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—REVIEW ARTICLE—

## What's So Wrong with Human Rights?

ALEX J. BELLAMY

**From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention.**  
By David Chandler (London: Pluto Press, 2002).

Since 1999 and the Western-led military interventions in Kosovo and East Timor, the twin ideas of universal standards of human rights and the duty of international society to uphold a 'basic floor' of humane governance by military force if necessary have been challenged from a number of directions. Realists have argued that foreign policy should not place the promotion of human rights overseas at its core because states should only be concerned with pursuing their own material interests.<sup>1</sup> Socialists and critics sympathetic to a critical agenda in International Relations have argued that interventionist acts and the new rhetoric of human rights sponsored by Western states mask a neo-imperialist politics of domination.<sup>2</sup> Interestingly, arguments from the right and left of the political spectrum have merged into a broad set of claims that oppose the very idea of universal human rights let alone the idea that international society might support collective action to put right human wrongs. One of the most strident critics of the liberal human rights agenda in international society is David Chandler, who has followed up his trenchant evaluation of the international protectorate in Bosnia with a wide-ranging critique of political action in the name of human rights.<sup>3</sup>

In *From Kosovo to Kabul*, Chandler's basic argument is that Western states are sponsoring and enforcing a new human rights regime for purely domestic political reasons. As Chandler puts it, 'the liberal preoccupation today with genocide, war crimes and barbarism has little to do with either the genocide and ethnic cleansing of the Holocaust or with the recent civil conflicts in Africa and the Balkans' (p.220). Instead,

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the 'new military humanism', as Chomsky labelled it,<sup>4</sup> that was fostered in the 1990s was prompted by a need for Western governments to relegitimise their rule and award themselves a moral purpose in an era where liberalism could no longer justify itself as a preferable alternative to communism. In order to rebuild the link between government and society that was shattered by the end of the Cold War and heightened globalisation, Western governments attempted 'to define themselves through taking the moral high ground and this process has led to a more active foreign policy' (p.221). For Chandler, the moralisation of foreign policy has a number of negative consequences. These include the removal of politics and its replacement with morality, the supplanting of law with morals, the reduction of political autonomy for non-Western peoples, and the relegitimation of war and the 'carpet bombing' (as Chandler puts it) of states such as Kosovo and Afghanistan. This is an important set of arguments because it challenges many of the assumptions that underpin contemporary discourses of human rights and state practices. However, it does so in a way that is deeply problematic. In order to hold a conversation about the legitimacy of international human rights and attempts by states and international organisations to uphold them, I will engage with only three aspects of Chandler's argument: the changing role of humanitarianism and human rights in international society, the relationship between human rights and political autonomy, and the promise of an ethical foreign policy.

I argue that, contra Chandler, the emergence of a global human rights regime is not an insidious Western plot to relegitimise governments and nor are human rights Western impositions that rest upon shaky foundations. On the one hand, Chandler's argument raises serious empirical questions: for instance, Chandler argues that 'it is not clear what the legal justification could be for the US-led military action against Afghanistan' (p.138). In fact there have been few clearer or more widely accepted legal justifications for war since 1945. The US told the Security Council that its intervention was primarily an act of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter, an argument publicly endorsed by the other permanent members of the Council.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, Chandler's argument is also conceptually flawed. How can furthering human rights be damaging to the political autonomy of individual subjects who live in states that do not recognise their right to autonomy or in many cases even their right to life in the first place? If all states resembled Mervyn Frost's 'ethical states' and allowed individuals and communities to freely construct their own conceptions of the good and live according to them, there would be no need for a global human rights regime or military humanism.<sup>6</sup> Sadly, only some states do

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in fact promote and facilitate the political autonomy of their citizens. I argue that even if we accept Frost's idea that human rights and notions of the good life are constructed within particularist communities through dialogue (communicative ethics) and democracy – and this is a problematic idea that overlooks the fact that the moral community and the state do not necessarily overlap – there remains a need to ensure that agents are capable of participating in dialogue and that they therefore enjoy basic civil, political, economic and social rights. Here, I am drawing on Henry Shue's notion of 'basic rights' and R.J. Vincent's conception of a floor of humane governance.<sup>7</sup> To argue against the idea of basic universal human rights on the basis that they are detrimental to political autonomy, as Chandler does, is deeply problematic because political autonomy and the ability of an individual or community to construct moral meaning is dependent upon these rights being respected. It is respect for basic rights that makes a particular form of dialogic or democratic politics (a form of politics that Chandler endorses throughout the book) possible in the first place.

## WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? THE NEW HUMANITARIANISM

Chandler's argument is based on a withering critique of the new importance given to human rights by Western states. As Chandler puts it, 'the transformation of humanitarianism from the margins to the centre of the international policy agenda has been achieved through the reinterpretation of humanitarian policy and practice and its integration into the fast-growing agenda of human rights' (p.21). His argument begins with a story about humanitarianism that is reminiscent of that told by Mark Duffield.<sup>8</sup> Traditionally, humanitarianism and humanitarian practices were based on the principles of neutrality, impartiality and discrimination only according to need. As pioneered by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), humanitarian relief was solely concerned with the preservation of human life and providing assistance to all whose lives were threatened by famine or war. As Chandler rightly points out, such humanitarianism was widely seen as apolitical (p.23). During the Cold War there was a rigid distinction between non-governmental humanitarian relief of the type pioneered by the ICRC and state-sponsored development programmes that were more interested in the long-term social transformation of Third World societies.

The bifurcation of humanitarianism and developmentalism was shattered by the end of the Cold War and the 'deepening' and 'broadening' of humanitarianism. It was deepened through a new

language of 'morals and ethics rather than politics'. New groups, such as *Medecins Sans Frontières* (formed by defectors from the ICRC led by Bernard Kouchner), argued that humanitarian assistance should be directed towards the victims of human wrongs rather than to all on the basis of need, and that humanitarian organisations should take political stands. Thus, in 1999 the EU directed aid to Yugoslav municipalities that had rejected Milošević's leadership, calculating that Milošević's rule was the source of much human suffering and that aid could be used to persuade Serbs to alter their political orientations. Similarly, in the late 1990s, many humanitarian agencies were horrified to discover that their humanitarian aid was being used to sustain the perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide in the refugee camps of Eastern Congo and subsequently withdrew their assistance. The 'deepening' of humanitarianism therefore relates to what other commentators have described as 'aid conditionality'.

The 'broadening' of humanitarianism refers directly to the merging of humanitarian relief and developmentalism. At an institutional level this has led to closer cooperation between non-state humanitarian organisations and state-led development programmes, to the extent that the biggest donors to many of the world's largest non-governmental humanitarian organisations are in fact states. At the conceptual level, this merger has spawned the 'people-centred' approach fostered by the UN, humanitarian organisations and Western states. This approach insists that short-term relief is ineffective because it does not tackle the roots of the problem which often lay in poor governance. The aim, then, is to fund measures to build the capacity of civil society to act as a counterweight to illegitimate governance and to foster economic, social and political development (p.34). Such an approach, Chandler argues, 'tended to portray the non-Western subject as incapable of self-government and in need of long-term external assistance' (p.36).

According to Chandler, the effect of this broadening and deepening of humanitarianism is wholly negative and operates in three primary ways. First, the new human rights agenda challenges the assumption that there is a universal right to relief in times of disaster. Second, it diminishes the importance of politics and replaces it with a one-sided Western morality. Third, it reflects a diminished view of the non-Western subject as being incapable of self-government.

There is much evidence to commend the central thrust of Chandler's account of the merging of humanitarianism and developmentalism. However, it is laden with problems. For instance, the move towards aid conditionality that Chandler identifies quite clearly indicates a politicisation of aid and has generated an important debate about

whether relief is a universal right or not. Nevertheless, Chandler suggests that this reflects the moralisation of aid and a denigration of politics. This prompts Chandler to suggest, on the one hand, that there are no universal criteria that we can use to judge human wrongs whilst on the other hand claiming that there is a universal and somehow pre-political right to humanitarian relief. The work of the ICRC notwithstanding, it is difficult to demonstrate the empirical or philosophical foundations for such a right.

The historical record is laden with the selective application of humanitarian assistance offered, as often as not, on the basis of the political preferences of donors. In 1945 few people argued that humanitarian relief should be offered to perpetrators of the Nazi holocaust. Much more recently, in 1979, Oxfam led a small group of NGOs in a relief mission to Cambodia in the aftermath of the Vietnamese intervention and the ousting of the Khmer Rouge. Other organisations chose to stay away, not on humanitarian grounds but because there was a pervasive belief that offering aid meant providing succour to communism – a charge that was frequently levelled against Oxfam at the time. Selectivity is not new amongst humanitarian and development donors. However, the new politics of humanitarianism and aid conditionality bases its selectivity on criteria that include the quality of governance, commitment to human rights and long-term programmes of political, social and economic development. There is no doubt that illiberal governance contributed significantly to the complex emergencies in Ethiopia, Somalia, East Timor, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Aid conditionality recognises the links between governance, the effectiveness and legitimacy of relief, and longer-term development. Such conditionality is not unproblematic<sup>9</sup> but represents a more legitimate, transparent and universal basis for selective humanitarian relief and development assistance than the ideological criteria that were predominant during the Cold War.

There is also a philosophical inconsistency at the heart of Chandler's critique of the new politics of selectivity that emerges from his conception of politics. Chandler buys into the idea that neutral humanitarianism can be apolitical. However, to be 'neutral' is not to be apolitical. Being neutral involves taking a particular political and moral stance on an issue. Such neutrality therefore has to be justified because it is not a self-evident good. Although Chandler criticises the 'public undermining' (p.42) of neutrality, questioning the legitimacy of neutrality and the conservative political values it reflects, particularly in the face of genocide, is a legitimate and important political and philosophical endeavour. Chandler justifies neutral humanitarianism by

reference to 'the universal right of every man, woman and child to relief at times of disaster which is enshrined in international law' (p.47).

There are three principal problems with this claim. First, it is not clear that these rights *are* enshrined in international law or even the customs of states and humanitarian organisations. For instance, the responsibility of states to treat refugees humanely and equitably in accordance with the 1951 Refugees Convention and subsequent 1967 Protocol is limited to those states that have actually ratified these legal articles, and most Asian states have not done so.<sup>10</sup> We cannot therefore talk about a universal responsibility towards refugees. Second, the idea that there is an apolitical humanitarian responsibility to provide subsistence relief is inconsistent with Chandler's subsequent denunciation of universal human rights, which, he argues, lack 'plausible fundamental principles' (p.103). Without the philosophical grounding offered by liberal internationalists it is difficult to see how a universal right to humanitarian relief can have 'plausible fundamental principles' either. Finally, being neutral does not mean doing no harm or having no effect on the political and military situation in an emergency area, but quite the opposite. Chandler mentions the principle of 'do no harm' in passing and glosses over the substantial amount of evidence that the very presence of 'neutral' humanitarian relief agencies may have deeply profound political consequences. Such unintentional consequences include the legitimisation of warlords, the provision of material support for ethnic cleansing, and the direct and indirect provision of food, drugs, cash, vehicles and other assets to the perpetrators of human wrongs.<sup>11</sup>

I am not saying that the principle of neutral humanitarianism should be discarded. Instead, I am cautioning against the conceit that neutrality is apolitical, that it is self-evidently good and grounded in universally recognised principles, that the politics of neutrality should not be questioned and that actors who claim to be neutral do not have a profound and sometimes negative impact on the regions where they are operating. In its place, I argue that if we accept the possibility of universally recognised humanitarian principles we must surely also recognise the possibility of universal human rights; that the politics of neutrality must be open to political scrutiny; and that neutral humanitarianism is not self-evidently 'better' (or for that matter 'worse') than human rights advocacy.

#### HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL AUTONOMY

Having debunked the idea of universal human rights, Chandler moves on to evaluate the negative impacts of human rights activism in

contemporary international society. He argues that such activism has three negative consequences for the political autonomy of non-Western states. First, human rights discourses are based upon a 'degraded' concept of the non-Western subject (p.112). Chandler argues whilst the Universal Declaration of Human Rights insists that human rights derive from the fact of being human, human rights advocacy requires firmer foundations because such 'abstract justifications' (p.100) are not enough to bring contemporary international society into question (though interestingly, he neither debunks the idea of 'universal humanity' nor explains *why* abstract justifications are not enough). Such justification is found in the rejection of 'state-grounded' political rights or citizenship rights, both of which assume that the individual is capable of self-government. Thus, the concept of universal human rights is predicated on the idea that subjects do not, in fact, possess the capability to govern themselves. As Chandler puts it, 'the universal subject of human rights has much less capacity, for either self-government or self-determination, than the rational individual assumed by modern representative government' (p.102). This move legitimises the interference of Western states in the affairs of non-Western societies 'because the human subject is defined as being without autonomy some external source has, of necessity, to be looked to' (p.109). In the absence of a world society, those external sources are Western states and their 'global' institutions. Human rights discourses are therefore predicated on the idea that non-Western subjects lack the capacity to exercise rational thought, and legitimise a modern form of colonialism predicated on a sense of moral superiority akin to the racist logic of the 'white man's burden'.

Contra Chandler, liberal human rights activists do not argue that individual subjects lack the capacity for self-government. Instead, they argue that individuals do have and *should have* the capacity for self-government but that their ability to exercise their capacity is inhibited by illiberal governance. Chandler's argument here is predicated on the assumption that Pol Pot's Cambodia, Idi Amin's Uganda, and Slobodan Milošević's Yugoslavia were genuine expressions of Cambodian, Ugandan and Yugoslav self-government, a claim that does not sit at all easily with the historical record. Milošević, one might argue, was elected. However, neither his rise to power in 1987 (not through the ballot box) nor his defeat of Milan Panić in the 1992 elections could be described as accurate reflections of Yugoslav self-rule. In 1992, one million (Albanian) voters were denied basic civil and political rights (guaranteed by the Yugoslav constitution), opposition parties were denied access to funds, members and media coverage (often violently), and there is substantial evidence to suggest that the ballot in many parts of Serbia was rigged.

Rather than 'degrading' the subject, liberal human rights attempt to guarantee that subjects *can* exercise their capacity for self-government. A community that can make its own political choices and construct its own ideas about the good life and pursue such a life is one whose members are free to speak their minds without fear of violence (political and civil rights) and enjoy a basic level of subsistence that enables them to participate in politics. Universal human rights do not diminish the subject. Rather, they attempt to provide a political, social and economic context in which subjects can govern themselves and pursue their particular understanding of the good life in ways that do not diminish the ability of others to do likewise.

Related to this point, Chandler's second argument in this area is that Western human rights activism is diminishing the realm of politics and replacing it with particularist moral ideas. As Chandler puts it, 'the logical conclusion of human rights policy would be the end of politics as a sphere for the resolution of social questions of the distribution of goods and policy-making' (p.115). He continues, 'all human rights advocates share the view that social justice, the "righting" of "human wrongs" should stand above the formal political equality of liberal democracy... Whereas representative government works to realise the derivation of the state from the will of the people, human rights theorists seek to subordinate the will of the people to ethical or moral ends established by a less accountable elite' (p.116). Chandler finds evidence for this in the tendency for human rights advocates such as Nicholas Wheeler to insist that civil society ('self-appointed liberal advocates', p.116) rather than states should be empowered to further human rights.

This argument can be contested on several fronts. First, *liberal* human rights advocates do not place social justice before democracy and are often criticised for this very reason.<sup>12</sup> Second, and relating to my earlier point, universal human rights make democratic politics possible in the first place. If all states respected 'the formal equality of liberal democracy' there would be no need for transnational human rights activism. Sadly, they do not. Third, therefore, liberal human rights advocates do not seek to subordinate the will of the people to abstract moral ends. Rather, they seek the conditions in which subjects can genuinely exercise their capacity for self-government in ways that do not prevent others from doing likewise. Finally, Chandler's understanding of politics itself is very narrow. For Chandler, politics is the stuff of states, parliaments and the ballot box. Whilst these are core aspects of liberal politics, in practice parliamentarians are held to account by civil society groups (from farmers unions to civil libertarians to schoolteachers) and political issues are debated and framed outside of government and

parliament. The existence of a thriving civil society must surely be indicative of empowered subjects engaging in politics at a variety of levels and through a variety of media.

This brings us to the third and final criticism of the impact of human rights on non-Western societies. Chandler argues that human rights activism is weakening already weak non-Western states and that this is generally damaging. Sovereign statehood, Chandler argues, provides a basic (though tenuous) degree of formal equality in international society. It is to be defended, he insists, because it is essentially apolitical and amoral. As Chandler puts it '*the traditional legal criteria for statehood are neutral and value-free*: that an entity must possess territory, a permanent population, have an effective government and the capacity to enter into international relations' (emphasis added, p.136). Leaving aside the startling claim that the legal criteria for statehood are value-free,<sup>13</sup> the idea that human rights activism diminishes the formal equality of states that are somehow *a priori* legitimate and hence reduces their capacity to act in order to fulfil the will of their inhabitants is problematic on both philosophical and empirical grounds.

First, it is worth pointing out that human rights advocacy organisations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have a policy of holding states accountable to human rights criteria that they themselves have signed up to or that are guaranteed in the state's own laws. Human rights advocacy is not, therefore, about weakening states by recourse to abstract notions of human rights. Rather, it is about holding states to account by reference to commitments that states themselves have made. Second, the meaning of sovereignty has changed considerably over time and the 'traditional' and 'value-free' criteria that Chandler refers to were in fact merely the criteria that were applied during the twenty-years or so of decolonisation that followed the Second World War. Those criteria were supplanted by international society in the 1990s with criteria that included the protection of minorities and provisions for democracy. The Soviet and Yugoslav successor states had to do much more than implied by Chandler to achieve recognition of their statehood. Moreover, this process of conditional recognition was endorsed by the Security Council and cannot, therefore, be argued away as a consequence of Western neo-colonialism.

Finally, although the liberal structures of global governance have contributed to the weakening of non-Western states,<sup>14</sup> it is **important to bear in mind** that such institutions have begun to recognise this and remedy the problem and that those states that do uphold the human rights of their citizens are often stronger and more stable than their neighbours. There is much agreement that the structural adjustment

policies enforced by the World Bank did a lot to weaken Third World states. However, it should be remembered that over the last five years or so foreign aid and lending has focused on building the capacity of states themselves. Nowhere is this more evident than with the emergence of the so-called security sector reform agenda which aims to build legitimate, professional and effective security sectors in Third World countries.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, those states that uphold the basic rights of their citizens have proved to be much more stable than their neighbours. Macedonia, for example, was able to avoid civil war largely because both communities were significant stakeholders in the state and because the basic rights of both groups were protected by the constitution.<sup>16</sup>

#### THE FALSE PROMISE OF ETHICAL FOREIGN POLICY

If not genuine concern for human rights, what is the impetus behind this new human rights activism? After the end of the Cold War, he argues, it has become increasingly difficult for Western states to legitimise their policies on traditional capitalist grounds (p.63). Thus, Western states have been inexorably drawn to moral arguments and exporting ethics. The exportation of ethics is particularly useful for three principal reasons. First, the object of criticism is overseas, thus directing criticism away from Western governments. Second, in foreign affairs governments do not have to match rhetoric with action to the same extent that they have to do in domestic affairs. Finally, in the field of ethical foreign policy it is easy for Western governments to claim credit for any progress regardless of whether or not they actually had anything to do with it (p.65).

The idea that ethical foreign policy is inspired by domestic *interests* rather than domestically inspired or international *values* casts serious doubt on the legitimacy of the whole ethical foreign policy project. However, Chandler's claims can be challenged here as well. First, Chandler is unable to provide any evidence to suggest that this is actually how governments came to adopt ethical foreign policies. He correctly notes that the UK did not adopt an ethical approach to foreign policy until 1997. He omits to mention, however, that in 1997 a new Labour government was elected. He also omits to mention that placing human rights at the centre of foreign policy had been a key component of Labour foreign policy since Michael Foot had led the party in the early 1980s. Second, his rationalisation is based on the assumption that Western electorates are concerned about human rights in foreign countries and that they change their voting preferences accordingly.

However, there is no evidence to suggest that Clinton lost a single vote because he chose not to prevent or halt the Rwandan genocide or that Clinton and Blair gained a single vote because of their activism over Kosovo. Third, the one explanation for ethical foreign policies that Chandler overlooks is the idea that Blair, Clinton, Axworthy, Evans and others may have thought that it was simply the right thing to do whenever it was feasible to do it. Finally, in the midst of the war against terror it is difficult to see which states now espouse an ethical foreign policy, suggesting that the idea of placing human rights promotion at the centre of foreign policy may not be as powerful as Chandler suggests.

The primary impact of this shift in foreign policy priorities on the part of Western states, Chandler argues, is the re-legitimisation of war in international society. This re-legitimisation has led to: revisionist readings of international law in order to elevate the status of human rights vis-à-vis sovereign rights by human rights advocates such as Tim Dunne and Nicholas Wheeler (p.161); the replacement of negative peace with positive peace and hence the negation of international order (p.166); and an 'extended international role in conflict situations' (p.176). What we are seeing, Chandler argues, is the proliferation of 'military human rights interventions to ensure the provision of internationally imposed people-centred protections' (p.178).

On the charges that liberal human rights advocates insist that the rights of sovereignty depend upon the fulfilment of responsibilities to citizens, that the pursuit of peace must include dealing with the structural sources of violence (from human rights abuse to poverty), and that international society is – and should be – involved in ameliorating the negative consequences of violent conflict and pursuing conflict resolution, liberal human rights advocates can only plead 'guilty'. Rather than denigrating non-Western subjects, however, such pursuits try to create the very conditions that allow them to govern themselves. Rather than imposing abstract concepts of human rights, liberal human rights advocates hold states accountable to the standards that they themselves have signed up to and attempt to create a context in which individual subjects and communities can create their own ideas of the good life and pursue it free from fear of persecution. Rather than replacing politics with morals, liberal human rights advocates begin by pointing out that politics and morality are inseparable and seek to open as many social spaces as possible for the political and moral interrogation of the claims and actions of political elites.

The question, then, is not whether we should have an ethical foreign policy or not. All foreign policies are based on ethics, be it the ethics of *realpolitik* or cosmopolitanism.<sup>17</sup> The question should be, does our

engagement with the world facilitate or inhibit the ability of individuals and communities to pursue their conception of the good life in ways that do not prevent others from doing likewise? The construction and pursuit of the good life occurs through politics and ideally through communicative ethics. To participate in communicative ethics, agents must be free to speak their minds without fear of harm and must enjoy a basic level of physical human security. In a world where ethical states are the exception rather than the norm it is incumbent on all those who engage with politics to decide whether they wish to open up dialogue by empowering individuals and communities or close it by denying people access to the building blocks of politics themselves: basic human rights.

#### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank Nicholas Wheeler, David Chandler and Sara Davies for their help with this essay.

#### NOTES

1. See for instance Michael Mandelbaum, 'Foreign Policy as Social Work', *Foreign Affairs*, Jan./Feb. 1996, and Henry Kissinger, 'Humanitarian Intervention has its Hazards', *International Herald Tribune*, 14 Dec. 1992.
2. See John Pilger, 'Humanitarian Intervention is the Latest Brand Name for Imperialism as it Begins its Return to Respectability', *New Statesman*, 28 June 1999, and Tariq Ali (ed.), *Masters of the Universe? NATO's Balkan Crusade* (London: Verso, 2000).
3. David Chandler, *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton* (London: Pluto, 1999).
4. Noam Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons From Kosovo* (London: Pluto Press, 1999).
5. See UN Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373. Michael Byers argues that although the claim to be acting in self-defence would have normally been contentious this argument found more favour in international society than other potential legal arguments and thus may make a change in customary international law. Michael Byers, 'Terror and the Future of International Law' in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (eds.), *Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
6. Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Approach* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).
7. See Henry Shue, *Basic Rights* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996) and R.J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986).
8. Mark Duffield, *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security* (London: Zed Books, 2001).
9. See Rita Abrahamsen, *Disciplining Democracy: Development Discourse and Good Governance in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2000).
10. I am grateful to Sara Davies for this point.
11. See Mary B. Anderson, *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – Or War* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999).
12. Adamantia Pollis, for instance, argues that concerns for social justice we 'considered

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- of little importance in liberal thought'. Adamantia Pollis, 'A New Universalism', in Adamantia Pollis and Peter Schwab (eds.), *Human Rights: New Perspectives, New Realities* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
13. Simply for reasons of space. A convincing case can be made, though, that either statehood was forged through the politics of economic and social domination or that the notion of sovereign statehood has always been linked to liberal ideas about political autonomy and self-government. See John Hobson and Stephen Hobden (eds.), *Historical Sociology of International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002) and Christian Reus-Smit, *The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
  14. See for instance, Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1987).
  15. The case for security sector reform was presented by Nicole Ball, *Spreading Good Practices in Security Sector Reform: Policy Options for the British Government* (London: Saferworld, 1998).
  16. See Alex J. Bellamy, 'The New Wolves at the Door: Civil War in Macedonia', *Civil Wars*, Vol.5, No.1, 2002.
  17. Ken Booth, 'Exporting ethics in place of arms', *The Times Higher Education Supplement*, 7 Nov. 1997.