagen, Geneva and Moscow when Western states such as Britain, France and Switzerland appeared to weaken the momentum because they did not want OSCE intrusion in their own affairs. France and Switzerland, for example, after fierce discussion, forced the Geneva Report to include the statement that 'not all ethnic, cultural, linguistic or religious differences necessarily lead to the creation of national minorities' (Section 2, OSCE 1995:15). Switzerland did not want its model of cultural pluralism to open it up to direct OSCE regulation (Brett 1993:155 & Heraclides 1992:14). France took the opposite approach in refusing to recognise the existence of cultural pluralism within its own territory (Brett 1993:158 & Barcz 1992:98). The discussion on minority issues revealed it was not just East European states that had sensitivities in this sphere: Germany forced the exclusion of 'new' minorities, such as migrant workers, to avoid the question of its treatment of the Turkish minority; the United States insisted that 'indigenous peoples' could not be classified as a national minority.

The different tensions, discussed above, attained their clearest organisational expression in the creation of the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) at the Helsinki Meeting, ending in July 1992. The perceived need to regulate minority rights in East Europe on the grounds of security concerns was given added impetus by the spreading conflict in former Yugoslavia, and at the same time, the war and the differing responses emerging in the European Union reinforced the dangers of encouraging minority secession. This resulted in a further institutionalisation of the shift to concerns of international security. This change in approach to national minorities was further reinforced by the reluctance of Western states to risk having their sovereignty undermined through minority commitments.

At Helsinki, with greater international regulation being proposed, the appeals for exclusion from Western states became more forceful. The United States, France and Greece stated that they did not recognise the existence of national minorities arguing that all citizens had the same rights and duties regardless of ethnic group. Other states

such as Turkey did not recognise certain groups as national minorities (Zaagman and Zaal 1994:105-6). However, with the non-‘national’ minorities, such as the Asians and African-Caribbeans in Britain, the Turkish and Kurdish communities in Germany and the Arab people of France, excluded from the remit of the proposed HCNM it was assumed that the focus of the OSCE’s regulative powers could now be the East European states without any obvious double standards.

The Helsinki discussions were to make the OSCE claims to universal commitments on national minorities ring hollow. When OSCE influence in Western states could not be negated through the denial of the existence of national minorities a second rider was proposed. The United Kingdom and Turkey, supported by Spain insisted that the HCNM could not intervene in national minority issues where terrorism was involved, effectively taking the Irish, Kurdish and Basque questions off the international agenda. This provoked uproar due to the restrictive nature of the proposal, in effect it meant that existing national minority conflicts (in the West) were excluded while only potential conflict (in the East) became a focus of concern (Chandler 1996:111-2).

The second tension, that of potentially causing instability by focusing on minorities, was addressed by making the new post of High Commissioner part of the conflict prevention machinery of the OSCE. In doing so the post was distinguished from the Human Dimension and the responsibility of safeguarding minority rights per se. The post was titled High Commissioner *on* National Minorities, not *for* National Minorities to make it clear that it was not the creation of an ombudsman. The HCNM was explicitly excluded from considering ‘violations of OSCE commitments with regard to an individual person belonging to a national minority’ nor does he protect the rights of national minorities, either as individuals or as group (OSCE 1995:22). These limitations were imposed to meet concerns that the HCNM might underline differences between various national minorities or prompt national minorities to make more and greater demands and claim privileges that the state concerned could not afford to offer the rest of the population, creating new inequalities or conflict (Bloed 1993b:5, Zaagman and Zaal 1994:107).

The task was designed to be two-fold. Firstly, to act as an ‘early warning’ through monitoring developments concerning national minorities and selecting specific situations for preventative diplomacy and, secondly, to facilitate, as appropriate, ‘early action’ by the OSCE. This mandate required a new and qualitatively different level of intrusiveness in to the affairs of the states of East Europe. The HCNM as a third party can become involved in a state’s affairs on his own discretion without acquiring that state’s consent or that of other participating states (Zaagman 1994a:114-5). For the theorists of international relations the 1992 Helsinki Declaration stands as one of the clearest statements to challenge the post-World War II conception of state sovereignty (Held 1995:104-5).

The OSCE’s reluctance to develop further commitments in relation to national minorities and the dominance of security concerns at Helsinki and afterwards has provoked criticism from many commentators who feel that human rights issues and national minorities protection in particular have become marginalised (Buchsbbaum 1994:356-7). Many feel that the reason for sidelining the Human Dimension is that Western OSCE states have little to gain from it today as added commitments in the

Human Dimension can only bring to the fore intra-West divergences rather than putting pressure on the 'new democracies' (Heraclides 1994:292).

The OSCE has been accused of treating minorities unequally, especially in the case of the HCNM who can only pay attention to the violation of minority rights if they have the potential to develop into violent conflict. It is clear that manifest violations of rights may not involve 'tensions' and therefore fall outside the HCNM's remit no matter how flexibly interpreted (Bloed 1993a:68). Some commentators clearly approve of the OSCE approach which considers minority rights as 'not exclusively or even primarily a human rights problem, but as a security issue' (Mullerson 1997:53). Others see this as promoting a negative image of national minorities which are focused on as a source of conflict (Buchsbaum 1994:339).

### **AN ASSESSMENT OF OSCE POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990S:**

Bearing in mind the considerations and aims of OSCE policy development in relation to national minority rights, the achievements can be looked at in three areas: the capacity to improve the situation of national minorities; the capacity to manage potential conflict over minority issues in the East and the creation of a framework for a more unified Europe.

With regard to the situation of national minorities, the OSCE has been highly successful in developing policy on minority rights and pushing this further than any other institution in the early 1990s. However there have been questions raised over the impact this has actually had on the life-chances of national minorities. It is unlikely that merely introducing normative standards of tolerance towards minorities will resolve tensions generated by social collapse and the struggle for resources in the region (Burgess 1996:34). Economic and social policy development remains the most important element in conflict resolution at the level of both domestic and international actors.

Another set of questions have been aired over the promotion of 'separate but equal' development for national minorities to foster a separate culture and tradition. For example, at the OSCE Human Dimension Seminar On National Minorities, held in Warsaw in 1993, one of the most controversial areas of discussion was that of constitutional and political arrangements to foster separate minority representation in the legislature. Participants raised two crucial points. Firstly, that it could be divisive and might foster 'ethnic' parties focused solely on ethnic interests while failing to give minorities a sufficient voice in decision making. To this end, some speakers argued that under a system of equal treatment national minority members would be more inclined to consider issues in a wider context. And secondly, that collective representation risked permanently marginalising national minorities. The dangers of 'separate but equal' policies breeding inequality and ethnic conflicts was stressed as well as 'the common risk that only learning the language of the minority could put the members of that minority at a disadvantage for participating in all institutions and structures' of the country and becoming second class citizens (ODIHR 1993).

In the Balkans, where most attention has been directed to national minority questions these points would seem to be valid. The focus on Albanians in Serbia and Macedonia

being educated in their own language, while making a political point, does little to end the marginalisation and isolation of the Albanian community. In Bosnia and Herzegovina the decentralisation of political institutions and collective representation systems, whereby Serbs, Muslims and Croats must vote for candidates on an 'ethnic key', seems set to increase division as seen by the dissolution of Serbo-Croat and the creation of three 'official' languages in the new state.

Secondly, in relation to conflict management in the East, of potential concern is the impact that OSCE regulation can have on the relationship between governments and national minorities. As Thomas Buergenthal notes:

[N]o domestic institution or norm is beyond the jurisdictional reach of the CSCE. Here the traditional domestic jurisdiction doctrine... has for all practical purposes lost its meaning. And this notwithstanding the fact that non-intervention in the domestic affairs of a state is a basic CSCE principle. Once human rights, the rule of law, and democratic pluralism are made the subjects of international commitments, there is little left in terms of governmental institutions that is domestic (Buergenthal 1993:9).

This subordinate relationship to the OSCE and other international institutions can weaken the ability of the state to stand above sectional conflicts because the legitimacy of central institutions can be brought in to question in relation to claims based on minority rights. This can create situations where minority/majority conflicts can become more destabilising rather than less so.

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, writers, such as Julie Mertus, argue that there are marked similarities to the destabilising Minority Treaties after the First World War (Mertus forthcoming). The Dayton structures, within which the OSCE plays a crucial role, have both legitimised nationalist differences and at the same time weakened the legitimacy of the Bosnian state through regulation by external international institutions (Chandler 1997:221-9).

Encouraging minorities to appeal to the OSCE can work counter to more flexible solutions to problems worked out by those on the ground. This also puts governments in a weak position as minorities can go 'forum shopping' and use different institutions to put pressure on the elected representatives. More than one OSCE state believes that special minority rights and the promotion of distinct identities does not resolve problems but instead leads to ethnic strife and disintegration (Heraclides 1994:186). As we have seen, the danger of exacerbating and internationalising potential problems in cases where minorities may seek to escalate conflict to involve outside parties was a central concern raised to restrict the mandate of the HCNM.

Thirdly, there seems little doubt that the OSCE focus on national minorities as an issue of international security does little to overcome a differential treatment of the East. To start with, the assumption that ethnic difference is a cause of conflict 'paints all sides as less rational and less modern (more tribal, more ethnic) than "we" are' and downplays any broader international, social or economic understanding of potential or actual conflict in the East (Bowen 1996:13). The focus on security concerns of national minorities rather than minority rights as a broader trans-European or

international question bears many similarities to the inter-war period where states in Eastern Europe were treated formally, and in practice, as inferior to the 'developed democracies' of the West.

After World War One states such as Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland put up a stubborn fight against the Minorities Treaties claiming that international guarantees of minority rights were an attack upon their sovereignty and an indication of a lack of confidence in their good faith as well as a source of potential danger because minorities would feel that their status rested upon the support of foreign powers. These states demanded to know why similar provisions were not put on Germany, Italy and France (Robinson 1943:154-55).

Occasionally there are similar responses today. These tend to come from leading states which resent being treated differentially, for example, the Czech President Vaclav Havel's response at the European Union sponsored Conference on Stability in Europe in 1994, that maybe a roundtable should be organised to discuss the Basque and Irish problems under the benevolent eye of the (East European) Visegrad group (Guardian 1994). The other group of disgruntled East European states are those that look like being sidelined through the focus on national minorities, such as Croatia and Slovakia. The Slovak Prime Minister, Vladimir Meciar, after being lectured by the HCNM, Max van der Stoep, in 1996, noted that he would like to receive a report on the situation of minorities in European Union countries, adding that 'if the results show that there is a higher level of minority rights in other countries we will be glad to adapt' (OMRI 1996).

The major difference today seems to be not so much the divisive character of national minority regulation but that resistance to the regulating role of international institutions such as the OSCE, the United Nations and the Council of Europe, is much more muted. The main reason for the lack of negative response has been the desire of East European states to enter European and international institutions and gain the diplomatic and economic assistance that are dependent on international acceptance (Zaagman 1994a:167). This means that concerns expressed by leading commentators that OSCE mechanisms may become discredited, if seen in Eastern Europe in the same light as the inter-war experiment in minority rights protection, are unlikely to be realised (Bloed 1993a:87-8, Heraclides 1994:302-3).

## **CONCLUSION:**

The OSCE led international consensus on national minority rights protection would appear to be much weaker than the conference agreements and public declarations from leading statesmen indicate. The consensus achieved in the early 1990s on the internationalisation of national minority rights rested on two key elements: the selective interpretation of what constituted a national minority question by Western states and the pragmatic acceptance of this framework by Eastern states.

To conclude, it would seem that making and restating commitments in the field of national minority rights costs little in terms of resources and enables states and political leaders on both sides of the old Cold War divide to achieve a higher international standing. However, underneath the veneer of commitment, there is little

political will to act when this means upsetting the delicate political status-quo in the East or questioning the sovereignty of states in the West.

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