

Western Intervention and the Disintegration of Yugoslavia,

1989-1999

Introduction

In 1989, Yugoslavia was a federal state consisting of six republics, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. By the end of 1999 only two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, remained within the rump of the federation which was undergoing further disintegration with Montenegro seeking greater autonomy and Serbia having lost control of the province of Kosovo. The disintegration of Yugoslavia over the last decade has been a bloody and protracted one. In 1991, Slovenian and Croatian independence was marked by armed conflict, in the next four years the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina took central stage and then, in the late 1990s, armed conflict in Kosovo, culminating in the Nato bombing of Serbia and Montenegro.

The causes of Yugoslavia's disintegration are often located within former-Yugoslavia itself - either in long-standing ethnic differences, in the territorial ambitions of Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, or a potent mixture of the two. The search for domestic or internal explanations for the turmoil within the region has produced a dominant view that considers the elected governments as unable to safely deal with their own political problems and poses international intervention as necessary to safeguard democracy and human rights. In the view of many commentators, bloodshed could have been avoided or minimised had the international community assumed a more

pro-active relationship to the situation and acted decisively to prevent elected leaders from stirring the ethnic caldron in the Balkans.

According to this perspective, the Western powers stood by and did little to stop the conflict spreading from Slovenia to Croatia and then to Bosnia and Kosovo. It was only the Nato actions against Serb forces in Bosnia in the summer of 1995, after nearly four years of war, and further Nato action against Serbia and Montenegro in the spring of 1999, after the breakdown of the Rambouillet talks on Kosovo, which demonstrated the will of the international community to take action to help the peoples of former Yugoslavia achieve some level of peace and democracy.(1)

This chapter seeks to question the above assumptions about the process of Yugoslav disintegration and, in turn, the lessons drawn about the need for further intervention in the Balkan region. In tracing the process of fragmentation over the last decade, this study highlights the frailty of the federal state, caught in the dual processes of international and domestic social and political realignments after the Cold War. These weaknesses were fully exposed, and regional and ethnic divisions consolidated, as a variety of external diplomatic, economic, political and military interventions by major Western powers and international institutions undermined regional mechanisms of conflict resolution. International intervention, it will be suggested, was a determining factor in the process of disintegration from 1989 onwards. Far from contributing to peace and stability, the policy and actions of Western powers undermined the federal institutions that held Yugoslavia together and then prevented compromise solutions, between and within republics, that could have minimised the conflict.

1989-1991: The End of Federal Yugoslavia

The problem of Yugoslav fragmentation had been a subject of concern since the mid-1960s, as economic reform and increasing exposure to the world market highlighted the uneven economic development within the federation. More industrialised republics which had greater financial contacts with the West, such as Slovenia and Croatia, came to resent the subsidies and cross-payments to the less developed regions, such as Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo. They wanted more control over their foreign earnings and less federal say over the state budget. Once the early attempt to overcome economic differentials by state-management had failed, Tito attempted to minimise the political fall-out over budgetary policy by a mixture of repression and liberalisation, sacking regional bureaucrats that were too outspoken while giving republics greater autonomy and veto powers at federal level. In the 1980s federal life ossified further under the toll of rising foreign debt, the imposition of IMF austerity packages under emergency legislation and the autarchic economic policies pursued in the republics as a response to the economic crisis. The weakened federal state had trouble collecting tax and custom revenues from the wealthier republics and, without funding for subsidies, maintaining order in the poorer provinces such as Kosovo.

Although under strain, until 1989 there was little possibility of these economic disagreements leading to the collapse of the federal state. The key factor that meant the richer republics had little choice but to negotiate a solution at federal level was the international situation. A bulwark of Western policy during the Cold War was United States' support for Yugoslavia's unity, independence and territorial integrity. For the

West, Yugoslavia's brand of market-communism was an example to the rest of the Soviet Bloc to leave the constraints of the Soviet Union and open up to Western influence. Yugoslavia had special access to Western credits to keep the economy afloat in exchange for Yugoslav neutrality and rejection of the Warsaw Pact. In the late 1980s the IMF attempted to reinforce the federal institutions and weaken the republics' veto powers in order to push economic reform against those regional elites who sought greater control over local economic resources. Without international support, no separatist development strategy was possible for Slovenia and Croatia.

In 1989, Yugoslavia's international position changed dramatically with the end of the Cold War. The federal state was no longer of vital geo-strategic importance to the United States. The weakness of the federal state and its inability to restore order in Kosovo was now portrayed as an issue of human rights by US officials keen to re-shape their links in the region.⁽²⁾ The federal government failed to receive economic assistance from the US, for its radical market reform programme, and its bid to join the Council of Europe was blocked. The threat of exclusion from avenues of essential international support was heightened by the newly independent states in Central Europe defining themselves, and appealing for inclusion in Western institutions, on the basis of historical and cultural criteria. This historical and cultural division ran through Yugoslavia and reinforced the separatist arguments being made by Croatia and Slovenia, keen to become integrated into the new pan-European political structures and eager not to be dragged down by the parlous economic condition of the rest of the federal state.⁽³⁾ In this context, the already weakened federal government was under new pressure both from within and without.

In 1989 the disagreements over economic reform became re-presented as a struggle between state sovereignty and human rights. Even before the US had raised the issue of human rights in Kosovo, the Slovene president had linked the promotion of human rights with greater autonomy for his republic. The US focus on the human rights issue, as justification for de-prioritising assistance for Yugoslavia, fed into and encouraged Slovene and Croat demands for greater autonomy and linked the separatist demands with a pro-human rights position. The Slovenes played on the Kosovo issue as a way of legitimising their own position and weakening federal constraints. The US stated its support for federal unity but at the same time undermined the legitimacy of the federal state by asserting that this unity could not be 'imposed or preserved by force'.(4)

The federal Communist Party collapsed in 1990 and free elections were held at republic level. In all the republics nationalist parties and politicians came to the fore although none of them contested the elections on the grounds of complete separation from the federation. Talks over the federal budget continued as the Slovene and Croat elites declared their right to sovereign powers and argued for a looser federal arrangement. The US and European states publicly declared their support for the federation and opinion surveys, as late as the summer of 1991, showed that in Slovenia and Croatia the publics were strongly divided on the question of separation while in the rest of Yugoslavia there was strong support for the maintenance of the federation.

Under the public show of international unity, leading politicians in Austria and Germany were sympathetic to the claims of Slovenia and Croatia, encouraging them

to hold back from accepting a new deal at federal level. At the end of June 1991, negotiations broke down and the two republics unilaterally declared their independence. The Yugoslav Peoples' Army (JNA) acted to secure the federal state's borders with Italy and Austria, clashing with Slovene defence forces. The European Community (EC) insisted on a peaceful settlement of the dispute and only the defensive use of force. The actions of the JNA in securing the federal borders were judged to be aggressive and the EC applied sanctions to the federal government. The EC mediated a cease-fire, at the Brioni peace conference, in early July, which, in effect, recognised Slovene claims to territorial separation.

While the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia was unproblematic, the situation in Croatia was more contested as the 600,000 Serb minority wished to remain part of Yugoslavia and had proclaimed their right to secede. In August, the European Community declared the use of force by the federal army 'illegal' and stated that the Serb minority could not receive JNA support for their claims. The EC established the Badinter Commission of international jurists, to arbitrate on the question of secession, and opened a peace conference in The Hague, in September, to organise a new confederal framework, with republics, which desired it, having the right to seek independence. Before the Badinter Commission could make its rulings, Germany forcefully argued for 'preventive recognition' of Slovenian and Croatian sovereignty to enable international forces to intervene on the ground without the assent of the Yugoslav government. Germany unilaterally recognised the independence of the two separatist republics in December and the European Community states followed, keen to preserve unity ahead of the Maastricht talks.

The international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia prior to any settlement on the situation of the Serb minority, which had declared their autonomy in the Croatian regions of Krajina and Slavonia, was to prove disastrous. Conflict within Croatia flared up as the emboldened Croatian state felt little need to compromise with its Serb minority which, in turn, became more desperate to remain within the federation. The possibilities of a negotiated solution with the federal state, involving border changes or regional autonomy, were further undermined by the Badinter Commission's ruling that republic borders were inviolate. This decision made little sense in the Yugoslav context where borders were drawn largely for administrative purposes and deliberately designed to prevent larger national groups establishing separate republics, for this reason 30 percent of the Serbs and 20 percent of the Croats were left out of 'their' respective republics, Serbia and Croatia.(5) The artificial nature of the borders of the Croatian republic was demonstrated by the fact that the new state could not impose its rule in nearly a third of its claimed territory. The six-month Croatian conflict over the status of the Serb-controlled areas was brought to a temporary halt by the establishment of four UN Protected Areas.

Germany's campaign for Croatian and Slovenian recognition was opposed by leading international mediators from the European Community and the United States, Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance, as well as Bosnia's President Alija Izetbegovic and the United Nations General-Secretary Perez de Cuellar, on the grounds that the premature break-up of the federation would lead to regional conflicts and 'the most terrible war in Bosnia'.(6) Germany's prime concern, however, was not Yugoslavia but matters closer to home. The campaign's focus was the international rehabilitation of the newly united Germany. Bonn claimed a new legitimacy to take a lead on the

international stage, and intervene in Yugoslav affairs, on the basis of anti-militarism and human rights, in direct contrast to the discredited language of German expansionism in the past.(7) In order to rehabilitate German power it was necessary to moralise the conflict in Yugoslavia and represent it not as a civil war with economic causes but as an ethnic conflict and war of external aggression. Germany therefore led the campaign to recognise Croatia and, in the process, began the Western demonisation of the Serbs and Serb President Slobodan Milosevic, now deemed to be the aggressors.

The European Community-negotiated Brioni agreement, of July 1991, and acceptance, in December 1991, of the German policy of 'preventive recognition' together ended the effective sovereignty of the Yugoslav state. The European Community had abandoned its previous support for the federal government and decisively weakened the federal regime by prejudging the actions of the federal army, in attempting to restore order in the republics, as acts of aggression and therefore illegitimate. Taking over from the Yugoslav people and their elected representatives the EC established the framework for the disintegration of the federal state, calling into existence new states along the lines of largely artificial republic boundaries.

Instead of offering economic and diplomatic support for the federal state's attempt to push through IMF market reforms and integrate into new pan-European institutions, Western policy-makers attempted to 'mediate' in a political stand-off between the state and the separatist republics. This process of mediation legitimated separatist claims and weakened the legitimacy of the state, further encouraging the process of fragmentation. In the context of greater instability and armed clashes, the Western

powers then intervened more directly to impose a settlement on the separatists' terms, fatally undermining the federal mechanisms of regulation. The federal state, with its system of checks and balances, to protect the rights both of republics and national groupings, was no longer able to play a cohesive role at either the federal or republic level. This meant the region fragmented further as the new states, with the exception of Slovenia, had little political consensus binding society together.

1992-1995: The Disintegration of Bosnia

Prior to the breakdown of the federal order, Bosnia had been recognised internationally as a model of multi-cultural co-existence and symbolic of federal Yugoslavia's progressive minority policies. Only six months before the first free elections in the republic, 74 percent of the population had been in favour of a ban on nationally- or confessionally-based parties, later overturned by the Bosnian constitutional court. The November 1990 elections were held against the background of uncertainty as to constitutional reform and new federal arrangements, the results reflected these concerns as nationalist parties took the majority of the votes among all three groups. The Serbian and Croatian minorities, roughly half the population (31 percent and 17 percent, respectively), previously guaranteed protections through the federal framework, were concerned for their future, and the larger Muslim community (43 percent of the population) feared the consequences of the republic disintegrating.

Public opinion polls in May and June 1990 and in November 1991 had shown overwhelming majorities (in the range of 70-90 percent) against separation from Yugoslavia and an ethnically divided republic. However, with the recognition of

Slovenian and Croatian independence, Bosnia was facing sharp division over the question of whether to leave the federation and seek independence. The failure to agree on a new federal framework, before dismantling the institutions of the Yugoslav state, put to question the guarantees of security and equal treatment, for the three main ethnic groups. Without the guarantees provided by the counterbalancing mechanisms of the federal state, questions of security became even more closely tied up with those of ethnic or nationalist orientation. Bosnian Croats and Serbs threatened moves towards autonomy to guarantee their security.

The breakdown of inter-ethnic co-operation in Bosnia was a direct consequence of external pressures on the political mechanisms holding the republic together within a federal framework, as opposed to the product of external invasion or a resurgence of ancient ethnic hatreds. With US encouragement, the Muslim-led government decided to seek international recognition for independence despite the wishes of the Serb community, bringing to an end the government of national unity. The Bosnian republic had little to hold it together in the absence of elite consensus and fragmented on ethnic and regional lines as the state institutions began to collapse. The Muslim leadership believed that, with international support, UN troops would be able to secure their control over the republic.

The European powers were reluctant to provide this support, by recognising Bosnian independence without a consensus between the three major ethnic groupings. This was also the opinion of the Badinter arbitration commission. The EC-led negotiations at Lisbon, in March 1992, led to an agreement on independence with minority groups protected by regional cantonisation and a high level of autonomy. A week later the

Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic, rejected the agreement after US encouragement to hold out for a greater say.(8) The US then moved the process of disintegration further by recognising Bosnian independence in the face of European opposition. As in Croatia, recognition directly led to a higher level of conflict as negotiations between the republic and the rest of the federation broke down and all sides tried to strengthen their positions on the ground. This led to a rising casualty toll and refugee flows, 'ethnic cleansing', as Serb and Croatian separatists carved out areas under their own control.

Recognising the Bosnian state on the grounds that this would enable international troops to protect its sovereignty was a circular argument. More to the point, it was a fiction. Any new settlement in Bosnia would have relied on the republic and federal representatives negotiating a compromise settlement that satisfied minority demands and avoided conflict. US pressure encouraged the Muslim leadership to refrain from reaching such a compromise and fed Bosnian Croat and Serb fears that only autonomy and closer links with Croatia and Serbia would safeguard their interests. In this context, international recognition did not stabilise the situation in the divided republic, in fact, it destroyed the possibility of it, ensuring that conflict was inevitable.

Once independence had been recognised by the international community there was no longer an equitable basis for negotiations. The Muslim government claimed the mantle of international legitimacy and portrayed the Serb and Croatian autonomists as belligerents trying to undermine Bosnian independence and claim ethnic territory. The United States publicly shared this view, arguing that the Europeans were wrong to try to negotiate a political solution between the representatives of the three main

ethnic constituencies, and encouraging Izetbegovic to hold out against successive European and UN deals.(9) While the Europeans looked to mediate a settlement between the Bosnian parties and contain the conflict, Washington called for a war crimes tribunal for Serb leaders, threatened to lift arms sanctions to supply Muslim forces and to launch Nato strikes against Serb positions. For the Americans, this was a low risk strategy - the Europeans could be accused of compromise while the US demonstrated leadership and coherence at home, defending moral absolutes and international norms, although at the cost of continuation of the war. As Susan Woodward notes, moralising the war was given priority over the European goal of a political solution.(10)

The international politicisation of the Bosnian war meant the moral language of human rights shaped the course and conduct of the war itself. The war was no longer seen as the predicted result of the collapse of state authority, leading to ethnic and regional fragmentation, but as an assault on multi-ethnic democracy by Serb and Croat extremists. As campaigning journalist and author, David Reiff, explained: ‘I and many other foreign writers, photographers, and television journalists kept choosing ... to spend time on the Bosnian [government] side. We did not just think that what was going on was tragic – all wars are tragic – but the values that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina exemplified were worth preserving’.(11) For the beleaguered Sarajevo government, with few resources to fall back on, fighting the war soon became of secondary importance to winning support for international intervention. Weakness became an asset as the war became increasingly staged for international media crews with the government attempting to provoke incidents around Sarajevo and UN-declared safe areas to encourage military intervention. This

strategy included exaggerating numbers of war casualties, preventing the reconnection of water supplies to Sarajevo, halting the evacuation of civilians from war zones and government shelling of their own territory.(12) These were rational responses to US human rights rhetoric which encouraged the Muslim government to play the victim card and refuse to negotiate a settlement in the belief that international aid was around the corner.

The more the Bosnian war became seen as a morality play of good against evil the less relationship the rhetoric had to the reality on the ground. In fact, it would be an exaggeration to see the war as primarily driven by the separatist desire for ethnic and religious division. Once the state institutions collapsed, the struggle for some form of security took on a regional as much as an ethnic shape. People searched for security in different ways according to locality. In the northern Bihac pocket, Muslim leader Fikret Abdic made alliances with local Serbs and Croats in a direct challenge to government policy, this split in the Muslim camp resulted in fierce fighting between two Muslim-led armies. Around Vares and Kiseljak, Serbs and Croats allied against Muslim militias, and around Mostar, Serbs and Muslims allied against Croat-led forces. The breakdown of the mechanisms of government authority resulted in increasingly localised, and criminalised, military configurations. Territories under nominal Croat, Serb or Muslim control fragmented into disparate enclaves as the process of political and social fragmentation continued.(13) Ignoring the reality on the ground, the international community continued to support the Sarajevo government, which had become a small coterie around Alija Izetbegovic (whose elected term as state president expired in December 1991), despite the fact that the government's writ extended to no more than twelve per cent of the territory claimed.(14)

In a repeat of the process of disintegration at federal level, Western powers' intrusion into negotiations between the Bosnian parties resulted in a breakdown of co-operation, as the side favoured by external powers had less incentive to compromise. This led to the institutionalisation of ethnic and regional divisions on the ground, and an increase in the levels of conflict. Failed intervention then led to greater international involvement and, finally, direct Western intervention to impose a settlement. In March 1994, the United States established a cease-fire between the Croat and Muslim forces, creating a Muslim-Croat Federation, offered military support and economic assistance. The Bosnian Croats were encouraged to sign up by the Croatian government, which was promised US diplomatic and tactical support for retaking the Serb-held areas of Krajina and Slavonia.(15)

The following year, the tide of war and diplomacy turned fully against the Bosnian Serbs, who suffered military defeats at the hands of the Federation forces and US-led Nato air strikes in August, 1995. The Serbs had little choice but to accept the US-peace plan, in the face of military defeat and international sanctions. The Dayton Peace Agreement divided Bosnia between two separate entities, the Muslim-Croat Federation, which held 51 percent of the territory, and the Serb-held region, Republika Srpska (RS), which held 49 percent. A settlement little different to the Lisbon proposals rejected by the US, prior to the war, back in 1992. What had changed over the intervening years was the rising toll of death and destruction within Bosnia and, internationally, the discrediting of UN principles of neutrality and respect for state sovereignty.

1996-1999: The Protectorate Solution

The US and NATO claimed the credit for ending the Bosnian war and the peace was signed at the US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio. The detailed agreement laying out Bosnia's constitutional structure was drawn up by US government advisors and imposed on the parties separately.(16) The fact that elected representatives from the new state had little input into the agreement was to be par for the course for the region, and repeated in the Rambouillet, Paris, 'talks' on Kosovo in 1999. There was little international hesitation in taking over the management of the political process. The lesson drawn, from the Bosnian experience, by most leading policy makers, was that UN neutrality and cautious diplomacy had given too much credibility to Yugoslav political leaders and impeded the decisive international actions necessary to regulate conflict in the region.(17) As leading liberal academic, Bogdan Denitch, noted: 'The sad but important fact is this: the meddling "Western outsiders" ... are far better representatives of the genuine interests of the Bosnian peoples'.(18) Dayton marked a new phase of direct Western intervention in the region with growing mandates for the UN, Nato and OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe) replacing government authority with regulation by international appointees. To this end, the UN appointed a colonial-style governor for Bosnia, given the Office of the High Representative (OHR).(19)

At the level of the Bosnian state, the High Representative viewed democratic consensus-building, in bodies such as the tri-partite Presidency, Council of Ministers and State Parliament, as an unnecessary delay to imposing international plans.(20) In December 1997, the 'cumbersome' need for elected Bosnian representatives to assent

to international edicts was removed and the High Representative was empowered both to dismiss elected representatives who obstructed policy and to impose legislation directly. The international community thereby assumed complete legislative and executive power over the formally independent state. In the Muslim-Croat Federation, policy has since been devised and enforced by the OHR in close co-operation with US state officials. In Republika Srpska, the international community supported the dissolution of the RS Parliamentary Assembly and overruled the RS constitutional court, to force new elections, and then organised the selection of a governing coalition which excluded the largest party, the SDS (Serb Democratic Party). In March 1999, before the Nato military campaign over Kosovo, the High Representative took international interference in entity politics further by dismissing the newly elected RS President Nikola Poplasen.

At city and local levels the international community has similarly had a free hand to overrule elected representatives and impose policy against the wishes of all three ethnic constituencies. In the divided city of Mostar, for example, seats are allocated in advance on the basis of ethnicity and then, under international guidance, 'consensus' politics are enforced against the Croat representatives from West Mostar and Muslim representatives from East Mostar. In the disputed region of Brcko, under a Supervisory Order on Multi-Ethnic Administration, an international administrator regulates the composition of the consultative assembly and issues binding regulations. As the *Washington Post* described, his 'kingly powers' extend 'right down to determining who will live in which house, the list of required attendees at meetings of the local police chiefs, the ethnic composition of the local municipal council and the pace at which privatisation will proceed'.(21) At municipal level, representatives of

the international community can enforce policy by imposing economic sanctions, dismissing local Mayors who are judged to be obstructive, and disregarding municipal election results, to impose power-sharing administrations or executive boards run by international appointees.(22)

Under direct international regulation, the institutions of Bosnian government at every level became hollow structures, not designed to operate autonomously, or enable elected representatives to negotiate their own solutions. For example, the Bosnian state Council of Ministers, with the nominal role of assenting to pre-prepared policy, has few staff or resources and is aptly described by the OHR as ‘effectively, little more than an extended working group’.(23) Muslim, Croat and Serb representatives have all argued for greater autonomy in policy-making. As an advisor to Bosnian President Izetbegovic noted, there is a contradiction between the stated aims of the international administration and its consequences: ‘A protectorate solution is not good, because the international community would bring all the decisions which would decrease all the functions of Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions. The High Representative’s mandate is actually, an opposite one, to strengthen the Bosnia-Herzegovina institutions’.(24)

The artificial nature of Bosnian institutions has meant that they can not play any role in creating new mechanisms of inter-ethnic co-operation. In fact, the lack of influence or say over policy decisions for elected representatives, or guarantees of security for their constituencies, has perpetuated the fragmentation of political power and reliance on personal and local networks of support which were prevalent during the Bosnian war.(25) The lack of cohering political structures has forced Bosnian people to rely on

more narrow and parochial survival mechanisms, which has meant that ethnicity has maintained its wartime relevance as a political resource. The 'new feudalism' noted by some commentators, and the continued existence of weak para-state structures in Muslim and Croat areas of the Federation, is symptomatic of the vacuum of integrative institutional power at state and entity level rather than some internal disintegrative dynamic.(26) Where earlier 'neutral' Western intervention undermined and weakened federal government and republic structures of political cohesion, the heavy handed protectorate powers being exercised in Bosnia appear to have had exactly the same results.

Conclusion: Disintegration and International Intervention

There has been little critical consideration of the international community's facilitation of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the role that over-extended international regulation has had in institutionalising ethnic divisions and weakening political structures across the region. In Bosnia and Kosovo the international institutions running the political process argue that they can govern the region better than elected governments can. This elitist view of the incapacity of Balkan people to cope with democracy and state sovereignty has not been challenged by the critics of international engagement in the Balkans. In fact, the most vociferous critics of international policy go further in arguing that there is still too much power in the hands of elected state leaders in Bosnia and across the region.(27)

Far from respect for state sovereignty, and the legitimacy of elected representatives, preventing an externally-imposed solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia, this study

would suggest an opposite interpretation. Conflict in the region has been fuelled through international intervention which has undermined the democratic state institutions necessary to cohere and integrate society and maintain law and order. This point is forcefully made by Michael Ignatieff, who argues that the cause of Balkan conflict has been the external pressures which have led to the collapse or weakening of states in the region, making inter-ethnic accommodation more difficult and, in turn, fuelling nationalist fears and ethnic tensions.(28) To conclude, from problems of inter-ethnic co-operation, that there should be less power in the hands of elected state and regional authorities, as liberal interventionists do, leads to policies which can exacerbate, rather than resolve, the crisis. This was again demonstrated by the course of events in the Serbian province of Kosovo, where 'neutral' Western intervention encouraged the demands of Albanian separatists and undermined the authority of state institutions leading to the withdrawal of Serb security forces. This led to a further breakdown in order in the province, armed conflict and further, highly destructive, international involvement. As the on-going crisis in Kosovo illustrates, Western intervention in former-Yugoslavia has created a vicious circle where one destabilising intervention has been followed by another as international institutions have set the framework of fragmentation.

The lesson for the future may well be that the growing liberal perspective, which sees state sovereignty as 'the traditional enemy of the human rights movement', could be in need of reassessment to take into account the need for democratic and regionally accountable mechanisms of conflict prevention and inter-ethnic co-operation.(29) There is an alternative to the cycle of greater international mandates, further regional fragmentation and the establishment of a new set of protectorates in the Balkans - that

of allowing elected representatives in the region greater freedom to negotiate their own solutions. The experience of Yugoslav disintegration over the last ten years suggests that respect for state sovereignty may be important, for, like democracy, in Churchill's words, it is 'the worst form of government apart from all the others'. When state sovereignty has been undermined by international intervention, whether ostensibly neutral or stridently interventionist, this has acted to intensify and institutionalise ethnic and regional divisions.

Notes

(1) G. Robertson, *Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice* (London: Penguin, 1999); F. Hartmann, 'Bosnia' in *Crimes of War: What the Public Should Know* (eds) R. Gutman & D. Reiff (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), pp.50-56.

(2) W. Zimmermann, 'The Last Ambassador: A Memoir of the Collapse of Yugoslavia', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp.2-20.

(3) S. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1995), pp.104-5. This text is one of best treatments of the break-up of Yugoslavia up to the Dayton Agreement, several of the points in this chapter owe much to her work.

(4) W. Zimmermann, *ibid*, p.3.

(5) A. Pavkovic, *The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p.50.

(6) M. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (3rd edition) (London: Penguin, 1996), p.163.

- (7) S. Woodward, *ibid*, p.186.
- (8) L. J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition* (2nd edition) (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1995), p.243.
- (9) J. Petras and S. Vieux, 'Bosnia and the Revival of US Hegemony', *New Left Review*, No.218, July/August 1996, pp.16-7.
- (10) S. Woodward, *ibid*, p.323.
- (11) D. Rieff, *Slaughterhouse: Bosnia and the failure of the West* (London: Vintage, 1995), p.11.
- (12) C. G. Boyd, 'Making Peace with the Guilty: The Truth about Bosnia', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.74, No.5, 1995, pp.26-9.
- (13) X. Bougarel, 'Bosnia and Hercegovina – State and Communitarianism' in D. A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda (eds) *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth* (London: Longman, 1996), p.105.
- (14) D. Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (London: Indigo, 1996), p.52.
- (15) L. Silber and A. Little, *The Death of Yugoslavia* (2nd edition) (London: Penguin, 1996), p.320.
- (16) C. Bildt, *Peace Journey: The Struggle for Peace in Bosnia* (London: Weidenfield and Nicolson, 1998), p.120-61.
- (17) See, for example, *Unfinished Peace: Report of the International Commission on the Balkans* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996).
- (18) B. Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (2nd edition) (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996), p.210.
- (19) For a more detailed survey of the Dayton provisions and their implementation see D. Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London: Pluto Press, 1999).

- (20) *Office of the High Representative Bulletin*, 62, 11 October 1997.
- (21) L. Hockstader, 'A Bosnian Town in Limbo', *Washington Post*, 8 October 1998.
- (22) *Bosnia and Herzegovina TV News Summary*, 15 July 1998.
- (23) *Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Bosnian Peace Agreement to the Secretary-General of the United Nations*, 11 July 1997, par. 24.
- (24) *Bosnia and Herzegovina TV News Summary*, 10 November 1997.
- (25) S. Woodward, *ibid*, pp.236-7; K. Verdery, 'Nationalism, Postsocialism, and Space in Eastern Europe', *Social Research*, Vol. 63, No. 1, 1996, pp.82-3.
- (26) B. Deacon and P. Stubbs, 'International Actors and Social Policy Development in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Globalism and the "New Feudalism"', *Journal of European Social Policy*, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1998, pp.99-115.
- (27) D. Chandler, 'The Bosnian Protectorate and the Implication for Kosovo', *New Left Review*, No.235, 1999, pp.132-4.
- (28) M. Ignatieff, *The Warrior's Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998), p.45.
- (29) G. Robertson, *ibid*, p.151.