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Book Reviews

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Book Reviews

Peace Operations

Peace Operations: Trends, Progress, and Prospects edited by Donald C.F. Daniel, Patricia Taft, and Sharon Wiharta. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008. Pp. 271+index. ISBN: 978-1-58901-209-7. $29.95 (pbk).

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The resurgent activity of the UN Security Council has led to the authorization of more peace operations than ever before, which in turn has increased the demand and perpetual strain to find effective and sufficient forces. This book addresses the question of national and regional capacities to undertake peace operations. The authors examine developments across regions and countries and provide insights about the characteristics of contributors to peace operations. They set out the multitude of options for divisions of labour between both the UN and the myriad regional and sub-regional organizations. The value of the book arises from its comparative approach through in-depth analysis across national and regional players. The coherent set of questions covering all regions is a unique feature of the book.

The book seeks to articulate trends and prospects for regional and national capacities, and the information is based on accumulated data from the three contributing organizations: Georgetown University's Centre for Peace and Security Studies, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Folke Bernadotte Academy. It compares, across nations and regions, a standard set of answers to questions that address: the scope of operations, the nature of relations with UN and other organizations, factors affecting troop capacity and characteristics of troop contributing nations, regional and national drivers and prospects for peace operations.

The multifold trends that emerge indicate that regional operations and coalitions of the willing will overshadow UN operations. These trends highlight the scarcity of the specialized resources necessary for operations which are more dangerous, challenging and demanding than ever before. The book reveals that rather than creating competition between organizations, the long-term pattern is of coordination, complementarity and coexistence. In cases where peace enforcement is most challenging, a tacit division of labour has evolved between the UN, regional operations and coalitions of the willing which has allowed the UN to concentrate on the demands for its services in Africa.

While the global supply of troops may currently be secure, a negative feature to otherwise positive news is that troop numbers are limited. The book reveals that 42 out of a potential 60 countries are already contributing to UN operations which raise questions about the availability of further troop deployment. The UN is over-dependent on troops from underdeveloped nations: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Ghana and Jordan, which contrasts starkly with the relatively 'high-calibre troops' from the West made available to the EU, NATO and

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other dangerous peace enforcement-type operations organized by coalitions of the willing. A positive feature is the development of niche capabilities such as specialized police and demining units, particularly from African countries, and specialized training provided by West European states.

The book also addresses capacities at the regional level. Of particular importance is Mark Malan's chapter on the challenges African organizations face in both building institutions and 'fire-fighting'. He cautions against overly optimistic expectations given the continent's dependence on the UN and external assistance. One critical gap that the book fails to address, however, is the potential contribution from *La francophonie*. A particularly interesting case is the bi-lateral support, including training, equipment and sustainment, provided by Belgium to Benin, which in the last five years has increased its troop contribution from 25 to 1500.

Like Africa, Europe has highly developed regional organizations in the shape of NATO and the EU, with perennial calls to develop a more coherent vision for its contribution to international peace and security operations. While Europe as a whole has a strong tradition and commitment to peace operations, and sophisticated capabilities, the deployment of these are constrained due to decreasing defence expenditures and by political attitudes shaped by concern about the use of force. The political challenges faced by the newly independent states, in particular a resurgent Russia, and the independence demonstrated by those states which face internal security problems, has lead to a tradition of deploying peace operations within the region rather than abroad. Furthermore, the escalation of tensions within the region has already led to assistance from EU in Georgia which may require assistance from NATO. This would require a renewed dialogue between Russia and the West.

The prospects are more encouraging in Latin America. Although regional institutional promise is lacking, Latin America's long-standing contributions and motivations are a constant trend. The changes taking place in East Asia indicate a slow incremental shift from 'quiet diplomacy' towards more effective responses to wider global threats including a nascent peacekeeping capacity. Of particular note, also, is China's expansion of troop numbers. Finally, the Middle East looks set to continue as a region that views itself as being affected by conflict, therefore requiring its troops for domestic purposes, precluding its participation in peace operations.

With the exception of the Middle East region, the book's findings indicate changes at various levels leading to the willingness to participate in peace operations for a variety of reasons: for example, a strong sense of international obligation, opportunity to enhance prestige or curry favour with a major power, to seek an outlet for surplus military capacity, provide remuneration for troops and more widely to share the burden of global security. Despite positive trends indicating good news, the book ends on a cautionary note; not to be complacent about these positive prospects, but to be mindful of the stubborn challenges.

STEPHANIE BLAIR © 2009
Kings College, London

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The Contradictions of R2P

The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All by Gareth Evans. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2008. Pp.xvi + 241 + appendices + notes + index. ISBN: 978-0-8157-2504-6. $29.95 (hbk).

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One of the most striking aspects of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine appears to be the gap between the promise and the reality. This paradox is at the heart of Gareth Evans' book, which attempts to restate and clarify this 'simple and powerful idea'. The fact that this book fails to do so speaks volumes for the problems facing those who argue that the endorsement of the concept at the UN General Assembly 2005 World Summit was a fundamental turning point in transforming R2P into an established principle of international relations.

Gareth Evans understands more than many others the problems of turning R2P into a reality. The former Australian foreign minister was the co-chair of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), established in the wake of the 1999 Kosovo war, tasked with building an international consensus for humanitarian intervention. The Commission felt this had been achieved with their 2001 report which essentially sought to repackage humanitarian intervention in the language of a 'responsibility to protect'.

The ICISS report itself reflected the problems of humanitarian intervention, recasting the 'right of intervention' accruing to Western military actors, as the 'responsibility to protect' and shifting the focus away from the interveners to the 'victims of atrocities' – the ostensible objects of intervention. The difficulty of justifying Western military intervention was also reflected in the report's shift of focus away from non-consensual military intervention in its argument for a continuum of responsibility: 'to prevent'; 'to react' and 'to rebuild'. This was an act of political evasion rather than political consensus-building and the advocates of R2P are still living with the consequences of this in the confusion that surrounds the R2P concept today. Evans argues that, despite the UN World Summit declaration, the work of establishing R2P is still to come and involves taking on 'three big challenges' which the book sets out to address (p. 54). The first challenge is conceptual: defining the concept – the meaning – of R2P. One would have thought that this was pretty fundamental. In fact, it is strange to talk about R2P as if it had some real existence despite the fact that there is no clarity about what it might actually entail. The second challenge is the institutional one: clarifying or establishing the institutions that are necessary or have the task of carrying 'it' out (whatever the 'it' of R2P might be). The third challenge is the political one: mobilizing the political will for the institutions (as yet undecided) to act on R2P (once it is clear what that might mean).

The confusions at all levels stem from the fact that R2P as a concern to prevent 'mass atrocity crimes' has been delinked from the initial discussion about the permissive use of coercive force without UN Security Council authorization. UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, took over the R2P language of the ICISS report, in preparation for the UN World Summit, but distanced it from the use of coercive

force through putting the recommendations in different sections of the report. The separation continued the shift of focus of the ICISS report; moving further from a Western state duty to intervene and more towards an ethical emphasis on non-specific responsibilities to prevent atrocities. If we take R2P at face value as ‘ending mass atrocities once and for all’ (the subtitle of Evans’ book) then it appears paradoxical that the one thing that did not occur at the 2005 World Summit was any international commitment on this precise point. Without the emphasis on non-consensual military intervention, R2P begins to blur into the general UN policy practices of conflict prevention.

This was highlighted in Kenya at the end of 2007, where disputed elections led to ethnic-related violence, with 1000 people killed and 300,000 displaced. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon publicly characterized this as an R2P situation (p. 51). Here R2P was seen to facilitate international pressure on the Kenyan government and to provide a discursive framework for international diplomatic involvement. Even, in the case of Darfur, Evans himself alleges that becoming classed as an R2P situation did not mean that non-consensual force would be used, or that R2P had ‘failed’ because military coercion was not deployed (p. 61).

Evans wants to argue that ‘prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to protect’ (p. 79), yet he is concerned that R2P language should not be deployed too broadly as this might be understood as raising the possibility of military intervention in a ‘whole variety of policy contexts’ – such as that of the Burmese/Myanmar government’s failure to react adequately to Cyclone *Nargis* – inevitably giving the concept of R2P a bad name. Here Evans’ argument that R2P should be primarily about ‘prevention’ but also strictly limited in application to ‘atrocity situations’ becomes a contradiction in terms, and highlights the problems of R2P from its initial conception.

The lack of clarity over R2P, both in conceptual and institutional terms, is an inevitable consequence of its development out of the ICISS report which attempted to muddy the waters over the right of intervention. It is not conceptually possible to consider R2P in terms of prevention, no matter how often the advocates of R2P repeat the mantra that ‘prevention is the single most important dimension’. Mass atrocities do not arise *de novo*, but in a context of inequalities and conflict. Evans himself admits that: ‘of course, it is true that some full-fledged R2P mass atrocity situations evolve out of less extreme human rights violations, or out of general conflict environments’ (p. 69). In which case, it is impossible to make a judgement in advance about the potential for mass atrocities, in order to enable R2P prevention to take place as some discrete set of practices separate from ongoing international responses to political crisis or conflict situations.

The contradictions multiply as Evans tries to dig himself out of the hole which has long been awaiting him. For Evans, the solution to the conundrum is ‘the need for some further criteria to be developed and properly applied if any kind of credible “R2P watch list” is to be prepared’ (p. 74). On the basis of a set of indicators, which Evans admits are ‘an art rather than a science’ and ‘essentially seat of the pants judgements’, he suggests that we can draw up a list of countries which, without mass atrocities ‘obviously occurring’, are nevertheless of ‘R2P concern’ (ibid.).

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The poverty of the argument is glaring, for it stands on three unfeasible claims: first, that these indicators, yet to be properly thought through – such as a history of mass atrocities, persistent tensions, poor coping mechanisms, receptivity to external influence and poor leadership – can clearly distinguish a select list of countries; that, second, any such list and labelling could generate a consensus around this classification; and, third, that, once clarified and consented to, some set of discrete policy measures could be set in place to prevent 'mass atrocities' as a distinct sphere of policy intervention.

There is no possibility that a discrete range of prevention, intervention and rebuilding mechanisms can be instituted which address the limited concerns of 'ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all'. It appears inevitable that, in shifting the emphasis from coercive intervention to consensual prevention, it may be possible to achieve a consensus at the UN General Assembly but, in terms of policy practice, we are left no nearer to establishing what R2P could mean or how it could be 'operationalized'.

DAVID CHANDLER © 2009
University of Westminster

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Perpetual Peace

On Perpetual Peace: A Timely Assessment by Dieter Senghaas (Translated from the German by Ewald Osers). Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007. Pp.216 + bibliography + index. ISBN: 978-1-84545-324-4. £37.50 (hbk).

Though its title is a deliberate evocation of Kant's puzzling essay and its substance may be read as homage to that greatest of German metaphysicians, this book is not a discussion of Kant's ideas about international politics. Instead, it provides a summation of the thought of one of the outstanding peace theorists of recent decades. Senghaas defines peace as 'the constructive non-violent treatment of unavoidable collective conflicts' (p. 90). For this to be more than a mere absence of organized violence – and here is perhaps the most obvious nod towards Kant – six conditions must be met simultaneously and at several political orders of magnitude: national, regional and global. The first of the six is that legitimate monopoly of the use of force without which the rule of law (second of the six) cannot be sustained. Third comes affective control, defined as the moderation that results from the kinds of social complexity that require individuals to perform a multiplicity of roles, promoting empathy and mutual understanding. Closely related to this is a requirement for mass political participation, which – together with the social complexity that underpins affect control – facilitates social mobility, helping dissolve traditional forms of social subordination. Fifth is social justice, best described as a dynamic expression of the rule of law, sensitive to the constantly changing configurations of identity and interest implicit in the third and fourth conditions. The final requirement is a culture of constructive conflict management, acting as both precondition and guarantee of the more formal

characteristics of the model. In this way, the core of a durable and worthwhile peace is captured in the simple and memorable spatial image of a hexagon.

Two things are immediately evident. First of all, peace theory, like the more empirical peace-building literature based upon it, becomes in effect a study of all politics, though a study that is tightly focused on the elimination of violence and depends upon an *a priori* denial of ultimately irreconcilable enmities. Avoidance of harm seems to be regarded, in the last resort, as a higher value than justice. The second is that the hexagon closely models liberal democracy at its best. The encompassing politics developed with such care here relies heavily on culture and naturalisation. The opportunities for the development of mature judgement provided by liberal democracy become embedded through irreversible social learning; identities and interests are 'the result of developments over centuries' (p. 95). By some combination of good fortune and good judgement a political atoll miraculously rises above sea level, transmuted from vulnerable living organism into something closer to rock. Zones of peace emerge. Yet if Senghaas were to have concentrated less on Europe and the OECD countries and more on that rather longer-established zone of peace, South America, he might have formed a different view about the process of norm creation in international society, been less sanguine about the irreversibility of liberal democracy or even the need for it, finding comfort in the apparent lack of close correlation between domestic politics and international relations, which survived the mid-twentieth-century lapse into dictatorship without marked deterioration.

Anyone fortunate enough to read both Senghaas and E. H. Carr's 1939 classic, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, within a short space of time, may be surprised to see the undoubted idealist and the supposed realist meeting halfway on a number of points. Both share an illiberal approach to economics, rating fairness more highly than optimization. Each understands (and a quotation might just as easily be found from Carr to this effect) that 'technocratic development programmes, attempting to stage development by bypassing political power stations, are usually bound to fail' (p. 179). Each is adept in estimating the range of objections worth considering and aware of the need to mute his progressive politics, as might a saxophonist jamming with the Berlin Philharmonic, in ways that will mollify the established majority of the political orchestra. Senghaas is, at times, as rough a sketcher of his opponents (conflating realists and rational choice theorists, for example) as Carr once was of those he styled Utopians. Yet the younger man lacks the mandarin touch that might have been supplied by a less literal translator and now and then inclines to crankiness. Sigmund Freud is given his head in Chapter 3 but falls at the first fence. Surely it is essential to his theory that people have bodies, while states do not? More seriously, Senghaas falls back at critical points on the utopian 'must'. If this-or-that is to be achieved then such-and-such must or has to be done (e.g. p. 107). Stated conditionally, as here, this is unobjectionable in itself, but is very often symptomatic of a lack of any plausible sociology of the causative as distinct from the intentional process by which peace is to be achieved. His fundamental objection to war deprives Senghaas of the unsocial sociability on which Kant relied, and which was shared in all its essentials by Anglophone liberals from Paine to Cobden,

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by which war – forcing states to create modern systems of public finance – would finally place the monarchs and their courtiers in debt to bourgeoisies with a supreme interest in uninterrupted and unimpeded international commerce. Precisely because he is sensitive to the multi-cultural and complex nature of contemporary society, Senghaas is unable to spin so fine a yarn as this and, in its absence, his book is unlikely to win new converts, though it will deservedly command respect.

CHARLES JONES © 2009
University of Cambridge

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Surviving the Siege of Sarajevo

Blue Helmets and Black Markets: The Business of Survival in the Siege of Sarajevo by Peter Andreas. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. Pp.208 + illustr + index. ISBN: 978-0-8014-4355-8. £12.50 (pbk).

A not inconsiderable factor in fostering so-called black markets during war is the formation of incentive structures for overcoming shortages created in war economies by disruption – especially sieges. Typically, the siege of Sarajevo from 1992 to 1995 represented a microcosm of war entrepreneurship in the Balkans as a whole. It also mirrored, with important variations, the experiences of other besieged centres throughout history.

War entrepreneurship is about primitive capital accumulation, the predatory, often brutal, rent seeking that exploits conditions of scarcity, lawlessness and high risk. This conceptualization of war economies is not new, and has been recorded in considerable detail by Donald Thomas for Britain during the Second World War and by R.T. Naylor for other cases. Peter Andreas's book also meshes with the thesis revived by Christopher Cramer that in terms of development and statebuilding, *Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing*.

Less concerned with a contribution to grand theory, however, Andreas offers a *mise en scène* to expose contrasts between the popular portrayal of Sarajevo's gallantry in the face of bombardment and shortages, and the scams, black markets, aid diversion and cross-ethnic organized crime going on, sometimes with the help of peacekeepers. He has written the first in-depth analysis of the economic impact of a siege in the context of peacekeeping and has contributed significantly to the literature on the Bosnian war.

Andreas uses the theatrical metaphor of 'front' and 'back' stage to dramatize what for many became a banality of evil and survival. This is an effective device that draws out the *quid pro quo* demanded by the besiegers from the UN for access to the city. It helps to accentuate, also, the Janus-like role of some of the journalists, aid workers and peacekeepers. For readers of *International Peacekeeping*, the clandestine activities of blue helmets are of particular interest.

The book's title is probably not meant to imply that there was a symbiotic relationship between peacekeeping and black marketeering. As individuals or

groups, peacekeepers tended to be auxiliaries of illicit activities, for they could hardly command the political economy of Sarajevo in the way that the Bosniak gangs and political leadership of the SDA did, for example. Indeed, NATO's demonization of the besiegers, who were handed about 25 per cent of relief aid by the UN, has tended to throw a blanket of near-silence over the activities of Bosniak elites who grew very wealthy very quickly and who proceeded to dominate the political economy of peacebuilding. Andreas uncovers a great deal about the enterprises of the besieged as well as the besiegers. For instance, a slew of allegations concerns the entrepreneurship of key members of the SDA Executive Committee and the Minister of the Interior, Bakir Alispahić. Bosnian generals, including Divijak, a Serb loyal to the government, were disgusted with diversions of aid and the soliciting of clandestine international support that 'provided a cover and opportunity for corruption, theft, and profiteering' (p. 97).

Peacekeepers and aid agencies were often oblivious to the way they were manipulated by smugglers carrying weapons and other goods through internationally-established checkpoints. In addition to unintentional collusion, other reports indicate that relief agencies and peacekeepers 'turned a blind eye' to theft or smuggling in order to keep the air-lift flowing smoothly. Other accounts point to UN personnel being paid for facilitating the safe conduct of illicit goods. Some peacekeepers, notoriously the Ukrainian contingent of the UN Protection Force, sold cigarettes and food on the black market, or took advantage of the fuel shortage to sell fuel siphoned from their own vehicles. The Ukrainians were sent home in 1992, their operations too blatant to ignore. For some peacekeepers, writes Andreas, 'their informal role as black market suppliers was arguably as important as their formal role as protectors and facilitators of the humanitarian aid effort' (p. 46). Without these backstage activities the city's population would hardly have survived. Such scams were not isolated. Nor was the sex trade that built up in the vicinity of barracks and which persisted as organized crime after the conflict ended.

A valuable section of the book deals with the embedding of criminality into the aftermath of the war as nationalist elites continued to engage in relationships with war entrepreneurs to reinforce their grip on peace. Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić, more renowned for their indictment as war criminals, were steeped in the culture of corruption and smuggling that financed Republika Serb politics into the post-Dayton period.

Andreas briefly surveys other contexts in and beyond Bosnia. Thus Srebrenica, Leningrad, Grozny and Falluja (Gaza would be another interesting case study) also demonstrate that behind the front stage portrayal of humanitarianism, of ethnic animosities and gallant resistance, the backstage political economy of war entrepreneurship and survival is a common theme. If, as John Mueller contends, only a small proportion of the population in the Balkan conflicts engaged in violence, a much more significant proportion was conducting everyday life through clandestine exchange for survival – or through formative modes of accumulation that in advanced capitalist countries at peace are more often associated with corporate scams. In his well-researched and fascinating

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book, Andreas shows that peacekeepers and relief agencies, wittingly or unwittingly, have helped to shape the political economies of spaces of distress.

MICHAEL PUGH © 2009
University of Bradford

Interventions and Their Unintended Consequences

Unintended Consequences of Peacekeeping Operations edited by Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning, and Ramesh Thakur. Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007. ISBN: 978-92-808-1142-1. Pp.312 $34.

Fragile States and Insecure People? Violence, Security, and Statehood in the Twenty-First Century edited by Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller, and Finn Stepputat. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2007. Pp. 264 $74.95 (hbk), ISBN 1-4039-8382-8.

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These two lively books examine the complications and unpredictability of peacekeeping and post-conflict reconstruction in fragile states. The two edited volumes consider the unintended consequences of peacekeeping, and the wisdom of concentrating on justice and security sector capacity building in environments where non-state sources enjoy greater legitimacy and reach. In laying out the sheer complexities of programming in fragile environments, each volume serves as a spirited riposte to much of the breathtaking ambition that accompanies many such interventions and the assumptions that often underpin them.

Chiyuki Aoi, Cedric de Coning and Ramesh Thakur have crafted an extremely readable collection that examines the unplanned side effects of peacekeeping interventions. The collection unearths a depressing account of the myriad repercussions these missions produce: abandoned babies and absent fathers, higher rates of sexual disease, exorbitant costs on apartment rents, dual economies, neglected national civil services and confused programming, to say nothing of the increased opportunities that exist for financial chicanery. Indeed, the only positive aspect that the contributors are able to find is the improved personal relationships between individual military officers from previously warring sides – Argentina and the UK, India and Pakistan – when they work together on an overseas mission.

All involved in this book deserve credit; the editors for managing to keep creative minds focused tightly on the central theme, and the authors for each delivering individually interesting and information-rich chapters. Without exception, each contribution is strongly written. Three chapters have particular merit. Katarina Amitzboell uses original research from Afghanistan and Kosovo to lay out the vast distortions to host country economies occasioned by the rapid influxes of international assistance in her section on the 'Unintended consequences of peace operations on the host economy from a people's perspective'. She shows salary disparities, dual public sectors, inflation, off-centre markets and social disturbances amidst a general context of poor practice and over-promised activities.

A severely distorted economy is the result, where cleaners earn more than government ministers, with all the peculiar incentives that come with that. It appears that only one NGO – Peace Dividend Trust – has become aware of the economic impact of peacekeeping and is attempting to harness the resources of international staff to impact positively upon local businesses. Taking a more conceptual tack, Stuart Gordon challenges the common assumptions about the ease of civil–military co-operation and the supposed benefits that necessarily accrue from it in his chapter, 'Unintended consequences of civil–military co-operation in peace operations'. The most impressive chapter, however, is Kwesi Anang's 'The case of Ghana', which reveals the institutional and political ramifications of peacekeeping activities within the Ghanaian police and military. Money is at the root of most problems. Lax systems and processes mean diverted funds and money 'strong-armed' from serving officers. In one instance, funds from the Department of Peacekeeping in New York intended to pay for the country's peacekeeping contribution was diverted to an off-shore fund used to purchase an (over-priced) private jet for the government of the day. The editors provide an understated conclusion. They caution against overestimating the ability of being able to correct change within a complex, dynamic and personality-driven system but also note the need to acknowledge that these negative consequences accrue. They counsel against pretending otherwise.

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Pretence is all too common among many agencies and institutions involved in peacekeeping. The phenomena laid out by the authors are not solely restricted to the geographic areas or temporal periods they consider. Similar pathologies or variants thereof can be found in almost every arena in which peacekeeping takes place. The consequences may be 'unintentional' but they can no longer be considered to be unexpected. Such events are often remarked upon privately but often remain unacknowledged formally. The Secretary-General's reports on peacekeeping – and the code cables sent from missions to New York – focus almost entirely on the positive results and linger less on any unfortunate and messy occurrences that are inevitable in a dynamic and ever-changing environment. Similar to most organizations, promotion and reward in the UN system comes with the achievement of 'good outcomes' rather than the focus on systemic difficulties. The question arises – is this situation really tenable? As the editors acknowledge, peacekeeping will remain an essential element in the international community's arsenal of response to international crises and will remain so. Therefore, the issue of managing the more unpleasant side effects becomes ever-more pressing. This volume represents an important first step in confronting these issues.

The edited volume by Louise Andersen, Bjørn Møller and Finn Stepputat's is slightly more of a 'curate's egg' in terms of the contributions, but still stands as an extremely useful addition to a growing body of research that critically examines the intent and impact of justice and security sector programming in the developing world. The most interesting research in this area is led by the Danish Institute of International Studies, from whence this volume originated.

The book focuses on current donor orthodoxy, which asserts the 'state' as the sole legitimate provider of justice and security support, with the consequence that

most assistance is concentrated on formal institutions such as police, military, courts and the bureaucracies around them. The editors' view is that this approach is simplistic, and their aim is to show that justice and security sector provision in the developing world is 'granulated', idiosyncratic and inconsistent. They argue that 'poorly sustained ideas about how things might work risk being recycled in reports and papers to the point of becoming established truths on the subject' (p. 16). To take but one example, Bruce Baker explains the vast range of actors that constitute the 'security sector' in any one environment, each different in shape and form, and none susceptible to easy classification.

In many of the chapters, the discordance between donor programming and the realities of the local context become apparent. Donors and international interveners are trying to create the apparatuses of a formal state when that state does not exist. Their programmes are too often based on assumptions about what is desirable rather than a detailed inquiry as to what is feasible. Collectively, the authors also point out an uncomfortable paradox: a vast majority of disputes and security incidents in the developing world are resolved or mediated without recourse to state institutions, yet donor programmes focus the vast majority of their attention on the 'state' sector. A finely nuanced conclusion by Louise Anderson and Eric Scheye calls for a pragmatic and 'multilayered' approach to justice and security delivery that will blend together elements of both state and non-state justice provision. The book will make uncomfortable reading for those involved in this field, assuming that programming decisions are informed by good research. Both volumes conclude that there can be no substitute for detailed understandings of local contexts.

The views expressed in this review do not represent those of the Australian Federal Police.

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Militarism, Moralism and Market Fundamentalism

Why We're Losing the War on Terror by Paul Rogers. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008. Pp.180 + notes. ISBN: 13 978-07456-4197-3. £12.99 (pbk).

Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite Power and the Illusion of Control by Paul Rogers. New York: Routledge, 2008. Pp.240. ISBN: 13 978-0-415-41938-3. $43.95 (pbk).

Paul Rogers is one of the foremost British academic commentators on the American-led 'war on terror'. Like all ambitious and mature scholars, he takes as his field the entire terrain of conflict, from the technological and economic factors, to the political, social and ideational factors that have shaped public policy. Rogers' view is refreshing because he is not bound by the

traditional strictures of critical political economy that tend to place undue emphasis on single factors. While he quite rightly places the economics of national interest squarely in his sights, he also takes a great deal of effort to show how both technological and ideational factors come into play. It is a rare scholar indeed who is as comfortable discussing weapons systems as he is discussing dispensation theology.

In *Why We're Losing the War on Terror*, Rogers is correct to note that political scientists have been chronically inattentive to the philosophical and religious ideas that have played such a large role in the aggressively internationalist policies of the Bush administrations. Therefore, this essay will attempt to address that gap by highlighting the most significant connections that come to light in Rogers' two most recent books. Since the publication of both these books in 2008, economic events have taken a more sinister turn and a secondary intent is to place Rogers' ideas about sustainable security in the context of the current financial crisis.

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Rogers provides a well-developed overview of the ideational foundations of American neoconservatism and its electoral mandate given by a supposedly impossible trinity of hawks, libertarians and Christian evangelicals. Neoconservative views are not the preserve of any one of these voting blocs; nor are they necessarily associated with a particular Jewish lobby represented by Leo Strauss and Allan Bloom. While neoconservatism's suspicion of transparency and disgust with the supposed moral relativism of the postmodern turn are indeed found in the work of Strauss and Bloom, other aspects of this particular ideological strain are better captured by the economic ideas of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, the social ideals of Rousseau and even the populism of Ronald Reagan.

In a nutshell, neoconservatism is deeply traditionalist in its approach to the use of political power (although this is somewhat tempered by the fact that American political thought abjures classical conservatism) economically liberal and socially libertarian. Might makes right in international affairs, power ought to be wielded by those with the esoteric knowledge to use it effectively, the market exists prior to political freedom and social values ought to be grounded in the attitudes and habits that enhance the competitive capacities of America. Democracy is rooted in the 'American idea', and cannot exist apart from it. This hybrid bloom of moral absolutes, martial confidence and evangelical zeal is thought to be able to grow in all soils, yet apparently reached its apotheosis in the pragmatic Protestantism of the founding fathers.

Apart from the jingoistic patriotism that infuses neoconservatism, there is little for hawks, libertarians and evangelicals to come together over. In fact, the social liberalism of libertarians runs contra to the moralism of evangelicals, and the militarism of the hawks grates against libertarianism. How can a loose coalition of voters lend its support to a set of ideas that none of them holds to fully? It helps that power, secrecy and esoteric knowledge are closely linked in the minds of those who sought to expand the executive powers of the presidency. It also helps that Republican strategists drove together voters that held certain affinities, while driving them away from the political centre. To those who

argue that voters are certainly more sophisticated than peasants, one only has to look towards the strident accusations of socialist conspiracy levelled against Barack Obama to see how simple (and fallacious) messages can galvanize commentators and journalists who are always the first volunteers for the war to win hearts and minds.

Also of special significance is Rogers' depiction of another unlikely union – that of evangelicals and American Jews. Seen in the light of history, this convergence of interests seems highly improbable. By and large evangelical Christians view Jews as beyond salvation not only because they do not believe in the resurrection of Christ, but also because they have explicitly rejected him as their promised Messiah. Jews on the other hand have dark cultural memories of pogroms and charges of deicide levelled by the faithful, and so they tend to keep a distance from Christian fundamentalists of all stripes. Many American Jews are affluent, educated and tend to support socially progressive policy initiatives and Democratic candidates for public office. American evangelicalism tends towards a decidedly patriotic and conservative view of America's place in the world. Evangelicalism thrives upon a politics of exclusion, in which Christianity is engaged in an epic war against sex, secularism, socialism and, of course, Satan. The genius of Karl Rove lay not in his grasp of the issues (which was formidable), but in his ability to effectively drive wedges between moderate and undecided voters on the right and left. How then do the interests of largely white, conservative, God-fearing and patriotic evangelicals mesh with urban, socially liberal Jews?

Rogers' depiction of the theological impetus behind evangelicalism's interest in the political future of Israel/Palestine is perhaps the best in recent history. Christian Zionism holds that the Jews have a special part to play in the final days of earth's existence. The heart of dispensation theology is the idea that the world ends not with a whimper, but a bang – a final battle to be more exact. In the Jezreel valley beneath the ancient ruins of the Megiddo fortifications, the forces of good and evil will gather for a final showdown before Christ returns to rule the earth for one thousand years. There are a number of fantastic predictions including a rapture of the righteous, best known to the uninitiated through the *Left Behind* series of novels that have sold millions of copies worldwide. The Jews play a central role in the final battle because God will fulfil His promises to the Israelites when Jesus returns to earth and rules from the city of Jerusalem. Ergo, it is both Jewish and Christian destiny to rule this contested terrain – albeit at the end of the world, which is thought to be within the lifetime of dispensationalist evangelicals today.

This belief in the convergence of Jewish and Christian destinies has attracted many millions of adherents, although the extent to which this trend dominates evangelical discourse is debated. Nevertheless, when Jerry Falwell declared that 'the bible belt is Israel's safety net in the United States' (*Why We're Losing the War on Terror*, p. 16), he was commenting on the coming together of this theological phenomenon with a neoconservative world view in which the responsibility to protect Israel's right to exist has fallen on America. Of course, all this may have been only a fascinating footnote in American religious

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history had not neoconservatism found a willing supporter in George W. Bush and had not Osama bin Laden been so disastrously successful on 11 September 2001. The rise of this messianic strain of thought in the US military has been documented in the *New York Times* (28 February 2009) and it appears that fundamentalist Christianity may have a deep and troubling influence on military affairs. A military focused on a mission other than that mandated by democratic representatives is always a recipe for trouble in the future, especially when that mission links existential and ideological yearnings to an expansionistic security policy.

Militarism, moralism and an abiding faith in economic efficiency, that George Soros and Joseph Stiglitz call market fundamentalism, have deeply etched themselves onto America's Middle East strategy. Rogers looks for a way beyond this morass with his call for a more sustainable security strategy. He argues that current Anglo-American military capabilities are still rooted in cold war strategies and doctrines. Donald Rumsfeld attempted to reorient military thinking towards a technological approach to force projection (think lasers, drones and smart bombs), but the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown the limitations to this approach. As a result, military thinking has fallen back on more traditional approaches to force projection at a time when the challenges of the Twenty-First Century require a radically different understanding of security. Sustainable security is an idea that is gaining some currency. It is rooted in an understanding of security that recognizes the current global shift underway in which socio-economic challenges, climate change and the traditional command and control approach to world leadership that is assumed by the American military–industrial–technological complex will increasingly undermine Western hegemony. Fareed Zakaria, in his provocative new book, has called the 'the rise of the rest', and his work dovetails well with Rogers. Both agree that as control is shown to be illusory, America's position becomes increasingly untenable.[1]

In *Global Security and the War on Terror*, Rogers revisits nearly two decades of his writing over a dozen essays. As with all such retrospectives, the final section, written to synthesize and build upon his progress, is the most interesting. This is not to say that the first 180 pages are for naught, but rather to suggest that those unfamiliar with Rogers' work will benefit the most from these essays. The last section, where he builds upon his central metaphor of illusory control, would have been better if he would have spent more time developing the ways in which military control is becoming elusive and counterproductive given the new realities of globalization, climate change and the growing gap between rich and poor.

For example, what precisely is the illusion of control? Is this an illusion created by technological superiority, by the belief in the infallibility of ideas; by an overreliance on market power, or perhaps it is some combination of the three? Rogers may be forgiven for failing to give a more exact and nuanced discussion of the dynamics of power in this case because in many ways this is a reworking of one of the central themes that runs through the corpus of his research. The essays give adequate example of the technological, strategic and

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policy failures that abound when an empire reaches beyond its direct sphere of control.

The financial crisis places Rogers' two main themes, an out of touch and unsustainable machinery of security, and the illusion of control it produces, under an intense spotlight. In this context, the link between global security and political economy is found in the certain faith in American economic superiority that was the outcome of 'winning' the cold war and riding a decade of massive capital flows that directly benefited the United States, even as they allowed American consumers to put themselves deeper into debt. In an ironic twist, neoliberalism explicitly rejects Keynes' implicit argument in the *General Theory* that the economic system is not a morality play, where prudence and judgement are rewarded and irrationality is disciplined, but rather a technical challenge in which the requirements of a market economy are balanced against the other needs of a society. The new liberalism made of capitalism a religion in which the high priests of finance were assumed to be so deeply immersed in their spiritual exercises that their motivations were beyond scrutiny. It is in the return to a sceptical secular appreciation of the possibilities and perimeters of capitalism that the 'limits of control' thesis resonates most acutely.

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Keynes held that invisible hand is not always dependable, nor can its signals be entirely disregarded. Individual freedom requires well-designed and regulated markets. Markets may not be prior to democratic freedom, but neither can societies that do not allow a significant degree of market openness be considered free. When shorn of its economic complexity, the countercyclical demand management that is the legacy of Keynes is easy to understand – in times of high unemployment, governments should expand demand by deficit spending. When employment rises, governments should pay down the resulting debt. But Keynes also had a deep understanding of the psychological foundations of capitalism, as Akerlof and Shiller show.[2] Capitalist economies, when left to their own devices, trend towards instability because investment decisions are made by what Keynes termed our 'animal spirits'. Irrational exuberance, blind trust in market institutions, and a gambler's willingness to risk large amounts of capital in the certain hope of a windfall are the irrational impulses behind the business cycle.

The collapse of Wall Street bears out Rogers' assessment of the ideological weakness of the Project for a New American Century. Hubris, overreach and irrational exuberance typify both the recent military adventurism and the derivatives fuelled real-estate bubble. In the popular mind, the Bush Administration is often equated with arrogance and 'criminality' but it may be more accurate to compare the overreach of neoconservatism to the irrational exuberance of a market bubble in which it appears that the biased views of the market's biggest boosters are entirely correct. It is only after the bubble bursts that mistaken assumptions are laid bare.

All of this recent history begs the question, is sustainable security possible? Rolling back globalization is not possible, but the creation of strong, distinctive national approaches to economic development, regional security and financial

regulation are now recognized by most experts to be the sine qua non of global governance. Given the illusory nature of the military command and control paradigm, a new formulation of the security question is required. Rogers' work points in the right direction.

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NOTES

1. Fareed Zakaria, *The Post-American World*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2008.
2. George A. Akerlof and Robert J. Shiller, *Animal Spirits: How Human Psychology Drives the Global Economy, and Why it Matters for Global Capitalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009.

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