

problems. There are more than the expected number of typographical and syntactical errors indicating that an additional proof-reading could have helped (for example: 'The sovereignty of Parliament mean that' (p.23). 'Or in more recent times President Sadat of Egypt who led his nation with great courage to war and then to peace' (p.26). Is this a sentence? (Or: 'But justice and liberty, her offspring, are not won (sic) by half-hearted attempts'.) The footnoting is sparse and rather odd (for example: on page 25 we are given the institutional affiliation of Maximilian Caspari, a reference to the Encyclopaedia Britannica of 1911 and another of Hill's own publications; most references are to ageing constitutional law and history texts or his own publications). There is no bibliography. Before you even read the text you can tell that this is not a normal academic book by the pictures: glossy photographs of the great men of history: John Locke, Turgot, Edward VIII, Dicey, Bacon, Macaulay, Cobbett, Carlyle, Cobden and Churchill all included for no obvious reason.

But it is the argument itself that is most troubling. Justice, Hill tells us, 'is an instinct implanted in Man without being formulated' (p.29). This claim is again backed up with an appeal to the writings of Locke. But this is largely gestural: what Hill really wants to argue is his own belief in Nature's universal sovereignty, which operates not only through 'gravity, the weather and animals' but also through 'taxation, inflation, poverty and unemployment' (p.35). This is a deterministic, naturalistic call for a culture of political thought based on principles of Nature and justice, which will inexplicably give rise to liberty and prosperity. I found the vision unappealing and the reasoning unconvincing. The general impression is of a libertarian maverick – a sort of radical upper-class English new-age Nozickian – who has not benefited from critical debate with peers prior to publication.

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**Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton, 2nd ed.** by David Chandler. London and Sterling, VA: Pluto Press, 2000. Pp.254; index. £45 (hardback); £14.99 (paperback). ISBN 0 7453 1403 1 and 1408 2

For anyone interested in a detailed examination of the record of peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the years 1995–99, this volume by David Chandler, now in its second edition, is a good place to start. Amply documented on the basis of documents issued by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and other English-language materials, *Faking Democracy* is also well grounded in the relevant scholarly literature, citing, for example, the writings of Claus Offe, Bogdan Denitch, Kimberley Stanton and Frank Fukuyama.

Chandler's argument is that, after more than three years of international involvement in Bosnia, little had been done to foster institutions of self-government. In his view, the western involvement in post-Dayton Bosnia bears comparison with nineteenth-century practices inspired by conceits about the so-called 'White Man's burden'.

Deep pessimism runs throughout the book, but Chandler provides such ample discussion both of OHR decisions and of policies on the ground that, given my rather different orientations as to what needs to be done in Bosnia, I found myself less pessimistic about Bosnia's prospects after reading this book than I had been before.

Chandler's chief concern, driving his pessimism, is that the Office of the High Representative has been increasingly undercutting local authorities and imposing decisions, thereby preventing the peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina from constituting normal civic life. He provides a useful summary of the respective positions of liberal and conservative critics of the Dayton Accords, though he misrepresents the liberals by lumping them together with the conservatives in the allegedly shared belief 'that democracy is a good thing, but not in Bosnia' (pp.181–2).

Not surprisingly, Chandler is sceptical of 'top-down' democratization (p.133), in spite of the post-World War Two successes with precisely this approach in Germany, Italy, Austria and Japan. Chandler understands the difference between liberal values (such as rule of law, tolerance, equality and individual rights) and democracy (multi-candidate elections, uncensored press, separation of powers, and so on.) and gives clear preference to the latter *over* the former. Indeed, Chandler seems puzzled that the international community has emphasized liberal values rather than self-rule, complaining that this has '... little to do with democracy as [it is] traditionally understood' (p.158).

Chandler also disputes representations about Bosnia made by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), arguing that NGOs were guilty of stretching the notion of human rights abuses in order to have a sufficient number of violations to report. He criticizes the International War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague for allegedly calling into question 'the capacity of the people of the region to be trusted with democracy' (p.100). And he disputes Human Rights Watch's picture of nationalist elites restricting media pluralism and points, on the contrary, to an allegedly wide choice of alternative media outlets (p.129).

Finally, in an Afterword for the second edition, Chandler condemns the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation powers' 78-day aerial campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as 'barbarous' and 'Orwellian' (p.200). In so far as the aerial operations of Spring 1999 have only the most slender connection with the subject of post-Dayton Bosnia, it appears to this reviewer that in writing this Afterword, Chandler was driven not by cool analytical curiosity about his supposed subject, as indicated in the title of his book, but by anger.

On the whole, I find myself in disagreement with Chandler's perspectives and conclusions at every step. But, leaving aside his Afterword, which I consider a piece of irrelevant self-indulgence (a judgement which I would pass even if he had advanced the opposite argument), I respect the author's accomplishment in assembling a large amount of factual information and weaving it into a coherent picture. Historically, as Chandler no doubt knows, Britain and the United States developed liberal values and democratic institutions in tandem, becoming steadily more liberal and, at least until the end of the 1960s in the American case (and leaving aside the reversals of the Reconstruction in the nineteenth century and the exigencies imposed by wartime mobilization in the early 1940s), steadily more democratic. Can democracy be set up first, in the absence of liberal values, with locals left to their own instincts, trusting them to find their own path? Will liberal values be born quite naturally out of a self-governing polity, in which citizens are granted the right to vote in multi-candidate elections and given a free press to keep them informed? These are important questions, and Chandler is to be commended for having raised them in so spirited a way.

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