

Who Watches the Watchdogs?'; and 'Current Issues and Continuing Tensions'. Part one is built largely on the findings and fears of outside observers – the popular press, the government, and the primarily left-wing watchdog groups whose self-appointed task it is to apprise the society of the dangers of (right-wing) extremism.

In part two, 'Militia Texts', a wealth of primary source documentation is reprinted, again in subsections which make for easy reference for readers concerned with specific issues. These subsections are: 'Why Now? The Need for Militias'; 'Recruitment, Organization and Structure: How to Form a Militia'; 'Militia is not an Ugly Word: Responding to Critics'; 'The American Founding'; 'The Second Amendment'; 'Gun Ownership and the Disarming of America'; 'Policing the Militias: Is "Big Brother" Watching?'; 'Conspiracies and the New World Order'; and 'Preparing for Y2K: The State of the Nation Reassessed'. Under these headings, nearly the full range of militia concerns in the 1990s are covered.

What is lacking in both parts of the text, however, is the kind of introductory and analytical material that would have made *Homegrown Revolutionaries* a much more valuable book than it is. Following the initial introduction and the interview material, the author simply disappears from the text. Given Dr Mulloy's considerable knowledge of the subject, this is a serious loss for the reader, who could have greatly benefited from the presence of a knowledgeable guide to this often arcane, and invariably contradictory, mass of material.

The book ends with a good bibliography of the movement, a small list of contact addresses, and an index that could have been far more comprehensive.

In sum, while a useful library acquisition, it would be difficult to recommend *Homegrown Revolutionaries* to readers of *Terrorism and Political Violence*.

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D. Chandler, **Bosnia, Faking Democracy After Dayton**. *Pluto Press*, 2000, pp.268. £14.99. ISBN 0745316891.

J. Galtung and C. G. Jacobsen, **Searching For Peace, the Road To Transcend**. *Pluto Press*, 2000, pp.296. £15.99. ISBN 0745316891.

N. Both, **From Indifference To Entrapment, the Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis, 1990-1995**. *Amsterdam University Press*, 2000, pp.266. £14.00. ISBN 90 5356 453 5.

Talking to a friend who has an intimate knowledge of what has been happening in Bosnia-Herzegovina over the last nine years, I expressed the wish to update myself, having not been back to the country since 1995 when I ceased being the EU negotiator. Without hesitation he recommended *Bosnia* by David Chandler. The appearance of the second edition in paperback and an invitation to review it could not, for me, have come at a better time.

Subtitled *Faking Democracy after Dayton*, this is its central relentless message, developed in a documented and detailed account. I do not doubt its sombre conclusion. 'Bosnia has become a parody of democratization because international action in Bosnia appears to be geared towards the democratization process as opposed to democracy'. It goes on to say that 'the experience of international democratization has demonstrated that it is not possible to impose a common bond on the people of Bosnia by administrative fiat. As long as Bosnian people have little relationship to decision

making processes, it is unlikely that any broader sense of common interest will emerge'.

In October 1992, with Cyrus Vance I gave very serious consideration to the proposition that the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina should become a UN protectorate. It was not impossible that the Serbs, having established themselves in over 70 per cent of the territory, might have accepted it, but they would have done so only cynically in the certain knowledge that their dominant positions, which they had taken as a result of brutal shelling, firebombing of houses and forced ethnic cleansing of the Muslim population, would be consolidated by a UN presence of insufficient size, authority or coherence. We rejected a protectorate for many reasons, not least that there was no political will at that time to devote a fraction of the resources that NATO, the EU and UNHCR in particular have brought to bear from 1996 onwards post Dayton. What is so interesting about this book is to see what a protectorate carries in its wake even when there are massive resources deployed. Essentially a protectorate is a top down solution and suffers from all the disadvantages of divorcing the administration from the population with a fatal lack of identification as well as democratic legitimacy.

I strongly recommend this book to anyone likely to be involved in the final status negotiations for Kosovo. The analysis from Bosnia carries immensely important lessons about how difficult it is to proceed even with a bottom up approach on the back of ethnic segmentation and division. The author concludes on building civil society, 'As the process has continued a vicious circle has been created in which the Bosnian people are seen to be less capable of political autonomy and the international community appear ever more necessary to guarantee democratic development'.

The political divides remain deep in Bosnia-Herzegovina five years on. This has been highlighted by the success of Karadzic's party in the November 2000 elections. It is right to question now within the international community whether more of the same policies will help. The author is correct to write, 'It would appear that organic compromises which pass responsibility and accountability on to Bosnian actors and thereby could have a greater chance of guaranteeing long term stability, will only be possible once greater autonomy to negotiate is available'.

At the time of writing my own view was that we would be at a crossroads in the Balkans in the spring of 2001: either more of the same internationally-imposed democratization in Bosnia and Kosovo or a new Balkan-wide settlement. A wider settlement would involve agreeing that Kosovo should be independent, which is something US diplomats and military are increasingly wanting. Where the US is wrong is believing this can be done without it being agreed that Serbia would have transferred to it the equivalent hectareage from eastern Bosnia that it would lose in Kosovo. Such an exchange, which would have to be agreed by the Bosnian government, would take the most recalcitrant Serbs out of Bosnia, the very ones whose implacable opposition to integration are the greatest obstacle to developing a genuine Bosnian identity. That would go some way to President Kostunica reaching a settlement involving the loss of Kosovo which could be defended in Belgrade. The Serbs in Banja Luka and western Bosnia have already shown a greater propensity to work together with Croatian and Muslim Bosnians. Croatia itself, with a new government after Tudjman's death, wants to be accepted in the EU and NATO and is much less inclined to encourage the separatist tendencies which the recent elections show still persist in the Croat dominated part of Bosnia. It is very sad to see Mostar still so divided, and I have no doubt that it and the surrounding areas will still regard themselves as Croatian while living in Bosnia.

The Macedonian Albanian population, probably now as much as 35 per cent, would, in any wider settlement, have to be told very firmly by everyone that there will

be no changes to Macedonian borders. Bulgaria has now sensibly abandoned their previous claims. What Macedonia needs is investment.

For the Balkans to develop economically nothing can replace the Zagreb–Belgrade–Sarajevo triangle. If Kostunica can reach an acceptable political settlement over Kosovo then the real unifying force of business and commerce with its disaggregated decision-making should start overriding the centralized political legacy of Tito's communism that still hangs over the region.

Montenegro would be wise to form a Serbia–Montenegro federation of equal powers. If, however, they refuse they will have to concede some territory around the Bay of Kotor to give the Serbian armed forces a naval port on the Adriatic and the territorial link would come from territory given up by Bosnia-Herzegovina.

It is depressing to have to admit that Dayton will need to be re-opened, and with a new settlement sounding very mechanistic and full of *realpolitik*, by contrast I turned, hopefully, to *Searching for Peace: The Road to TRANSCEND*, by Johan Galtung and Carl G. Jacobsen. It promised a totally different approach. 'This does not mean that the state would not play a role, but that the nature and the position of the state itself be left open to question, that rather than enforcing this model of human community on all the peoples of the world and accepting a state-based system as the only and natural structure of the world, other approaches and other forms of human community be identified'.

The book contains many pithy criticisms of peace efforts throughout the world but has a rather unrealistic habit of printing TRANSCEND in a rather off-putting way throughout the text. I failed also to find much beyond words in the concept of moving 'towards the possibilities of holistic, transformative co-operation and creativity'. There is, I fear, an air of unrealism about the analysis of the nature of conflicts in many parts of the world. For example, the book criticizes the Contact Group nations for not promoting 'a wide based and extensive dialogue between Serbs and Albanians geared towards developing viable alternatives which would have been acceptable to both sides, and encouraged the LDK (League for Democratic Kosovo) and dissidents in Serbia to unite to promote democracy and human rights and freedoms of all the people in the region'. How could this have been done? There was no credible dissident opinion in Serbia ready to countenance the independence on which Ibrahim Rugova was so adamant. This was an issue on which Serbian opinion was and still is almost totally unified. Even, as is suggested, for Western governments to lend more support to free media and independent journalism within Yugoslavia was very difficult in a state Milosevic dominated. We did try this when Prime Minister Panic challenged Milosevic in the early 1993 Serbian election. Milosevic stopped anything being established. He granted a modicum of freedom to give a semblance of freedom behind which was a highly sophisticated system of state control of the media inherited from Tito.

In one chapter on the 'Psychology of the TRANSCEND Approach' is described the conflict triangle of attitudes, behaviour and contradiction – in shorthand A, B and C. They wisely say one basic assumption is that 'people are better able to discuss a root problem when they sense there is a solution', and go on to a second basic assumption 'that if we manage to develop a perspective on a transformation of the root conflict, then that opening at C may drain negative energies at A and B, so normalizing inner and outer relations'. There is much more jargon and complex formulae of this kind, making it impossible to recommend this book or TRANSCEND itself, either to students or practitioners. I believe the time would be better spent reading *Preventing Deadly Conflict, the Final Report of the Carnegie Commission*, on which I and others laboured long to provide some practical guidelines.

By contrast, *From Indifference to Entrapment: The Netherlands and the Yugoslav Crisis 1990–1995* offers a fascinating account of the various phases of Dutch policy on Yugoslavia in the period between 1990 and 1995. Norbert Both, who co-authored with Jan Willem Honig *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime* (Penguin 1996), previously worked as my research assistant from 1995–96 on my own book *Balkan Odyssey* (Victor Gollancz 1995). Since 1998, he has been affiliated with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This book presents the results of research, for which the author was awarded a doctorate from the University of Sheffield, involving the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the former Minister of Defence Relus ter Beek, my own personal papers and interviews with other former members of government, high-ranking officials, military officers and diplomats. Though focused on the Netherlands, it gives a brilliant and incisive account of how foreign policy developed within the EU. If we in Europe are to learn from our mistakes there is no better place to start than here, for politicians and not just diplomats and scholars.

The most crucial decisions over the Balkans were made during the Dutch chairmanship of the European Community (EC) from July–December 1991. A Dutch paper to the Council of Ministers in July 1991 argued that the boundaries of Croatia and Bosnia should be subject to minor adjustments through negotiation. Unwisely, the other eleven countries rejected the idea and the fateful decision was made to recognize the internal boundaries of the former Yugoslavia as international boundaries. Initially, the Dutch were careful not to alienate France and Great Britain and held Germany in check when it was eager to recognize Croatia and Slovenia. From October onwards, however, the Dutch leadership gradually moved in the direction of the German position. In that month Van den Broek set a deadline: that within two months, just before the end of the Dutch chairmanship, either a general peace treaty would have to be agreed to, or steps would be taken to grant recognition to Croatia. Tragically, the fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina scarcely played a role in all the EC deliberations. So the EU ignored the advice of the UN Secretary-General, Peres de Cuellar, its own negotiator, Lord Carrington, and the UN mediator, Cyrus Vance.

The idea of 'safe areas' was never a viable option but despite military warnings the US, UK, France and Russia in May 1993 endorsed the concept to cover their own abandonment of the Vance–Owen Peace Plan. The government of the Netherlands, always emotionally drawn to the 'safe areas' concept committed itself a few weeks later in Copenhagen, on 22 June 1993, to supplying Dutch troops for the UN 'safe areas'. Already morally and politically trapped, the arrival of the first Dutch troops in Srebrenica in February 1994 meant that the Netherlands also became militarily trapped. Most of the Dutch elite involved with security policies bear the responsibility for supporting the 'safe areas' policy. The painful conclusion of the book is that while 'morality' was the dominant consideration in domestic decisions about sending troops to former Yugoslavia, the real moral question, namely whether the Dutch blue helmets would actually be able to protect the Muslim population in the Srebrenica enclave, played no role in the decision-making. A salutary account of where misplaced morality can lead to genocide.

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